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KANT'S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Critique of Pure Reason, translated from the German of Immanuel Kant, by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. London; George Bell & Sons, York Street, Covent Garden. 1878.

Works of Thomas Reid, in three volumes. New York. 1882.

KANT originated a system of philosophy which was entirely new to the schools of higher learning. It presented human thought, and the nature of the mind's faculties, under a strange aspect, one under which they were never before viewed by any philosopher; and the novelty of his conception soon gained for his writings the attention of speculative minds in Germany, France, and England. On completing his work, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, with long painstaking industry, he offered, at its conclusion, the result of his venture as the projector of a new theory, to all who might wish to pursue "a scientific method," in preference to "Wolf's dogmatism" and "Hume's skepticism." He assures the inquisitive reader that his own "critical path," though "hitherto an untravelled route," will lead him who follows it to that perfect contentment in the possession of certain truth not before reached by any scientific method.

But Kant's philosophy does not redeem his bright promise; on the contrary, it is another proof how impossible it is for any human ingenuity to contrive a system of science which can be consistent, and at the same time either disregard or contradict well-

known facts and evident first principles. That his works show him to have possessed an extraordinary intellect cannot be justly denied. While it may not happen, perhaps, that mankind will ever finally agree in awarding him the title given him by his enthusiastic admirers, the "Aristotle of modern times," it is quite certain, however, that the learned world will not allow Kant's theories to pass away unanswered and undiscussed, even if it result, in the end, that his doctrine, like that of Spinoza and that of Hume, prove only a negative help to true science.

The obscurity peculiar to all Kant's writings is generally recognized; and this, with the darkness in which his interpreters have enveloped his theories, has helped to give celebrity to the saying, "German philosophy is obscure and incomprehensible." The obscurity which distinguishes Kant's philosophy comes, in part, from his style, which is diffuse and involved; but it results mainly from the impossibility of verifying his doctrine by reflection on what we observe actually to take place in our own minds; for we can discover in ourselves no such thoughts, no such mental operations or processes, as those which he ascribes to the mind. Indeed, Kant admits no one fact, and no one principle, understood precisely according to the manner in which it had been previously understood by mankind in general. The human mind originates no one idea for itself precisely in the manner described by Kant's theory; and it reaches no one scientific conclusion according to the method which he points out. He has changed the supposition of terms, or the meaning of all the words ordinarily employed to signify the mind's primitive conceptions, and uses those terms to express things which no one ever thought before him, and which no one after him can comprehend, or define, except in Kant's own words.[1] In his transcendental logic he may even be said to have given to logical terms, which are terms of the second intention, a sort of third intention. It is not surprising, then, that his captivated interpreters, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, etc., explain his system into conflicting theories of skepticism, transcendental idealism, pantheism, etc., through elaborate volumes of speculation, in which the ingenuous student can scarcely find a thought that is clear, or a proposition that is intelligible.

Kant is more generally understood by impartial readers as teaching a system of philosophy which is reducible to pure subjectivism or idealism; that is, a system which supposes the denial that there is anything real outside of the mind's ideas.

[1] The translator of his work on "Pure Reason" says in his preface: "It is curious to observe in all English works written specially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for a moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering in his own words." Preface, page xii., *note*.

It is not proposed herein to follow Kant's reasoning through all the special subjects or branches of philosophy treated by him; some salient points of his doctrine will suffice to convey a general notion of his system, comprehensive enough for the present aim; which is that of considering it as a method of science, or of philosophical reasoning.

Kant, like Descartes, builds up a system of knowledge beginning absolutely *a priori*, and rejecting as "mere dogmatism" all previously admitted principles with the conclusions derived from them, and even all primitive facts, as previously understood and assented to; because those principles and facts, he maintained, are only assumptions, without due critical proof or explanation. His own presupposition, by way of fundamental "dogma," is, that science or philosophy must be completely originated *a priori*, by the mind for itself, without the concurrence of objects known; hence, objects can have no existence outside of the mind's ideas, for it must be assumed that in so far as they are things known, they are produced by those ideas. By "*a priori* ideas of pure reason" he seems to mean ideas which have reason alone for their primitive and total cause; they thus precede experience, and, under that aspect, they are also styled transcendental ideas.

It is not possible for us to conceive how a dependent or created intellect can thus be the absolute and total cause of its own knowledge and the objects known by it; for we attribute such a mode of knowing objects, by creating those objects, only to the infinite mind of God. The divine intellect is the cause of objects created conformable to archetypal and absolutely transcendental ideas. Hence all created things are related to the divine intellect as that which is measured to its measure; or as the effect is related to its cause; but knowledge of objects is produced in the created intellect by the concurrent influence both of the object and of the faculty. Man's intellect, considered in itself and *a priori*, is undetermined to this or that act; it must be determined to its act by the object of that act duly presented to the intellect. It is not correct argument to lay down the principle, "no object can exist independently of intelligence," and conclude "therefore the human intellect produces the objects of its own ideas." It is true that no object can exist independently of divine intelligence; but objects exist whether they be known to man's intellect or not. But how must we conceive the *a priori* ideas of pure reason to originate in the mind according to Kant's theory? Some of his interpreters explain his meaning to be that those ideas are infused into the mind naturally, or that they are innate; others, with Fichte, contend that these ideas are produced by the spontaneous, natural action of the intellect itself, determining itself to act without help or influence from ob-

jects, or any extrinsic cause; for Kant attributes to the intellect a peculiar spontaneity of action.[1]

The most completely self-determining power in man is his will, when acting freely; but even then it cannot act without the concurrence of an object as end intended. Just as it is absolutely impossible for a non-existent body to move itself from a state of mere possibility into actual and real existence by its own virtue or action, so is it impossible for the reason to pass from the state of merely possible act into that of positive action, without any determining influence from an extrinsic cause.[2] A created agent is not absolutely sufficient for itself, and for its own action; it is only the First Cause that is the absolute principle of its own action.

Fichte goes so far as to assert that the intellect, or its idea, produces itself; but this includes a supposition which destroys itself, since it implies that one and the same being is the cause of itself, and the effect of itself. The divine ideas are absolutely *a priori* eternal, and are thus transcendental; but for that very reason those ideas are unproduced, or they were never preceded by a state of non-existence. The assertion that man's ideas are absolutely *a priori* and transcendental, and that they produce their own objects, and thus transcend all experience, is to use language that is incomprehensible, unless we identify the human and the divine modes of knowing truth, which is not to be done, as is evident.

Kant's *Criticism of Pure Reason* has for its aim to show how the reason as *pure*, or as independent of all experience, produces *a priori* its own ideas, and the principles by which we can know objects when their phenomena are presented to the mind.[3] Not, however, that it thereby knows real external objects, for they are unknowable; only phenomena are known, and phenomena have no real existence except in the mind's faculties. The objects which reason knows are furnished by the *a priori* ideas, not by any realities external to the mind. Pure reason forms out of its *a priori* ideas, by means of analysis, universal ideas or judgments; they

[1] As when he says: "Transcendental Logic," i, p. 45: "We call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, *understanding*."

[2] "Nihil reducitur de potentia in actum nisi per aliquod ens actu." P. i., qu. 79, a. 3 in C.

"De potentia non potest aliquid reduci in actum nisi per aliquod in actu." 1 P., qu. 2, a, 3 in C.

"A thing cannot be reduced from the potential or possible state into the actual state except by something else which is itself actual or in action."

"Omne quod exit de potentia in actum potest dici pati; etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati." P. i., qu. 49, a, 1, ed. 2.

"Everything that passes out of the potential or possible state into the actual state, can be said to suffer, or receive, and this even when it is perfected thereby, and thus for our own intellect to act is to *suffer*."

[3] "Idea of Transcendental Logic," I., where he explains the understanding as the "Spontaneity of Cognition."

are deduced analytically from the essences expressed by *a priori* ideas. These judgments thus formed have necessity and universality; and twelve of them have the office of categories.

The schoolmen[1] taught, with Aristotle, that man's intellect knows primarily and directly the universal; it knows the singular material thing secondarily and reflexly. Berkeley and Hume hold that the mind knows only its own impressions and ideas, and that it does not know objects or things external to them at all; Kant agrees in this opinion with Hume and Berkeley.

Aristotle's categories are founded on real objects, which they classify into ten families or supreme genera; Kant's twelve categories are *a priori* abstractions which, as he asserts, determine their objects. Aristotle's categories are made by their objects; Kant's categories make their objects.

Kant's categories, which he describes as *a priori* forms or ideas by which the mind knows objects of intuition, are of four classes; first class, of quantity, unity, plurality, totality; second class, of quality, reality, negation, limitation; third, of relation, substantiality, causality, community (reciprocity between agent and patient); fourth, of modality, possibility, existence, necessity.—*Transcendental Logic*, sect. iii., Categories, p. 64.[2]

Aristotle's categories, which are classes of real things, are: substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion (action received), place, time, posture, habiliment or thing possessed. Aristotle's post-predicaments are not supplementary categories, as Kant asserts; they are merely modifications, consequent to real things as constituted into the categories; but they are not themselves distinct genera of real things; they are opposition, priority, simultaneity, motion and mode of possession. These are not distinct kinds of realities, but only modifications of real things.

Kant teaches that the category, *substance*, for example, is an *a priori* or a transcendental deduction of reason from its own *a priori* conceptions; that is, such object is antecedent to experience, and is not furnished by experience, as are the objects of Aristotle's ten categories. Hence, when the mind knows an object, say, this tree, which it judges to be a substance, the "substance" which it attributes to the tree exists only as a category or object of a universal idea in the reason; we cannot even know that a "substance" is possible outside of the mind's idea; for "beyond the sphere of phenomena all is mere void."[3]

[1] P. i., qu. 86, a. 1: "Singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest . . . Intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium . . . quod a materia individuali abstrahitur est universale."

[2] "It is only by these categories the mind can render the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition." Ibid.

[3] "Analytic of Principles," ch. iii.; "Division of all objects into phenomena and noumena."

His theory is that all scientific knowledge consists of two elements or constituents; one is an *a priori* idea of pure reason, or, what is here the same thing, a category, which is an *a priori* judgment; the other element is a synthesis, or a synthetical judgment, furnished by experience; and experience is the same thing as intuition, whether the intuition be consciousness[1] or sensation. A judgment composed of these two elements, the *a priori* and the synthetical constituents, is what Kant styles a "synthetical judgment *a priori*;" and he maintains that such judgments are the only ones which augment our knowledge. For analysis, by which we deduce a predicate from an essence, adds nothing to our knowledge, he tells us, since the predicate was included in what was already known; as "a part is less than the whole," such analysis teaches us nothing of that "whole" not previously known. But synthesis, as "bodies are heavy," teaches us something not previously known by merely knowing the essence, for it is not of the essence of bodies to be "heavy." Hence, synthesis augments knowledge; analysis of an essence does not.

It seems certain and evident, however, that to deduce a predicate from an essence in which it was not previously known to be contained, is to augment knowledge; just as, despite Locke's assertion that "the syllogism is not a means of discovering truth," to deduce a conclusion from premises not previously known as containing it is to "discover truth." Knowledge is truly and properly augmented by each of these operations.

But how, in Kant's theory, is an empirical or synthetical judgment formed? How does the mind acquire experience of things represented through sensation? The answer is, sensation gives or represents in the imagination a "manifold," that is, sensation represents, say, a tree, or a lawn, not as one distinct total, but as a confused collection of particulars or points. Then consciousness and the understanding have an intuition of that confused "manifold" or collection of particulars, and are thereby enabled to reduce this representation to "synthetical unity" in a judgment affirming the object.[2] This is experience, or it is thus the empirical element of knowledge is acquired.

But neither the representations of objects in a "manifold" nor the synthesis of the "manifold" furnished by sensation would be possible he tells us, unless we concede to the imagination two

[1] "In Transcendental Logic," I., p. 45, he distinguishes intuition as pure, or without sensation, and intuition as empirical, as having sensation from the presence of an object.

[2] "It is necessary for the mind to make its ideas sensuous, that is, to join the object to them in intuition, and to make its intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under ideas. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without ideas blind."—"*Transcendental Logic*" I., p. 46.

a priori transcendental forms or principles, namely, time and space. These forms are only in the imagination; for time and space have no existence outside of the imagination.[1] They are the formal principles in sensation, and impression is the material principle or the occasion. They are necessary for representing objects, since there must be succession in time, and relation of parts in space, for objects to be imaged at all. But these conditions or principles, time and space, are furnished by the imagination, they are not in or of objects external to the mind.

The next operation of the mind is the one by which knowledge is made perfect; and it consists in combining together the *a priori* judgment and the synthesis or synthetical unity acquired by means of experience. The *a priori* judgments of pure reason which the mind thus applies to the synthetical conceptions furnished by experience are the twelve categories.

It may be seen, from what has been thus far said, that Kant proposes to explain theoretically, and to prove absolutely anew, even the primitive truths which the human mind has hitherto accepted on their own self-evidence as neither requiring nor admitting proof, because themselves first principles. He aims to go beyond those first truths, and to show how all knowledge is ultimately the product of *pure reason*, and how reason gives, even to the empirical object represented, what it takes back from that object; and thus that all science, in the last analysis, has a purely subjective origin. He does hypothetically admit the possibility of an external objective order; that is, if it be necessary "to explain the possibility of experience;" but he denies that the noumena, or objective reality of that order, is knowable. He gives what he styles a "refutation of idealism;" but his argument is found by all that read it to be obscure and unintelligible; it is entirely *a priori*, and from the subjective side of the question, for it is a radical principle of his theory that objects must conform to the ideas of them in reason (preface to second edition, xxi., where he insists on this point). The total reason of all truth in the mind must be found, according to Kant's system, in the mind's own idea, not in anything extrinsic to those ideas; "inasmuch as the object, as in the case of right and

[1] "We have intended then to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena, that the things which we intuite are not the same as our representation of them in intuition; nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relation of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves, disappear, and that these, as phenomena, can not exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of receiving them," etc.—"*Transcendental Æsthetic*," sec. 9.

wrong, is not to be discovered out of the conception."[1] Or, as he expresses the relation of ideas to their objects (*Principles of Pure Understanding*, sect. ii., p. 117): "The possibility of experience is that which gives objective reality[2] to all our *a priori* cognitions." The object, therefore, derives its reality from the cognition of it in such case; the cognition does not depend on the object. But this is not to refute idealism, it is to defend idealism.

After the understanding has combined the "manifold of sensation" into a synthesis or whole, reason then applies to that synthesis the corresponding category, for example, the category "cause;" and this is done by "subsuming" the particular synthesis under the category, which gives to reason a "synthetical judgment *a priori*." Mathematics, all science, all genuine metaphysics contain these synthetical *a priori* judgments or propositions; and, as before said, it is only such judgments that augment knowledge. Hence, such synthetical *a priori* judgment consists of two elements or constituents; namely, the category, which is an *a priori* judgment of pure reason;[3] and the empirical judgment, which is a synthesis from experience or intuition.

We may be helped towards conceiving what Kant perhaps here means by his "synthetical judgment *a priori*," if we translate it into more familiar terms, and style it a "mixed judgment," or a "direct universal," understanding a direct universal to signify the same thing in this case as a simple universal applied to a particular included under it.

A judgment which is synthetical in its primitive origin, however, could not be formed by reason, since reason would not know its subject and predicate as separate, before making their synthesis. Either the intellect first knows the subject and predicate as separate, and then combines them into this synthetical judgment, or it does not first know them as separate; if it does first know subject and predicate separately, then the synthetical judgment

[1] "Antinomy of Pure Reason," sec. iv.: "In the general principles of moral there can be nothing uncertain, for the propositions are either utterly without meaning or must originate solely in our rational conceptions."—Ibid., p. 299.

[2] He often insists on this notion, as in "Transcendental Dialectic," bk. i., sect. ii., p. 225: "Pure conceptions *a priori* represent objects antecedently to all experience."

[3] Kant aims to prove in his "Transcendental Logic," sect. 18, that in cognition the only legitimate use of the category is its application to objects of experience (p. 90). By "subsuming" a synthetical judgment under the category, he means simply the connecting of a particular with the universal, by way of minor premise, in order to make an inference. For example, "The sum of the angles in the rectilinear triangle is equal to two right angles; A is a rectilinear triangle," etc. Here the triangle A is *subsumed* under the general truth, in Kant's use of the term. "If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general, and if the general be certain *in se*, and given, it is only necessary that the judgment should subsume the particular under the general, the particular being thus necessarily determined."—"*Transcendental Dialectic*," appendix.

a priori does not really differ from any other synthetical judgment. If the intellect does not know subject and predicate separately, or before knowing them as conjoined in a judgment, in that case the intellect does not form the judgment at all, and consequently such judgment would not be a rational operation. Judgments not formed by the intellect, as affirming or denying predicate of subject, must needs be infused, or be naturally implanted by way of instinct, as are instinctive judgments in brute animals. It is certain that brutes can practically discriminate between some objects as good and harmful to them; and it is equally certain that they are unable to know the subject and predicate of a proposition, or synthesize them into a judgment. Kant seems to regard the judgment in question as primitively, or *a priori*, a synthesis. Yet all the judgments of human reason are comparative; the human intellect can form no judgment unless by first apprehending subject and predicate separately, and then comparing and conjoining them. What answer, then, must be given to Kant's question, which, he tells us, "proposes the great problem of pure reason,"[1] namely, "How are synthetical judgments, *a priori* possible?" He himself gives no intelligible or satisfactory answer to the question.

Kant contends that Hume was correct in denying the possibility of knowing cause, as inferred from an observed fact as effect, for the reason that there is no "medium," no "interposed idea," which can certainly found such inference. But when Hume concludes, with universality, that all our knowledge of real cause and effect is "merely the customary experience of constant conjunction," Kant finds Hume thereby to show that he failed to conceive the whole problem, namely, "how is a synthetical judgment *a priori* possible in such case?"[2]

Kant answers that we know such cause and its effects in "a synthetical judgment *a priori*," or by a mixed judgment. But, as this is not explicitly to answer Hume's denial of any assignable medium, or "interposed idea," through which the inference of cause from its observed effect is made, Kant proceeds to ascertain that medium:[3] "Now what is this *tertium quid* that is to be the medium of all synthetical judgments? It is a complex in which all our representations are contained; internal sense, to wit, and its form, time." This, then, is the *tertium quid*, third thing, or medium, in which,

[1] Introduction, sec. vi.

[2] "Hume could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding must, nevertheless, be thought as necessarily connected in the object; and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experience in which its objects were presented to it."—*Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*, p. 78.

[3] Analytic of Principles, sec. ii., p. 117.

according to Kant, the *a priori* principle and the synthetical principle meet, and by which they are united into a synthetical judgment, *a priori;* with this medium the mind is able to connect cause, which lies outside of its effect, with that effect, so as to make the tie or synthesis of the two.

But this answer is mere fanciful theorizing; and, moreover, it is based on what is not true as a fact; because, even if we perceive in our minds such "complex," we do not employ any purely subjective medium in deducing a cause from its effect. Instead of answering Hume's statement, which, though false, is not obscure, Kant merely involves both the point in question and his own peculiar synthetic judgment in more complete darkness.

His most intelligible statement, perhaps, as to what is this medium of the synthetical judgment, *a priori*, is contained in his "Conclusion of Transcendental Æsthetics," p. 44. But that, too, is purely speculative theorizing, not founded on fact; and it does not explain what we see to be the operation of our own minds when we infer cause from its observed effect. He returns to this fundamental principle of his theory, by which he entirely shuts out from the mind the real objective order, in *Transcendental Principles*, conclusion, p. 174, where, like one striving to reconcile the inconsistencies of a false story, he only burdens his previous assertions with new incongruities.[1]

As heretofore seen, the medium, or this *tertium quid*, by which we truly deduce causes from their effects, first observed as facts, is the real relation between them which we discover; and this real relation is something objective, not a mere conception of the mind itself.

It is true that we do not know real cause and its effect as intrinsically and essentially connected with each other, for this would be to know such cause and effect *a priori* as they are primordially known only to infinite intelligence, which is presupposed both to the cause and its effect. Our knowledge of them is *a posteriori*, or from the objects, for we know them by way of related facts or realities; and the principle of causation, which is first acquired by us analytically as a necessary and universal judgment, furnishes

[1] Kant makes a remark (Transcendental Doctrine of Method, ch. 3, p. 510), which, perhaps, has reference to this medium between the *a priori* principle, or category, and empirical element related to it: "Even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements of our cognition, the one completely *a priori*, and the other *a posteriori;* and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and with it the just idea of a science, has never been established." This seems to be a surrender to Hume, whose skepticism is based on the assumption that there is no medium or bond of relationship between any cause and its effect which can ever be known with certainty; a doctrine which it is the avowed claim of Kant to have refuted with his "synthetical judgment *a priori*."

the absolute major premise, whether it be expressed or only implied, when we infer a cause from its observed effect.

It could be conceded to Kant, however, that the mind's inference of cause from its observed effect furnishes a synthetical judgment, *a priori*, in the sense that such judgment includes both a particular and a necessary universal element as absolute major principle; but the medium of inference, as said, is, in all cases, the real relation of the effect and its cause. The medium founding such inference perplexed Kant much; and he states the difficulty also in his introduction (iv.), where he defines the analytical and synthetical judgments. His error is in assuming that such medium must be purely ideal and subjective, or that it must be sought for in the mind alone, and not in the objects. The true reason why a cause is formally and really such is in the cause or object itself as presupposed to our knowledge, or our ideas of it; and therefore our knowledge of a cause must proceed fundamentally from the object, not from any merely subjective affection, or pure figment of the mind.

It has been suggested that Kant borrowed the ideal of his "synthetical judgment *a priori*" from Dr. Reid. The peculiar judgments attributed to the mind by Dr. Reid, supposed to be the original copied by Kant, are described in vol. ii., essay vi., chap. i., of Dr. Reid's works. He says there may be judgment which "is a solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it by affirmation or denial is not at all essential to it. . . . . Our judgments of this kind are purely the gift of nature, nor do they admit of any improvement by culture. Nature has subjected us to them, whether we will or not . . . . . Philosophers have never been able to give any definition of judgment which does not apply to the determinations of our senses, our memory, and consciousness, nor any definition of simple apprehension which can comprehend these determinations." He restricts these judgments, however, to "persons come to the years of understanding." He admits, also, that "judgment is an act of the mind, specifically different from simple apprehension, or the bare conception of a thing." He should have admitted, moreover, that there can be no judgment without affirmation or denial; or, what comes to the same, there can be no judgment without comparison of subject and predicate, and assent or dissent as to their agreement.

Dr. Reid seems not to have distinguished duly between the mind's obvious first judgment of what is evident by way of primitive fact and the act by which the intellect simply apprehends, or has "a bare conception." While analysis, synthesis, and judgment may be required to form our first clear conceptions, both of incomplex things, as "being, one, essence," etc., and of sensible objects,

yet it does not thence follow, as Reid assumes, that such sensible objects cannot afterwards be apprehended by the intellect without a judgment. The intellect can readily either apprehend or judge when objects previously known are presented by "the senses, memory, or consciousness;" it can apprehend even a complex object, as a judgment; and it can thus apprehend a judgment without making that judgment its own act, or without affirming or denying the agreement of its subject and predicate. But obvious first judgments of things, evident by way of primitive facts, are not "solitary acts of the mind." They are comparative judgments, which affirm or deny connection of subject and predicate. Reid's "judgments, which are purely the gift of nature," which are "solitary acts of the mind," would not give logical truth to the intellect, since they would not be comparative judgments, and would not explicitly include either composition or division; indeed, they would not express formal truth in the mind any more than the instinctive appreciation or *quasi* judgment of sensible things expresses formal truth in the brute's faculties.[1]

Kant must have weighed all these objections to Reid's "judgment of nature," which is "a solitary act of the mind;" for Kant's "synthetical judgment *a priori*" includes, as he often tells us, the synthesis of subject and predicate, made somehow, *a priori*, by "pure reason." His embarrassment is to ascertain and assign the medium, or the nexus of predicate and subject, which must be seen by the intellect when it forms this incomprehensible judgment. If the medium is something learned empirically, then the judgment is purely synthetical; if the medium be known only *a priori* then the judgment is purely analytical. He seeks for a mixed or dual principle, that will account both for the synthetical and the *a priori* character of such judgments.

It is not easy to conceive how all mathematical judgments are synthetical, as asserted by Kant, especially if we accept his own definition of the synthetical judgment, in which he describes it as one attributing to a subject or essence a predicate which lies entirely outside of that subject or essence; as, for example, "bodies gravitate." It is true that he subsequently amends this definition so as to include the case in which a mathematical predicate implicitly or logically contained in the subject is attributed to that subject, though not explicitly known by merely knowing the es-

[1] There is inchoative but imperfect formal truth in the intellect's simple apprehensions; but yet, as St. Thomas says, p. 1, qu. 16, a, 2, truth is in such acts as in things, it is formal truth properly so called only in judgments of composition or division: "Veritas quidem potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente."

sence itself, which predicate, however, is found by analysis.[1] But no explanation can do away with the obvious fact that all purely mathematical conclusions are properly and truly analytical judgments, and are learned by means of analysis.

It seems true that the mind never employs analysis, which, under all respects, excludes synthesis, as Aristotle implies, *Posterior Analytics*, bk. ii., ch. 9, where he says: "It is manifestly necessary that primary things become known to us by induction," which includes experience. But yet, the final inference in the example given by Kant, that $7 + 5 = 12$, or that "a straight line is the shortest distance between two given points," is analytical, though it is a judgment of composition; and his reasoning merely shows at the most that some synthesis must precede this judgment and help towards it. Yet the two operations, synthesis and analysis, are here distinct from each other, and therefore they do not so combine as to constitute one composite operation, which is a "synthetical judgment," *a priori*.

The absolutely necessary, he asserts, is out of and beyond the world, or the "cosmological;" it is not an object of experience or intuition, nor can it be concluded from the world. But this is not logically correct, for the necessary can be validly deduced, *a posteriori*, from the contingent. "Supreme Being is a mere ideal of speculative reason," he says; yet, though "a mere ideal," he concedes that it is a faultless one for its theoretical uses. "Necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves, they are merely subjective, or are of ideas."[2] In this language, again, it may be seen how universally Kant denies all reality which is external to the idea. If objects external to the ideas of reason have neither contingency nor necessity, then they have no reality; they become, as Fichte would say, merely "things posited by reason," for all conceivable real things must, as a fact, be either necessary or contingent; and, consequently, if there be no real things that are contingent, nor any that are necessary, then there are no real things at all, since there is no medium between the necessary and the contingent.

Kant concludes his work, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, with a treatise on the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method*, in which he explains his "architectonic of all cognition," or how all science may be systematized into a high philosophy, based on principles of an upper pure reason, which, it would appear, transcend all his other transcendentals. He says: "It is possible to frame an architectonic of all human cognition, the formation of which, at the present time,

[1] Transcendental Æsthetic, § 9. Also, Transcendental Doctrine of Method, chap. 1, sec. 1.

[2] Transcendental Dialectic, bk. ii., chap. iii., sec. 5, p. 378.

considering the immense material collected, or to be found in the ruins of old systems, would not, indeed, be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the architectonic of all cognition given by *pure reason*. By *reason* I understand here the whole high faculty of cognition, the *rational* being, placed in contradistinction to the *empirical*."

He then proceeds to construct this "architectonic of all human cognition" by giving each branch of science its proper place in the edifice. Logic, Natural Philosophy, or Physics and Mathematics, he maintains, are not philosophy; they are merely instruments used by the philosopher. He distinguishes philosophy as historical, or philosophy as learned from a teacher, but not understood scientifically and in its principles; and as rational, or philosophy which is understood in its principles, its conclusions being seen as apodictic, or demonstratively true. But if philosophy be considered as something objective, or in itself, it is an archetype which has never been reached yet. Reason can philosophize, he tells us, and thereby tend to that archetype as to "a possible science," but cannot certainly reach it.

Also, philosophy as cosmical is the teleology of reason, or it gives the ultimate end of reason. That final end of reason, or its ultimate perfect state, is, as yet, something ideal. When reached or realized by reason, then the philosopher can legislate for human reason, or give the entire law of rational knowledge. Finally, philosophy is either propedeutic, that is, critical and explanatory of pure reason; or, it is metaphysical, including metaphysics of nature and ethics. The metaphysics of nature comprehends all pure rational principles and all theoretical cognition; understanding, as regards such theoretical cognition, that the theory itself is founded on pure *a priori* ideas or principles. Ethics contains all the principles which determine *a priori* and necessitate all action. Ethics is philosophy which is purely *a priori;* hence, it is not based upon anthropological considerations, nor, indeed, upon any empirical matter. Ethics supposes, as a fundamental truth, the will's necessary tendency to good as its object; but the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God, are not demonstrable, though they may be admitted as presuppositions for theoretical convenience. The whole system of metaphysics includes four principal parts, namely: ontology, rational physiology, rational cosmology, and rational theology.

The argument of Kant's entire work is briefly this: "Granted that pure reason originates for itself *a priori* all its universal ideas, and that time and space exist only as *a priori* forms or principles, which determine representations in the imagination; then all my system follows as a necessary conclusion."

But neither does he deduce a congruous system from his supposed first principles, nor are his first principles themselves true; and thus it happens that, by repudiating all first principles and all primitive facts, as previously understood by the human mind, Kant has built up, *a priori*, a theory which does not defend one proposition, peculiar to itself, that is simply true when viewed under all respects. Nor is this assertion too sweeping, since the human mind has no such ideas, and no such principles, as those on which he bases his entire system, and from which he derives all his conclusions. It is not too much to say, furthermore, that no distinguished philosopher before Kant's day had ever gone so far as he went into that arbitrary and gratuitous "dogmatism" which he full often censures in his predecessors. On his own "dogmatic" assumptions he founds a theory of man, of the world, and of God, which does away with the objective reality of them all, and reduces all real truths to a maze of *a priori* abstractions, to a mere barren and meaningless idealism, which is more completely unfounded than that of Berkeley, or than was the skepticism of Pyrrho. Kant affirms neither the existence of God nor the immortality of the soul. His theory incloses man's soul in himself, where it is to become learned without seeing any real truth; where it has no object to know except the unrealities of a blind idealism. The student, educated entirely according to this ideal, must soon come to see his own life as aimless, and even existence itself as without purpose. If he looks upon the dreary and perplexed theories of his own subjective philosophy, he finds only ideas with which nothing, no object, is thought. What wonder if his spirit then sink down within him, baffled and hopeless!

Some few salient principles of Kant's ideal philosophy, which are above briefly considered in this article, are: 1. Pure reason has various *a priori* transcendental ideas not derived from objects external to them; 2. The imagination has two *a priori* forms or ideas, space and time, which do not exist outside of that faculty; 3. Phenomenon is from impression, but it is only subjective; and the forms of the imagination, space and time, are the active determining principles that give existence to all representations in the imagination, the impressions being the matter or the occasion; 4. The mind acquires scientific truth only by means of synthetical judgments *a priori*, the synthesis alone being augmentative of knowledge; all mathematical judgments are synthetical *a priori*; 5. The medium through which a synthetical judgment *a priori* is inferred, as, when cause is inferred from an observed fact or effect, is purely subjective, is obscure and is undefined in Kant's system; 6. The mind knows nothing of external things beyond phenomena, and *a priori* ideas or judgments are the only means by which phe-

nomena can be manifested to the mind; 7. Objects must conform to our cognitions, for intelligence and ideas are presupposed to all their objects; 8. The noumena, or the objects from which phenomena proceed, are unknowable.

Since the human mind knows naturally, and by way of primitive facts, both that the external objects around us are realities, and that time and space are things independent of man's imagination, this article will not be lengthened with arguments adduced to refute Kant's "mere dogmatism" in gratuitously denying these evident truths.

A complete exposition of Kant's *Criticism of Pure Reason* could not be made within the small compass of a few pages. It is intended herein merely to convey some notion of that author's philosophical method, which may prove useful to the student who wishes to read for himself the influential writings of this distinguished founder of a new school in speculative philosophy.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK THE SECOND.

Part First.

AS the same landscape, surveyed from different points of view, necessarily presents different aspects, so any period of history must be differently viewed by students of history in succeeding centuries. Moreover, as from a lofty eminence a wide prospect may be surveyed and relations between its parts detected which closer proximity would hide, so the progress of historical science gives breadth of view and often reveals before-unsuspected connections between familiar facts which may thus gain a new significance.

Historical finality is, then, impossible to us, and many an important act of the great drama of human history must needs be again and again described, in the light afforded both by the acquisition of new data and by the removal of old overshadowing prejudices. This is especially the case with respect to such periods as form critical epochs in human evolution, or which have been the battle-fields of opposing political and religious beliefs.

One of the consoling facts of the present time is the comparative justice of most of our historical writers compared with those of the preceding century, as is conspicuously apparent in their treatment of the history of the Middle Ages.

Now, of those ages it is the thirteenth which has come to be regarded as that which witnessed the culmination of a political and social civilization emphatically Christian. It is true that not only then, but in the Middle Ages generally, the Christian revelation—that is, the authority of the Church—was officially recognized as the true and proper guide of public, no less than of private, life, throughout that comity of nations which then formally merited the denomination of "*Christendom*." It is also true that not a little may be advanced in favor of the Christian pre-eminence either of the twelfth or of the eleventh century. Nevertheless, it is the century which beheld the reigns of Innocent III., St. Louis, and St. Ferdinand, which was distinguished by the establishment of the great Franciscan and Dominican orders, and which closed with the Knights Templars still in possession of their commanderies, that has not without reason been generally accepted as the typical age of Christian supremacy.

According to the ideas prevalent in that age, the world was to be conjointly governed by two supreme powers: by the Pope in all things spiritual, and by the Roman Emperor in matters temporal. It is, then, in the relations existing between the popes and the emperors that we have the key to the general history of the period. On account, however, of the short duration of many pontificates, and because the life of Frederick the Second extended through the first half of the thirteenth century, it will be convenient to make use of the history of this emperor as a means of depicting the condition of the world generally during that most eventful half-century.

There are three other considerations which invite our attention to the career of the second Frederick. These are: (1) The remarkable character of the man himself—the so-called wonder of the world; (2) The fact that his career occasioned the first appearance of evils which did not show their full deformity till three centuries later. The lurid light thrown by the conflagration of the sixteenth century upon events of the thirteenth, which prepared the way for that calamity, makes plain to us how well-justified were certain actions of mediæval Popes which have been ignorantly or inconsiderately reprobated. (3) The third consideration which lends interest to the biography we propose to sketch out, is the tendency which exists amongst both Catholics and non-Catholics to regard our own time as one of exceptional anti-Catholic triumph. Recent sacrileges, persecutions, and defections from the faith have induced a depression on the part of some churchmen, and an exultation on the part of the Church's enemies, which are, both of them, alike unreasonable. A study of the history of Frederick the Second is well fitted to correct this unreasonableness, by showing how great were the religious evils which existed in that "age of faith," and thus bringing home to us the greatness and solidity of the religious gains we now enjoy, in what many persons too hastily deem to be an "age of infidelity."

Frederick the Second was born on the 26th of December, 1194, and with that date our story begins.

It will be well, however, before beginning that story, to take a somewhat preliminary survey of the condition of the civilized world at his birth, and especially to note such antecedents of his empire, his kingdoms, and his ancestry, both male and female, as may enable the reader to understand the meaning of the various facts to be afterwards related. Without a preliminary comprehension of such introductory matters, a survey of the multifarious transactions of his reign would hardly instruct, but rather bewilder, the reader. The plan, which it appears most reasonable here to pursue, is to begin with the series of Supreme Pontiffs, to follow on

with a brief summary of Frederick's imperial predecessors, and with notices concerning those countries included within their empire. The countries external to that empire should next come under review, and, finally, his maternal ancestors, with the domains which acknowledged their sway.

The Popes.

By briefly surveying the series of Supreme Pontiffs for about a century and a half before Frederick's birth, we shall possess ourselves, as it were, of a continuous thread of history, whereby we may subsequently connect together all the historical facts to which reference will have to be made.

The long line of the Popes, after various alternations of eminence and insignificance, with many examples of distinguished piety, and some sad cases of lamentable demerit, may, for our present purpose, be considered from the Pontificate of the illustrious and saintly German, Leo IX., although the names of some earlier Pontiffs will have to be incidentally mentioned in noticing the earlier of the Roman Emperors after Charlemagne.

Leo IX. was designated Pope in the year 1048 by his powerful kinsman, the Emperor Henry III. He, none the less, however, but rather more, submitted himself to the election of the Romans, an act to be expected of one so jealous for all that was canonically regular and from so stout an opponent of simony and all unworthy conduct on the part of clerics. In the first days of his Pontificate, Leo visited the great abbey of Clugny, and thence brought with him to Rome the renowned monk, Hildebrand,[1] whom he made sub-dean and treasurer of the Holy See. Leo had to do with some of the remote maternal ancestors of Frederick the Second, namely, with certain Northmen, or Normans, who had not long before appeared in Southern Italy. In contending with them he fought and lost, in 1053, the battle known as the battle of Civitella. After becoming their prisoner, he, in 1059, accepted their chief, Robert Guiscard, as his vassal Duke of Apulia, and thus gave him legal power and status.

Pope Leo, after receiving from the Emperor the duchy of Beneventum, died in 1054, and was succeeded by Victor II. and Stephen IX., whose Pontificates together lasted but four years, throughout which the influence of Hildebrand prevailed, as it also did through that of their successor, Nicholas II., who reigned from 1058 to 1061. Nicholas is renowned, amongst other things, for restricting the right of electing the Sovereign Pontiffs to Cardinals only (of whom Hildebrand was one), and for his efforts to enforce

[1] Hildebrand had been chaplain to a preceding Pontiff, Gregory VI.

clerical celibacy—efforts which encountered much opposition in Northern Italy. Upon the death of Nicholas, the North-Italian prelates elected (in spite of the new law as to Papal elections) an Antipope of their own, while the Cardinals at Rome canonically elected Alexander II., whose power was successfully maintained in spite of the efforts of the then Emperor to support the Antipope. On the death of Alexander in 1073, Hildebrand was elected Pope, and, as Gregory VII., carried on that well-known struggle with the Emperor Henry IV. which led to the besieging of the Pope in the Castle of St. Angelo, to his rescue by Robert Guiscard above mentioned, and to his retreat to Salerno, where he died in 1085. This great Pope was, as every one knows, zealously supported by the powerful Matilda, known as "the great Countess." She was daughter and heiress of Boniface, Count of Tuscany, and she had given up to the Pope her wide domains during her lifetime, reserving to herself only a life interest. She was no less a supporter of Gregory's successors, Victor III. (1086–1087), Urban II. (1088–1099), and Pascal II. (1099–1118), who were all duly elected by the Cardinals without imperial interference, and who zealously carried forward the policy of the great Hildebrand. Urban II. was the Pope who promoted the first Crusade. After the very short reign of Gelasius II. (1118–1119) came Calixtus II. (1119–1124), who, in the year before his death, terminated the long strife about investitures by the celebrated Concordat of Worms. By that treaty the Emperor renounced the manifest abuse of giving investiture of Episcopal temporalities by unmistakably spiritual symbols—the ring and crosier—while his right to receive homage from newly appointed Bishops for their lands was recognized, the sceptre only being made use of to bestow investiture of them. During this Pontificate the Holy See became legally entitled to the domains of the Countess Matilda through her death, though possession of them was far from being attained.

The next Pontiff, Honorius II., who reigned from 1124 to 1130, and who directly intervened in the election of the Emperor (Lothair), received from him an engagement expressly to exclude ecclesiastical affairs from the matters respecting which Bishops had to take an oath of allegiance. The Emperor also engaged to yield up to the Holy See the lands of Matilda, and to solicit Papal sanction for his election, recognizing that sanction as a condition essential to its validity. The next Pope, Innocent II. (1130–1143), further secured the recognition of the important regulation that no bishop should be invested with his temporalities before his consecration. He had long to contend with two Antipopes—Anaclet II. and Victor IV.—and towards the close of his reign there broke out that revolutionary movement of Arnold of Brescia, which troubled the

very short Pontificates of his two successors, Celestine II. and Lucius II., the latter of whom actually lost his life, in 1145, in a revolutionary tumult. To these two Pontiffs succeeded the pious Cistercian monk known as Eugenius III. (1145–1153), who, though unable to enter Rome for his consecration and subsequently compelled to take refuge in France, yet regained, in 1149, possession of the Holy City, though only by a compromise with the so-called Republic. It was he who caused St. Bernard to preach the second Crusade. The next Pope, Anastasius IV., was but the very short-lived predecessor of the only English Pope who has as yet been chosen—Cardinal Nicholas Breakspeare of St. Albans. He took the name of Hadrian IV., reigned from 1154 to 1159, and is noted for his supposed action respecting Ireland and Henry II. of England. Wishing to restore the full temporal jurisdiction of the Holy See (which had lapsed under his predecessors), he excommunicated Arnold of Brescia, laid Rome under an interdict, and retired to Orvieto. These actions led to the expulsion of Arnold by the Romans themselves, followed by his recapture and death in the early morning on the day of an imperial coronation in the subdued but still tumultuous city. Next came the illustrious and energetic Alexander III. (1160–1181), during whose Pontificate there were no less than three Antipopes, who styled themselves Victor IV., Pascal III., and Calixtus III., respectively, as will be more fully noted in speaking of the simultaneous Imperial rule. To Alexander there succeeded Cardinal Ubaldo di Ostia, called Lucius III. (1181–1185), and afterwards came Uberto Crivelli (a Milanese), who took the title of Urban III., and is said to have died of grief, in 1187, at the loss of Jerusalem by the Christians. The next Pontiff, Gregory VIII., was Pope but for two months, and his successor, Clement III. (1187–1191), was long kept from his city by revolutionary disorders, and only entered it in 1188, in consequence of a treaty made with his subjects. Three days after his death, which took place on Lady-day, 1191, Cardinal Hyacinth was elected at the advanced age of eighty-five. He took the title of Celestine III., and he was in the occupation of St. Peter's chair when Frederick the Second first saw the light.

Such being the list of Pontiffs from 1048 till Christmas, 1194—for the most part illustrious for energy and single-minded devotion to the cause of the Church—we must next also survey the antecedents of Frederick's empire, from the time of its foundation till his birth. This part of our task, as it includes both the male ancestors of the subject of this memoir and the history of the central and greatest temporal dominion of Christendom, will have to be treated at greater length than any other section of this introduction.

The Emperors.

When Leo III., by his coronation at Rome of the great Karl, revived, in the year 800, the Western Roman Empire, that Empire included the following countries: All modern France and North-eastern Spain down to Barcelona, Belgium and Holland, the duchy of Holstein, modern Germany and Bohemia as far as the river Elbe and somewhat to the east of it in the north, Hungary as far as the river Theiss, Istria and the inland parts of Northern Dalmatia, Switzerland, and Italy as far south as about to the border of the modern kingdom of Naples. This vast domain, after various temporary divisions, came with one exception into the possession of Charlemagne's grandson, Charles the Fat. The exception referred to is the kingdom of Burgundy,[1] which passed into the possession of Boso, brother-in-law of Charles the Bald, yet another grandson of Charlemagne. This kingdom is a region of much historical importance, and included the modern French province of Provence, with an adjacent strip of Languedoc, the eastern part of the Lyonnais, Burgundy east of the Soane, with Franche Comté, Dauphiné, Savoy and the western half of Switzerland. On the deposition of Charles the Fat, in 887, his dominions were divided into the following four parts: (1) The kingdom of the East Franks, or the Teutonic kingdom; (2) The kingdom of the West Franks, or Karolingia; (3) The kingdom of the Mid Franks, a portion intermediate between the East and West Franks, called Lotharingia; and (4) The kingdom of Italy. *Lotharingia* included modern Holland and Eastern Belgium, with Hainault, part of Picardy, and about half of Champagne, with what of Lorraine and Alsace that was lately or is still French. It also included modern Germany west of the Rhine, except a tract to its left south of Mainz, and a strip on its right bank northwards from Coblentz, so that Aachen, Köln, Trier and Strasburg were included in Lotharingia, which extended west almost to Rheims. Southwards it was bounded by the kingdom of Burgundy. The kingdom of *Karolingia* included all the domains of the Empire to the west of Lotharingia and Burgundy, while those to the east of Lotharingia and north of the Alps formed the *Teutonic kingdom* of the East Franks, separated from Denmark by the river Eider. The *kingdom of Italy* embraced the Imperial domains south of the Alps and east of Burgundy. Lotharingia oscillated for a short time between the East and West Franks, but soon became solidly united with the former, so that the Teutonic kingdom and Lotharingia came to constitute together

[1] The reader should be careful not to confound this *Imperial* Burgundy with the *French duchy* of Burgundy, which consisted for the most part of the province of Bourgogne west of the Saone.

the *kingdom of Germany;* and it is that kingdom that will for a time especially occupy our attention, and form, as it were, the foreground of our historical sketch.

This kingdom was subdivided (as indeed was the Empire generally) into great military districts, the commander of each of which was termed a *Herzog* or *Duke.* Within each duchy were more or fewer subordinate divisions, the superintendent and judge of each of which was called a *Graf* or *Count.* The border lands of the Empire were termed *Marches* or *Marks*, and each such region was placed under a *Margrave* or Count of the March (also called a *Marquess*), who was charged with its defence and extension. Other dignitaries set over the various royal estates were called *Palsgraves* or Counts of the Palace—more briefly Counts Palatine—and one of these, the Palsgrave of the Rhine or *Archpalsgrave*, came to rank with the highest officers of the Empire. Important cities which owed obedience to no one but the Emperor only, were often governed to a greater or less degree by the *Burgraf* or Count of the City. Besides these temporal Lords there were (sooner or later) six great spiritual Princes, the Archbishops of Mainz, Köln, Trier, Bremen, Magdeburg and Salzburg, and to these by degrees were added other spiritual powers holding directly of the Emperors by fief granted to them, so that there came to be many Prince Bishops and Princely Abbots and Abbesses. The secular functions of the Abbeys were committed to some lay-noble, who was called the *Advocatus* or Steward of such Abbey, and who too often sought to appropriate to himself the property confided to his management.

All these dignitaries, of whatsoever degree, generally agreed in one respect. This was their desire and endeavor to transform themselves from mere administrators of domains into their possessors, the first step towards which was the obtaining of a right to transmit their offices hereditarily, and, if possible, through females as well as males.

The great duchies into which Germany was divided were the following: (1) That which was of the whole Frankland, the Frank duchy *par excellence, i. e., Franconia.* This included the valleys of the Main and the Neckar. It was bounded on the west by Lotharingia; on the south by an undulating line running from a little south to a little north of 49° north latitude, and rising northward towards the east; on the north by the duchy of Saxony, and on the east by the river Saale and a line running thence south by Bayreuth, and a little west of the longitude of Munich. (2) The duchy of *Saxony*, which included what is now Mecklenburg, Hanover, and Rhenish Prussia, almost as far west as the Rhine. (3) *Lotharingia*, which from a kingdom thus became a duchy. (4) *Suabia*, or *Alemannia*—the land in which both the Rhine and the Danube

arise—a region bounded on the south by the Rhætian Alps, and therefore including much of Switzerland; on the west by the Rhine, and so including modern Baden and Wurtemberg; on the north by Franconia, and on the east by an undulating line continuing southward for a space the eastern boundary of Franconia, and then curving westward so as to exclude all but the uppermost part of the valley of the Inn. (5) *Bavaria*, a region very different from the Bavaria of to-day, and bounded on the south by Italy and the Alps (including what is now Southwestern Austria and the valley of the Inn), and on the west by Suabia and Franconia. Northeastwards it was obliquely bounded by the southwestern mountains of Bohemia, and southeastwards by an undulating border extending from near Linz to near Lienz. Besides these five duchies, Bohemia and certain marches should here be noted. *Bohemia* was practically the Bohemia of to-day without Moravia. Of the marches one was *Austria*, a tract extending eastwards north and south of the Danube, towards and ultimately to Vienna. It was bounded on the north by the river Taga, and on the south by the lower slopes of the highlands south of the Danube. From the last-mentioned boundary to the Adriatic, or the east of Italy, was the march of *Carynthia;* while north of Bohemia, and east of Franconia, was the march of *Meissen*, extending between the Elbe and the Oder, north of Bohemia, and including the Saxony of to-day, with an adjacent parallel slip of Prussia. Later instituted marches were those of *Moravia*, which adjoined the duchy of Bohemia on the southeast, and of *Brandenburg*, which lay north of Meissen and east of Saxony.

East of the Elbe was the land of the *Obotrites*, in the great island of *Rugen*, lying off its eastern end, east of which was *Pomerania;* while elsewhere, north and east of Germany, some Scandinavian, Finnish, and Slavonian peoples, who may be more conveniently noticed later on. Of this great kingdom of Germany Duke Arnulf was, on the deposition of Charles the Fat, elected king, and was crowned emperor at Rome in 894. The short reign of his son, the child-king Lewis, is notable for the irruption into the empire of the fierce and pagan Hungarians. In 918 Conrad I., a Franconian count,[1] was elected king, to whom, by his own desire, succeeded an opponent, Henry I. (surnamed the Fowler), who was Duke of Saxony and founder of the Saxon dynasty of Roman emperors. He warred successfully with the Hungarians, made the refractory Duke of Bohemia do homage for his duchy, and finally

[1] On his accession he resigned his county to his brother, who was already Palsgrave of Franconia; and he was made Palsgrave of Lotharingia by Henry I., in consideration of his making no claim to succeed his brother in the empire. Thus these offices became and remained united.

annexed Lotharingia to the German kingdom. He also founded many great towns, and he transferred his own duchy of Saxony to a relative, who founded the Billung line of dukes, to which there will be occasion more than once to refer. Upon his death his son, the great Otho I., was elected, and, in 936, crowned king at Aachen, being attended at his coronation by the dukes of Franconia, Lotharingia, Suabia, and Bavaria, as carver, chamberlain, cross-bearer, and horse-master respectively. He compelled both the King of Denmark and the Duke of Poland to do him homage, and finally expelled the Hungarians from Germany. Crossing the Alps, he made Berengar, King of the Lombards, become his man, and was subsequently himself crowned King of Italy at Milan, and emperor at Rome on December 2d, 962, by Pope John XII., being the first German king so crowned since Arnulf. Otho brought all the great duchies into his own hands or into the hands of members of his family.[1] He won lands from the Slaves, and founded the archbishopric of Magdeburg. He associated his son Otho with him, crowning him king at Aachen in 961, and making him co-emperor in 967. This son succeeded to his power as Otho II. in 973, and died ten years later, leaving his infant son, Otho III., under the guardianship of his mother, Theophania, daughter of Romanus II.,[2] Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire. Otho III. was crowned emperor at Rome in 996, and died childless in 1002, being succeeded by the saintly Henry II.,[3] who was crowned King of Italy in 1004 and Emperor in 1014. Before he obtained the title of emperor he took that of "King of the Romans," a title thenceforward assumed by German kings up to the time of their imperial coronation. It was now a fully established custom that the elected King of Germany should become Roman emperor, although his assumption of that dignity was only to follow upon his coronation by the Sovereign Pontiff. Henry II. died in 1024 and was buried at Bamberg, the seat of a bishopric of his foundation. It was this emperor who first sanctioned the settlement of the Normans in Southern Italy, an important event, indeed, as regards the history of Frederick II. With Henry ends the line of the Saxon emperors.

The next dynasty, of Franconian emperors, was initiated by Con-

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[1] Thus, though king and emperor, he also remained Duke of Franconia. He gave Lotharingia to his son-in-law, Conrad, husband of Leitgarde. His son Rudolph he made Duke of Suabia, and his brother Henry Duke of Bavaria, in the place of a member of the ancient Bavarian family of Schyren, who was deposed for rebellion. Subsequently Otho made one of this family a palsgrave of the duchy.

[2] Of the Basilian dynasty of Greek emperors. She was also daughter-in-law of Nicephorus II., Phocas (who married her widowed mother, Theophania), and sister of Basil II., the conqueror of the Bulgarians, who extended his empire to the Danube.

[3] He was the grandson of that Henry who, as has been noted, was made Duke of Bavaria by Otho I.

rad II.[1] (called the Salic), who was elected King of Germany in 1024, crowned King of Italy at Milan in 1026, and emperor the year following. About this time certain changes were made which should here be noted. Carinthia had been erected into a duchy by Otho III. Lotharingia was also divided into (1) Lower or Riparian Lotharingia, and (2) Upper Lotharingia, or that of the Mosel, separated by a boundary running roughly parallel with the river Mosel, but a little north of it. Conrad II. bestowed the duchies of Suabia, Bavaria, and Carinthia upon his son, Henry, and on another relative, the Archpalsgrave, the united Palatinates of Franconia and Saxony, and the *Palatinate of the Rhine*, a region comprising most of Franconia west of the Rhine, with more than the trans-Rhenish part of modern Bavaria. One of Conrad's most important acts, however, was the addition to the empire, in 1032, of the kingdom of Burgundy,[2] which had been separated from it since the time of Charles the Fat.

Of the emperors since Charlemagne no one was so great and powerful as the first Otho. After him the imperial power had become diminished to the advantage of that of the great nobles, who especially profited by the long minority of Otho III. to extend their power and influence. Their power was still further extended by an edict of Conrad II. making fiefs legally hereditary. This decree was, indeed, intended to strengthen the emperor by giving greater power to the lesser nobles who held under the Dukes. Nevertheless, in the long run, it still further diminished the power and influence of the emperors themselves. Conrad died in 1039 in Italy, but was buried at Speyer, where his monument still remains. His son Henry was but twenty years of age at his accession, and the year before he had been crowned King of Burgundy at Solothurn. He became a more powerful emperor than any of his successors till 1194, or any of his predecessors, save Charlemagne and the great Otho, giving away the duchies at his will to men who were content to act as his agents,[3] retaining Franconia himself, and bestowing Bavaria upon his wife Agnes. He enlarged the march of Austria, and made the Hungarian kings do homage for their crowns. In 1040 he raised to the Papal throne the saintly

[1] A count of Franconia, cousin to its duke, and descended from Leitgarde, daughter of Otho I.

[2] This he inherited from the father of his wife, Gisela, namely, Rudolph, third Burgundian king of that name. This kingdom, founded, as before mentioned, by Duke Boso, in 879, after having been divided (into the two kingdoms of Upper and Lower Burgundy) was reunited by Rudolph II. in 933, to whom succeeded Conrad the Pacific in 937, followed by Rudolph, the father of Gisela, in 993. Rudolph II. had acquired the kingdom of Arles from Hugh, King of Provence, as the result of their contention for the kingdom of Italy.

[3] He gave the duchy of Upper Lotharingia to another relative, whose descendants retained it till the time of the Empress Maria Theresa.

Leo IX., with whom our list of Popes began. He died in 1056, and was succeeded by his unfortunate and unworthy child, Henry IV., under the guardianship of the widowed empress, under whom the power of the crown underwent serious diminution. She resigned her own duchy of Bavaria to Otho Graf von Nordheim, and made her son-in-law Rudolph, Count of Rheinfelden (husband of her daughter Matilda), Duke of Suabia, to the injury of a certain powerful Suabian earl, Graf von Breisgau (to whom her late husband had promised it), whom she sought to propitiate by making him Duke of Carinthia, who took the title Duke of Zäringen.[1]

It was during the reign of Henry IV. that the renowned struggle with Gregory VII. took place,—of which the well-known visit to Canossa was an incident,—during which horrible disorders prevailed in Germany. Great disputes and struggles between the leading nobles, partly as Papal or imperial partisans, partly as men seeking merely their own selfish views, and partly probably in most cases from mixed motives. Some of the descendants of these nobles play more or less important parts during the life of Frederick the Second, and on this account it will be desirable to record here some details which might otherwise be omitted. Thus Henry deprived Otho of Nordheim of his duchy of Bavaria and bestowed it on Welf IV., son of the Italian marchese, Alberto Azzo II. of Este, who had married a descendant of the ancient Bavarian house of Welf, and from whom proceeded a notable personage known as *Henry the Black*. By way of compensation Otho was made administrator of Saxony. Now the duchy of Saxony had long been in the possession of the race of Herman Billung; and with Magnus, son of its then Duke, Ordolf, the discontented Otho conspired and rebelled, with the result of imprisonment to both; and Magnus (by the death of his father in 1073) succeeded to his claim to that dukedom while in prison.

Owing to the Papal excommunication inflicted upon Henry IV., the German nobles met in 1077 at Forchheim, and there elected as their king the empress's son-in-law, Rudolph, owing to which the latter was deposed from his dukedom by the emperor; and at a diet, held at Ratisbon in 1079, the duchy of Suabia was then and there bestowed upon Frederick of Hohenstaufen, who also received the hand of Agnes, the emperor's daughter. Here, then, we first meet with a person more notable for us, since this same Frederick was a direct ancestor—a great-great-grandfather—of Frederick the Second. It is important, also, to note that this ancestor enters upon the scene in the character of an imperial and anti-papal partisan.

"Hohenstaufen" was not the original name of Frederick's ancestors. They were more anciently known as lords of *Büren*, a vil-

[1] From the name of one of his ancestral possessions.

lage not far from Stuttgard. Near it is a chain of hills called Staüfele, and close to their village was a hill yet higher called the *Hohe Staufe*, to the top of which the Lord of Büren removed his dwelling, building a castle on its top, and becoming the Lord of Hohenstaufen. In addition to the dukedom of Suabia the Lord of Hohenstaufen also possessed considerable private domains in Elsass, inherited from a female ancestor.

The Emperor, Henry IV., got together at Brixen, in 1080, an assembly of German prelates, who affected to depose Pope Gregory VII., and to elect in his place the Archbishop of Ravenna, who called himself Pope Clement III. Henry then entered Italy, and, triumphing at Rome, was crowned emperor by his Antipope in 1084, the true Sovereign Pontiff, Gregory, remaining shut up in the Castle of St. Angelo. The Norman, Robert Guiscard, before mentioned, coming, however, to his rescue, the emperor was compelled to retreat northwards; while his own son, Conrad, supported by the great Countess, and next his son Henry,[1] rebelled against him. The struggle ended by the abdication of the emperor at Ingelheim. In 1106 he died, excommunicated, at Liége, his body lying in an unconsecrated chapel at Speyer till 1111.

His son, Henry V., on his accession, at the age of twenty-five, bestowed the Archbishopric of Mainz and the dukedom of Saxony respectively on Adalbert of Saarbruck and on Lothar Graf von Suplenberg,[2] who had aided his rebellion.

Duke Magnus, who, the reader will remember, succeeded to the duchy while in prison, had died, leaving two daughters. One of these, Elike, married Otho Graf von Anhalt, and bore him a very notable son, known as *Albert the Bear* (of whose claims to the duchy we shall have more than once to make mention); the other, Wulfhilda, married *Henry the Black*, before referred to, and conveyed much the larger share of her father's patrimonial possessions in Saxony to her husband, who also succeeded Welf as Duke of Bavaria.

Henry V. still maintained against the Pope the contest respecting investitures, and, marching to Rome, he made Pascal II. prisoner, and forced him, in 1111, to crown him emperor. He was so triumphant that the great Countess, who, though aged, married Welf, predecessor of Henry the Black in the dukedom of Bavaria, was forced in this last period of her life to receive him, and whose lands

[1] He had been crowned King of Germany in 1079.

[2] His wife, Richenza, was heiress of all that part of the duchy of Saxony which has come to form the duchy of Brunswick and part of the kingdom of Hanover. Her father was Henry of Nordheim, a relative of Otho of Nordheim, the dispossessed Duke of Bavaria, who had been appointed administrator of Saxony. Lothar himself was the son of a Saxon count, who, in 1075, had married Gebhard, a great-granddaughter of Otho III.

on her death he seized and held during the rest of his life. Being excommunicated, he held a diet at Worms in 1122, whereat was entered into that concordat, some of the stipulations of which were mentioned in the before-given summary of contemporary Papal history.

Meantime, Frederick, Duke of Hohenstaufen, had died in 1105, leaving two sons, Frederick and Conrad (aged fifteen and twelve respectively), to the care of the emperor, who gave the hand of their widowed mother—his own sister—to Leopold, Margrave of Austria. He married the elder boy, Frederick, to Jutta, daughter of Henry the Black;[1] the younger, Conrad,[2] he made, in 1115, Margrave of Tuscany and Duke of Ravenna. On his death, in 1125, he left his patrimony[3] to the two brothers, and intrusted the imperial insignia to his empress Matilda.[4] With Henry V. the Franconian dynasty of German kings and Roman emperors came to its end.

Now was strongly manifested that hostility between Saxony and Franconia which was of old standing, and ever latent when not patent. Franconia formed the very heart of Germany, and its great city, Worms, was distinguished for its fidelity to the Franconian emperors even during the heat of their struggle with the Holy See. Saxony, on the other hand—the conquest of Charlemagne—was, for the most part, hostile to the emperors who had succeeded its illustrious Saxon dynasty, and was proportionally papal in its policy, as were both its Duke Lothar and its Archbishop of Mainz, Adalbert. Papal, also, was the great Duke of Bavaria, the Guelf Henry the Black.

Frederick of Hohenstaufen, Duke of Suabia, with his possessions in Elsass, as well as in Suabia and Franconia, and with his imperial descent, through his mother Agnes, not unnaturally expected to be elected emperor,—an expectation strengthened by identification and fidelity, as well as by half-blood, with the great Franconian line. His very Franconian and imperialist attributes, however, made him objectionable to the Saxons, as also to the faithful adherents of the Holy See.

Though the empire was elective, yet the precise mode of election was as yet unfixed by any rules, and on this occasion no less than sixty thousand nobles are said to have claimed to vote and to have proceeded to Mainz to record their suffrages. After various disputes ten nobles were, by the rest of the nobility, chosen as

[1] Frederick was thus powerfully connected, not only through his wife, but also through his sister, the spouse of Conrad, Duke of Zäringen. His mother's second husband was Margrave of Austria, while maternally he could claim descent from Charlemagne.

[2] He was for a short time before this Duke of Franconia.

[3] Chiefly estates in Franconia.

[4] She was daughter of Henry I. of England.

electors, from each of the four duchies, (1) Suabia, (2) Franconia, (3) Saxony, and (4) Bavaria. The Papal legates were for the first time present to add their influence ; and also, strange to say, the renowned Frenchman, Suger, Abbot of St. Denis, near Paris. The result was the election, in August, 1125, of Lothar as emperor.[1] In return he granted to all nobles, even the dukes (whose interests in this respect were the most opposed to his own), the right of hereditary succession in their fiefs. He gave his daughter Gertrude to Henry the Proud, Duke of Bavaria (who was the son of Henry the Black), adding to it the duchy of Saxony also, Henry the Bear being made Margrave of Lausitz.[2] Scrupulous to do all that was right, Lothar sought from the Holy See a ratification of his election, and endeavored to conciliate the disappointed Hohenstaufen brothers, confirming them in the lands inherited from Henry V., and in the duchy of Suabia. His efforts in this respect were in vain; for, though the brothers submitted to Lothar, doing homage for their lands and swearing allegiance to him, we soon find them in rebellion against the emperor, and the emperor redemanding the bequeathed possessions of Henry V.

The younger brother, Conrad, even got himself crowned King of Italy at Milan by its antipapal archbishop in 1128, and was subsequently supported by the Antipope, Anaclet II. By the advice of St. Bernard, Lothar descended into Italy, drove both the now excommunicated Conrad back to his brother in Germany and the Antipope into the Castle of St. Angelo, while he himself was crowned emperor by Pope Innocent II. in 1133. The good Lothar then swore to allow freedom in episcopal elections, and formally acknowledged that a bishop must be consecrated before receiving his temporalities. He also yielded all claim to the territories of the great Countess, beyond a life-interest which he accepted as a vassal of the Holy See, and he was subsequently allowed to transfer the margravate of Tuscany to the Duke of Bavaria,[3] also as a vassal of the Holy See. Peace was then made through the influence of St. Bernard, the Hohenstaufen brothers renewing their oaths of allegiance. The elder was allowed to remain Duke of Suabia, while Conrad was rewarded for his submission with the duchy of Franconia, with precedence over the other dukes, and with the office of standard-bearer of the Holy Roman Empire.

[1] Thus we have a solitary Saxon emperor coming in between the Franconian and Hohenstaufen dynasties, as we had a solitary Franconian between the Carlovingian and Saxon dynasties.

[2] Or Lusatia. Henry the Bear was, as already mentioned, grandson of Magnus, Duke of Saxony. Losita, or Lausites, was a Slavonic march north of Bohemia, and forming part of what is now the modern kingdom of Saxony.

[3] He was heir of the great Countess's second husband.

During his reign, Lothar was occupied in various important transactions external to the kingdom of Germany. In conjunction with Innocent II. he subdued the Normans in Sicily, jointly investing its conquered king[1] with the dignity of Count of Sicily; and he also did something to check the rising evil influence of Arnold of Brescia. In Scandinavian and Slavonian regions he settled a dispute as to the crown of Denmark,[2] intervened in certain contentions with respect to a people inhabiting what is now Mecklenburg and Eastern Holstein, and known as the Obotrites.[3] He also waged an unsuccessful war with Boleslas of Poland,[4] and a more successful one with Duke Sobieslas of Bohemia.[5] One very interesting and novel appointment was also made by Lothar. The region of Thuringia—ever memorable to Catholics from the name St. Elizabeth—occupied the southeastern angle of the duchy of Saxony, and had formed a margravate. This region (the margravate having become vacant through crime) was bestowed by Lothar upon his kinsman Graf Ludwig, with the novel title of its *landgrave*, but with ducal rights.

With the death of Lothar we come to another hotly contested election. His son-in-law, the great and powerful Duke Henry the Proud (who had received the imperial regalia from his dying father-in-law), expected to be called to the throne of the empire. But a similar expectation was entertained by Conrad of Hohenstaufen, who, in addition to the great resources of himself and his brother, had the moral support of the Pope, and the energetic aid of Albert the Bear, ever seeking to regain the Saxon duchy of his grandfather Duke Magnus.

The princes, with the papal legate, met at Coblentz in 1138, and there and then elected as emperor Conrad, Duke of Franconia,

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[1] The Normans had supported the Antipope Anaclet, who sent a cardinal to crown Roger as "King of Sicily."

[2] He settled it in favor of Niel, the illegitimate brother of a deceased King Eric.

[3] They had been tributary to Charlemagne and the Saxon emperors; but their condition had varied with the strength of the empire, and it had of late been a Christian kingdom in vassalage to the dukes of Saxony. In this case, their Christian sovereign being murdered, they had renounced both their vassalage and their Christianity. The revolt ended with two heathen princes, Nicklot and Pribislaff, agreeing to be feudal dependents on and to pay tribute to the Duke of Saxony.

[4] Who had withheld from the emperor both homage and tribute, and who (in his efforts to convert, with the help of St. Otho of Bamberg, the lapsed heathens of Pomerania) was subjecting to Poland tribes deemed by the emperor to be rather his own vassals. The emperor was aided in this war by Albert the Bear, who married a daughter of Leopold, Margrave of Austria, and half-sister to Frederick, Duke of Suabia.

[5] Whom he compelled to do homage, a custom which had become neglected during the intestine struggles of the German kingdom under Henry IV.

who was crowned by the legate[1] King of Germany at Aachen. Certain important changes now took place;[2] Saxony and Bavaria were separated, the son of the deceased Henry the Proud, called Henry the Lion, being ultimately made Duke of Saxony, and resigning Bavaria to Henry Margrave of Austria, who had succeeded his brother Leopold and had married the widowed Gertrude, daughter of the Emperor Lothar. Albert the Bear, who had for a time regained the coveted duchy of Saxony, resigned it, but took instead its margravate, enlarged with the town of Brandenburg and a large district attached to it, which was separated altogether from Saxony and made immediately dependent on the emperor, its holder taking the title of *Margrave of Brandenburg*.[3]

Herewith Berlin first appears upon the scene, and about the same period we first hear of Vienna and Munich. Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary all called for and received Conrad's attention, and he was urgently summoned to Italy by Pope Innocent II., who, in 1139, had assembled a council at the Vatican, which condemned the heresies of Arnold of Brescia and vainly enjoined silence upon him. Meantime the Antipope Anaclet had died, and schismatic cardinals had elected another Antipope, Victor IV. The latter yielded to the arguments and persuasion of St. Bernard, and, resigning, made full submission to the vicar of Christ. The Antipope's Norman supporters, however, still resisted, and Roger, Count of Sicily, took the Pope prisoner,[5] who was treated by his captor with such extraordinary respect and deference that Innocent II.[6] sanctioned the assumption by Roger of the title of king, and invested him with large possessions on the mainland and with

[1] There was at this time no archbishop of Mainz.

[2] Henry the Great, Duke of Bavaria and Saxony, loyally yielded up the regalia to Conrad, who at a diet at Wurzburg declared it unlawful for Henry to hold two duchies, and also that Albert the Bear was lawfully entitled to his ancestral duchy of Saxony. The double duke, rebelling against this decision, was deprived of both his duchies, which led to prolonged civil war, terminated by the results stated in the text.

[3] A dissentient voice made itself heard on the part of the brother of Henry the Proud, Welf, who claimed for himself again and again the duchy of Bavaria.

[4] The repeated domestic struggles of Germany had again given Bohemia the opportunity of asserting its independence, but the emperor soon forced Vladislas, its duke, to once more acknowledge the imperial suzerainty. On an appeal from Ladislas of Poland, the competitors for that throne also acknowledged the emperor's sovereignty over Poland proper, as well as over Pomerania and Rugen, which had been rendered before by Boleslas III. Boris of Hungary also appealed to Conrad, who intervened in that country with but indifferent success.

[5] Roger invaded the territories of the mainland, whence he had been previously excluded by Innocent and Lothar. For this the Pope attacked him, and it was thus that Innocent was taken prisoner together with his cardinals.

[6] The Romans had made war with and conquered Tivoli, and eagerly desired to expel its inhabitants and burn the city. Its protection by the Christian zeal of Innocent was declared to be one of the ill results of clerical rule.

legatine authority in both Sicily and Apulia, the king on his part engaging to pay an annual tribute and resigning to the Pope the principality of Beneventum. In Rome itself Innocent met with rebellion, partly on account of his benevolence towards Tivoli, and partly from the revolutionary spirit which dominated in the Eternal City. An *imperial* Roman republic was then proclaimed, a senate instituted, and the emperor personally invited to return and once more rule the world from its ancient centre. The disorders continuing, as has been mentioned, through four succeeding pontificates, the emperor's presence in Rome was sought by both the city and its pontiffs, and alike in vain, as circumstances drew him not to Italy but to Palestine. The fall of Edessa[1] in the Holy Land had led to the preaching of a Crusade by St. Bernard,[2] but his efforts had to be seconded by those of St. Hildegarde before Conrad could be prevailed upon to take the cross a second time (he had been a Crusader in his youth), in spite of the example set him by Louis VII. of France. The dukes of Bavaria, Bohemia, Lotharingia, and Suabia[3] also took the cross; but the dukes of Saxony[4] and Zäringen[5] remained behind, promising to spread the faith in Northern Europe.

At Easter, in 1147, the Crusaders assembled at Ratisbon, and thence proceeded through Hungary to Constantinople. This Crusade was extremely disastrous. They were well received by King Geisa of Hungary, but as soon as they entered the domains of the Eastern emperor, Manuel Comnenus, their troubles began.[6] They were cheated and otherwise ill-treated on their way to his capital, and subsequently betrayed by his subjects.[7] After being compelled to return to Constantinople, Conrad sailed thence to Acre, and thence made ineffectual attempts on Damascus and Ascalon. Ultimately the emperor, with the relics of his expe-

[1] This took place during the reign of the young King of Jerusalem, Baldwin III., and his mother Melisenda.

[2] He preached it only in obedience to the commands of Eugenius III.

[3] This duke was the son of the duke who was the elder brother of the Emperor Conrad. He was also named Frederick, and had already distinguished himself in Germany. He ultimately became the successor in the empire of his imperial uncle.

[4] This duke, the reader will recollect, was Henry the Lion, to whom was restored, by the Emperor Conrad, that Saxon duchy of which his father Henry the Proud had been deprived.

[5] The representative of that Graf von Breisgau to whom the Empress Agnes (widow of Henry III.) had given the dukedom of Carinthia, as before stated in the text.

[6] This was the more surprising because Conrad had entered into negotiations with the Emperor Kalo-Johannes, Manuel's predecessor, with reference to Sicilian affairs, and because the actual Emperor Manuel's wife was the sister of the Western empress.

[7] They betrayed the emperor, and that portion of the Crusaders who had elected to traverse Iconium with him, into the hands of the Turks, so that they only escaped with much difficulty and loss. The French king Louis VII. and his queen Eleanor were much better treated by the Greeks than were the Germans.

dition, set sail for Acre, to return home, on the nativity of the Blessed Virgin, 1148.[1] On his journey home Conrad lingered at Constantinople, and there effected an alliance with the Emperor Manuel against Roger, King of Sicily, and brought back with him to Germany the Eastern Princess Theodora as wife for the Duke of Bavaria.

During the prosecution of this ill-starred Eastern expedition, the emperor's elder brother Frederick prosecuted a Northern Crusade in conjunction with Henry the Lion, of Saxony, and Albert the Bear. This effort resulted in another temporary Slavonian conversion, and the marriage of the Duke of Saxony with his cousin Clementia, daughter of the Duke of Zäringen. Fresh disorders soon arose in Germany under the young King of Germany, Henry, the elder son of the Emperor Conrad. Welf, brother of the deceased Henry the Proud, rebelled, asserting his claims to the duchy of Bavaria, and the Duke of Zäringen joined in the rebellion. They were supported by Geisa, King of Hungary,[2] but the rebels were overcome by the young King Henry. Next, the Duke of Saxony (Henry the Lion) affirmed that his surrender of Bavaria had not been final,[3] and also claimed that duchy, whereupon Saxony was invaded by the Emperor Conrad, supported by Albert the Bear. In these troublous times the young King Henry died (in 1151), whereupon the Emperor Conrad recommended as his successor, not his own younger son, the child Frederick, but his nephew Frederick, who now, through the death of his father, had become Duke of Suabia. In the very next year the Emperor died at Bamberg, after confiding the imperial regalia to his nephew just mentioned, and before he himself had found an opportunity to be crowned emperor. In fact, death surprised him in the midst of preparations for an expedition to Italy for his imperial coronation.

The princes met at Frankfort to elect an emperor, and this was the first occasion on which such an election took place at that city. In March, 1152, the princes accepted the recommendation of the deceased Conrad, electing his nephew, Frederick of Hohenstaufen,

[1] Leaving the young King of Jerusalem, Baldwin III., only ten years of age, to do as best he might. Amongst the causes of the great failure of this Crusade were probably the jealousies which unhappily existed between the various Christian (or Frank) states then existing in Syria, and not unnatural apprehension felt by the Greeks at the advent of the Western warriors, seeing that the Normans were then invading Athens and other parts of Greece. The Greeks also detested the Westerns, as, in their eyes, unorthodox. Before long (in 1204) their apprehensions were to be justified and their hostile conduct avenged.

[2] A debatable land caused dissensions between Austria and Hungary, since formerly the Austrian territory had extended to the Raab, while more lately Hungary had reached the Ems.

[3] He affirmed that he had only surrendered Bavaria to his mother, of whom, as her only child, he was the heir.

afterward known by his surname of "Rothbart," and generally called in history *Frederick Barbarossa*. He was the grandsire of our Frederick the Second, and thus for the first time a direct male ancestor of the subject of our memoir ascends the steps of the imperial throne of the Holy Roman Empire.

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND THE IRISH NATIONAL LEAGUE OF AMERICA.

THE only serious criticism made upon the Irish National League of America is that it is in some undefined way a menace to American institutions. It has not been absolutely assailed as an *imperium in imperio*, for that would be too severe a strain upon American intelligence. But there have been assertions to the effect that it may be indiscreet for the people of the Republic to encourage within its confines a great association composed of men of a single race, ardently and avowedly devoted to the creation of a foreign state, beyond the jurisdiction of the American government.

In reply to this criticism I venture to affirm concerning the Irish National League of America these propositions:

I. That to assist Ireland in obtaining her national independence is only a reciprocation by the American people of the service Ireland rendered the Republic in establishing its independence.

II. That the American Republic is directly and selfishly interested in the achievement of the national independence of Ireland.

III. That the organization of the Irish race in the United States is beneficial to this country, because it tends to remove the evil effects of English misgovernment upon that important element of the American people who are of Irish origin.

I. Little needs to be said upon the first of these propositions. Doubtless, it is because the precise data have been difficult of access, that American historians have not allotted to the Irish immigration prior to the Revolution, the proportionate value to which it was entitled. There has been, moreover, a curiously illogical disposition to conceal with rhetoric the truth the fathers of the Republic struck into immortality with the sword. Some of our recent historians and certain conspicuous politicians are exceedingly de-

sirous that we should believe the American Republic a political organization evolved from an Anglo-Saxon cell. Anglo-Saxonism has been studiously feeling its way into our national good-will, anxious that its infamous behavior to North and South twenty years ago, should be speedily and permanently forgotten. The most effective and the most gracious way by which it can hope to keep our countenance is to persuade us that we are, after all, of common blood, that our constitution is modelled upon the British constitution, that our Revolution was only a stronger assertion of the principles of the British constitution, and that, in a word, England is the "mother" of America. Some American publicists unite with English politicians in promoting this absurdity; and the voluminous pages of some American historians suppress, misrepresent, or gloze over the array of facts which completely expose it.

Every American of sound sense knows that the yoke which the fathers of the Republic felt upon their shoulders was the yoke of Anglo-Saxonism; and birth in the American colonies was not essential to the dignity of being a father of the American Republic. Its paternity was uniquely heterogeneous; but it was homogeneous in one vital characteristic,—its abhorrence of that which the whole world recognized as essential Anglo-Saxonism; not the Anglo-Saxonism of mere brute force, but ideal Anglo-Saxonism, legal and constitutional Anglo-Saxonism. That kind of Anglo-Saxonism was the principle of the attitude of England toward the colonies and toward Ireland; and that principle included these claims: that the imperial power might constitutionally impose and collect taxes without consulting the people who were to pay them; might suspend all safeguards of personal liberty and annihilate all rights recognized as national or individual; might regulate trade for the exclusive profit of Anglo-Saxon monopoly; might enter into the domestic life of the governed for the purposes of spoliation, coercion of conscience, or moral and intellectual debasement;—might, in brief, do anything and everything unconstitutional with a ruffian pretence of constitutionality. That was Anglo-Saxonism as then known and applied in the colonies, and as known and applied in Ireland to this hour.

The American Revolution was inspired by a political principle the precise negative of that; and the foundations of the American Republic are laid upon the ruins of the Anglo-Saxon constitution of the eighteenth century, as applied upon this continent. The United States of America is the monument of history to the infamy and tyranny of the British constitution; and political Americanism is essentially the antitype of political Anglo-Saxonism. The attempts that have been occasionally made in recent days to represent the Republic as the daughter, the child, the heir of the

British constitution, only illustrate the facility with which facts which stand like pyramids in political history may be completely forgotten by those whose faces are turned away from them.

It was inevitable that Ireland, in which the same Anglo-Saxon constitution was in force, should unite with the American colonies in their effort to expel it; and it is perfectly reasonable to say that had the war in America lasted longer, Ireland, like the colonies, would have achieved independence. She was recognized by English statesmen as one with the colonies in the Rebellion; and every battle won in America by the rebels, native and foreign, illuminated the Irish hill-tops and forced from the crown some concession to Ireland. The history of Ireland and that of the colonies are blended during the Revolution. Ireland was the only ally America had from the beginning; the progress of her struggle was watched with anxious solicitude and its triumph hailed with the wildest joy. The interest of Ireland in the outcome was not merely that of hope for her own independence; it was the interest of race and blood.

For more than a century before the Revolution the Irish race had been hurrying in a thick and increasing tide to the colonies. The numerical magnitude of the emigration it will never be possible to ascertain. That it began as early as 1649, is indisputable; that it became more and more copious is certain. Whether the emigrant were a prisoner of war, destined to be sold to planters not yet in possession of black chattels; whether he marched to the seaboard with one of the numerous bands whom poverty, made by the law, compelled to accept the terms offered by trafficking agents of New England merchants who were in urgent need of labor; or whether he voluntarily deserted his land to seek in the colonies the liberty of craft, of commerce, of conscience, denied him there by that brutal power which made education penal in Ireland, obliterated her commerce, and strangled her manufactures,—in whatever way he reached the colonies, he disembarked a justified hater of the sham called the British constitution; and in Irish immigration there was no increment for American Toryism.

The economist Anderson, who was engaged upon his essay on the colonies when he heard of the surrender of Cornwallis, claimed that, for obvious reasons, partisans of colonial interests exaggerated the growth of the population, as they did the virtues of the climate and soil of America, in order to tempt immigrants. He contended that the population of the colonies, prior to 1630, was about 2000, and that between that and 1660 about 40,000 European immigrants were added to it. From unquestionable data it may justly be claimed that, between voluntary and enforced emigration, the Irish in the colonies at this time could not have been far below 10,000. But the Navigation Acts of 1660, applicable to Ireland

and the colonies, swept the Irish ships off the Western seas; and thenceforth, for a considerable time, the Irish emigrants to the colonies, compelled to ship from England, are necessarily included in the immigration statistically denominated English. It is certain that of many tens of thousands of the Irish people who disappeared after the Cromwellian version of the British constitution in Ireland, many thousands must have found their way to the colonies. Indeed, so close became the conscious sympathy of the colonies and the island that as early as 1676 Ireland sent a thousand pounds to the New England colonies to assist the families impoverished by the King Philip war. It was an Irishman who was president of the society for "Promoting the Propagation of the Gospel in New England;" and in 1677 to Robert Boyle was dedicated an "Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christianized Indians in New England." Ten years before that, in the city of Cork, William Penn had enjoyed more than a taste of the British constitution. He resolved on embracing the tenets of Quakerism, and was promptly thrown by the British constitution into the place that constitution still maintains in Ireland for those whose opinions are objectionable to it—into jail; and it was while imprisoned there that Penn avowed those principles of perfect toleration which attracted to Pennsylvania, a few years later, an immense Irish immigration, whose love of the island was perpetuated in the names of so many of its cities and counties. It was one of the first of these immigrants, John Logan, who governed Pennsylvania for two years after Penn's death, and who bequeathed to the City of Brotherly Love the invaluable library which bears his name.

Swift's loud complaint of the flight of the Protestants of Ireland to the colonies only corroborates the evidence of many others of that epoch of the numerical strength of the exodus, terribly accelerated by the successive English statutes which crushed the incipient Irish manufactures in order to promote the manufactures of England. "This malady of emigration has appeared at many different periods during the century," wrote the Protestant provost of Trinity College, in 1779. Speaking of periods prior to that year, he says the Irish manufacturers were emigrating by thousands. It is said that the emigration from the single province of Ulster amounted to 100,000 persons; and another authority estimates the departures for the colonies at 3000 a year. Anderson estimates the total emigration from Europe to the colonies at about 12,000 a year between 1690 and 1780; and with their prolific race characteristics it is no exaggeration to claim that when men were needed for the army that was to send the British constitution out of the colonies, the statement of Robertson before the Parlia-

mentary committee was below rather than above the truth; for, if half the rebel army was Irish, as we shall find it declared to be, fresh from Ireland, a very considerable part of the other half must have been Irishmen's sons. Long before the Revolution, Irish immigration was pouring into Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Delaware, New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Maine, Connecticut. It was the Irish idealist, Berkeley, who presented his farm and library to Yale College, and wrote among the rocks of Narragansett Bay the prophetic line,

"Westward the star of empire takes its way."

If we are to accept English evidence on the subject, the service the Irish race rendered in expelling the British constitution from the colonies, and in completing the enterprise of the revolutionists, was indispensable. Not to mention the financial aid given by Irish merchants to Washington, at a critical juncture; to say nothing of the strength and influence of that race in the Continental Congress, of which Franklin's Irish friend, Charles Thomson, was secretary; to say nothing of the navy; not to allude to the nine Irish signers of the Declaration of Independence,—we have singularly strong testimony concerning the preponderance of Irish in the army itself. English statesmen of that period employed the word "American" to designate persons born in the colonies, the descendants of early settlers. "Emigrant" was applied only to foreign-born persons newly arrived in the colonies. When the House of Commons ordered an inquiry into the conduct of the war, among the witnesses who appeared before the committee was Joseph Galloway, a native American. He testified that "not a fifth part of the Americans from choice have supported the present rebellion." Lord George Germain stated on information that there were more native Americans enlisted in the British corps in the colonies than there were in Washington's army. General Robertson, who had lived in the colonies twenty-four years, and been quartermaster, with excellent opportunity for knowing the *personnel* of the "rebel" army, when asked how that army was composed, whether mostly natives or emigrants, answered that General Lee told him that "half the continental army was from Ireland,"—emigrants, not natives of the colonies. General Lee had excellent opportunity for knowing the truth about the army; and so highly did the Congress value him, that, when captured by the English, six English field officers were offered as an equivalent for his exchange. If, then, half the revolutionary army was composed of Irish immigrants, born in Ireland, and in the other half were the sons of earlier Irish immigrants, it is within good taste for Americans of Irish descent or of Irish birth to remind their fellow-Americans of other races that

this is our republic quite as well as theirs, and that in its maintenance and perpetuation we propose to follow the example left by our countrymen who participated in its foundation.

II. That the American republic is directly and selfishly interested in the achievement of the national independence of Ireland, is so obvious that to assert it seems almost a waste of time. It must be clear to every reflecting American that just so long as Ireland is a political dependent of England, she will be an actual dependent on the United States. The causes which create and maintain her phenomenal poverty are political. They do not exist in the soil, which ranks among the most fertile. They are not in the habits of the people, to whose industry the concurrent tributes of English and Continental observers might be easily adduced, and whose activity and thrift in England and the United States are notorious. Under English law, and restrained by English arms, the people dwell in a state of serfage, from which there can be no effectual and final escape except by changing the political system itself. That system has engendered a land tenure by which the soil of the country is practically owned by aliens, who spend little or nothing of its annual money-product in Ireland. The soil, speaking broadly, is the only capital-maker; and since the money thus obtained is taken out of the country, nothing remains to invest in manufactures. It is too late to tell any intelligent man that a community cannot safely live by agriculture alone, since, if generally the surest means of life, it may at any time wholly or partly fail. But what shall be expected of a people, almost exclusively agricultural, who do not own the soil they are born on, and who till it, not that they may live by honest labor, but that absentees and idlers may live in luxury in foreign lands? It may be said that I am ignoring the sweeping benefits of the recent land legislation. Unfortunately, land bills, which have been numerous enough in the British Parliament for fifty years, are rarely read in this country; and the rosy exaggerations of their contents made by partisans of a ministry are necessarily accepted as accurate. The most that can be said of the land legislation can be said in a sentence. The landlords cannot for fifteen years raise the rents that have been fixed by the land court, or have been agreed to by landlord and tenant, without recourse to the court. But there are large numbers of the tenants who, on account of the unfavoring clauses of the acts, were unable to seek their advantages; and for all who have availed of them the heavy legal expenses will for several years fully cancel the benefits accruing. But in fifteen years, unless national independence be achieved, the whole land question will be on its feet again. It has not been settled. It has been merely lulled.

There has been no legislation to remedy the radical evil of the country,—the draining of Ireland of the capital which, if kept at home, would speedily find its way into manufactures, giving employment all the year, and promoting domestic exchanges, without which no community may be said to be safe. The causes of the chronic and desperate poverty of the country have not been as much as touched by imperial legislation; and, while those causes exist, Ireland will be a direct tax upon the people of the United States. Only an Irish Parliament, elected by all classes of the people, can or ever will legislate thoroughly and equitably upon these causes. The interests which are paramount in the imperial Parliament, and will continue to control its course toward Ireland, are interests selfishly but solidly allied against removing the causes of poverty in Ireland. The Irish people in the United States must continue to save the lives of their kindred, and supply such comforts as their means will permit, so long as the political system which keeps them poor survives. The amount of money thus annually extorted from this country is at least five million dollars. In 1851, when there were several millions less of the race here than there are now, the amount remitted reached the enormous sum of nine hundred and ninety thousand pounds. Five million dollars is a low estimate for the yearly remittances since then; and a single generation of the Irish in America must have deprived themselves and their children of nearly two hundred million dollars to pay rack rents and support the British constitution in Ireland. This money, earned in the United States, should have remained in the United States. It is a pirate's toll. Five million dollars a year is a cruel and unjust burden for the British constitution to levy upon Irish labor in the United States. It will continue to be levied and delivered until the Irish people govern themselves and remove the causes of poverty in Ireland, which are purely political.

Those fastidious persons who complain of Irish agitation in the United States would show more reasonableness if they attached their censure to the causes of the agitation. It may be of more importance to them that the newspapers should have less to say about the affairs of a little island three thousand miles away, than that the labor of a portion of their fellow-citizens should be taxed to pay a pirate's toll to a foreign government; but they may as well make up their minds to this simple truth: the Irish race will never cease agitation, in whatever part of the world its people may be found, until Ireland shall have achieved its national independence. And the race will employ, in the phrase of Mr. Gladstone, all the resources of civilization to that end. The agitation does no harm to the American Republic. A tax of five million dollars a year sent from the American Republic to Ireland is a substan-

tial injury to the Republic. Let the critics of Irish agitation in the United States contemplate this serious fact, and manfully unite with their fellow-Americans of Irish origin in repairing the injury. The material interests of the Republic imperatively require the expulsion of the British government from Ireland, in order that the latter may cease to be a burden upon the United States.

III. The influence of the League in the United States is a positive Americanizing influence and beneficial to the Republic, because it helps to remove the effects of English misrule upon Irish-Americans, thereby increasing their usefulness as American citizens. Let us examine for a moment the political and social ideas the native of Ireland has acquired from the British constitution. He has learned from that symbol of Anglo-Saxon Christianity that it is the duty of every man to hate his fellow-man for the glory of God, if his fellow-man's religious convictions differ from his; and that it is his right, if he have the power, to deprive his fellow-man of liberty, property, and life, on account of that difference. The Irish National League brings face to face the Protestant, the Catholic, and all others, in the name of their motherland, and teaches them to reject that blasphemy, and to adopt instead the principle of toleration and brotherhood. The British constitution has taught the Irishman that education may be denied his fellow-man in order to coerce his conscience. In the Irish National League that infamous doctrine is repudiated, and its members learn to value education as a right pertaining to every member of the human family. The British constitution has taught the Irishman that the inheritance of a title gives a man a claim upon the homage and the labor of his fellow-man. In the National League the Irishman learns that character and conduct alone give a man a claim upon the respect of his fellows, and that no human being is born with a hereditary right to the labor of his fellow-man. The British constitution has taught the Irishman that labor is base, degrading, ignoble. The National League teaches him that labor is the noblest thing on earth, and that the laborer has the first right to live off the results of his labor. The British constitution has taught him that childhood has no rights and old age no sanctity, for he has constantly seen infancy cast naked into the ditches, youth condemned to ignorance and unrewarded toil, and tottering age left to die on highways, or treated like felony in workhouses. The National League inspires him with the resolve to keep his children in school, that they may become useful men and women, and to shelter and love the gray hairs of those who bore him.

In fact, the National League is the school in which thousands of men, deprived by the British constitution of the opportunity of acquiring education in their native land, unlearn all the lessons which

English misrule has taught them concerning politics, government, labor, caste. If it did only this it would have ample reason for existence, for the lessons it teaches are those of political equality, religious and civil liberty, industry, love of law, and manly self-respect as the substitute for cringing subserviency.

But the National League in America and the societies affiliated with it—the temperance, charitable, mutual benefit, military, and other societies—do still more to render the Irish in the United States more useful men, and therefore more useful citizens. It is difficult for an American to realize how thorough-going and how complete are the mischievous influences of political misrule in Ireland. Let him contemplate a country without foundries, without factories, without mills, without workshops, without elevators or granaries, without shipping, without industrial arts. His imagination will be subjected to a severe strain. Let him contemplate such a country overawed by soldiery, its people cowed by ubiquitous police; the right of public assembly almost permanently suspended, religious hatreds spasmodically incited to keep the people from uniting; every home liable to rough midnight intrusion, and every citizen liable to capricious arrest and indefinite imprisonment without trial. What business habits will the mass of such people have? What will they know of self-discipline? What knowledge can they possibly possess of trade, manufactures, machinery, of sanitary laws, of literature, the progress of the world, of science? What acquaintance can they have with those methods which experience and competition have been creating for rendering life cleaner, happier, brighter, more beneficent? There is not one of these societies which does not perform an educational function. Their members are brought into contact with living thought, many of them for the first time in their lives. In these societies they learn the value of thrift. Thrift in Ireland has always been a misfortune for the mass of the people, because it exposed them to increased rent. Many of the Irish tenantry have to discover, when they come to the United States, that political freedom is necessary before thrift can be considered good fortune. All these societies encourage, if they do not actually enjoin, sobriety. All teach their members self-denial, economy, frugality. All help to diminish pauperism in the United States, because each has its own treasury, and takes care of its sick members, aids their widows, makes some provision for their orphans. To keep the treasuries full, the men must deny themselves indulgences to which they would otherwise resort. Thus the societies improve health, promote virtue, and render homes more comfortable. In the meetings of the National League and all the affiliated organizations the members learn the duty of mutual respect and forbearance, of courtesy to each other

and to all men. They learn to think before speaking, and to confer before acting. Many of the societies have reading-rooms, lectures, music, discussions upon many questions wholly disconnected from the politics of Ireland, and thus in still another way they are educating, informing, and refining. They discipline their members to transact business in business-like ways. They enable men engaged in diverse occupations to convey to each other practical and useful knowledge which it would be utterly impossible for many of them, working all day and at night weary, to acquire by more expensive or more fatiguing methods. In a word, all the Irish organizations in the United States, which were fused at the Philadelphia Irish Race Convention into the National League, to assist their kindred in Ireland in securing national independence, are calculated to make Irishmen better men and better American citizens.

Instead, therefore, of being a menace to American institutions, the Irish National League in the United States is a benefit to the Republic.

IS IT THE WILL OF GOD THAT ALL MEN SHOULD BE SAVED?

ONE of the most difficult facts for the human mind to realize is the intense individual interest taken by the Creator in each and every one of the creatures He has made. Even those which have no share in reason have their life mapped out by Him with thoughtful care, so that there is every reason to believe that the pleasure of their brief existence overpasses the pain, and that it is better for each one of them to have lived than never to have lived at all. But His love for them is as nothing compared with His fond affection for each individual being who is made in His own image and stamped with a likeness to Himself. Men know and confess the fact of God's love, but it makes no vivid impress on their intelligence, it is relegated to the region of theoretical rather than of practical truths. Tell a man that God loves him just as much as if he was the only rational being in the world; that he is never absent from the thoughts and memory of God; that every circumstance of his life has been planned from all eternity with a view to his good and advantage; that all the world around has been made for him, and to serve the Divine purpose to his profit; that friends, companions, enemies, persecutors, benefactors; that father and mother, brothers and sisters, wife and children, were all destined to be aids to his solid and lasting happiness; that the Incarnation took place for him; that it was for him that Christ suffered and died, so that if he alone had lived upon this earth, Christ would have willingly shed His blood for him alone; that he was present to the mind of Christ all through His sacred passion; that for him the scourging, mockery, crucifixion took place, and that no thought of other men interfered with or set aside the longing, yearning love that Christ felt for him during His long agony; that for him—not as one out of a crowd, but by himself and apart from all else—Christ died and rose again;—tell him all this, and he will accuse you of pious exaggeration, of an appeal to his feelings based on poetry rather than on fact, of making him out to be of an importance in the eyes of God which seems to him impossible.

Yet all this is not poetry but fact. *Dilexit me et dedit semetipsum pro me*, "He loved me and gave Himself for me," is true in the mouth not merely of one of the princes of the Church of God, nor merely in the mouth of those who in their turn love Him by whom these words were spoken, nor merely of those who will sooner or later make the act of submission which at present they refuse, but of

every single member of the human race. It is true of the greatest criminals as well as of the most virtuous of men; of those most deeply dyed in sin as well as of those who shine with the most exalted saintliness. It was true of Cain, Esau, Judas Iscariot, during every moment of life, just as it was true of Abraham, David, St. John the Divine. On each was fixed the yearning tenderness of the heart of God; for each Christ died; each the mercy and compassion of the God of mercy sought to win by graces, blessings, inspirations, ever present from the first to the last moment of the period of their earthly probation.

Now this love, fondness, tenderness, compassion, mercy, was all directed to one end. It had not for its object the present welfare and enjoyment of him on whom it was bestowed, nay, lavished with an extravagance of generosity. The Divine Lover did not destine for the loved a smooth, tranquil journey through life, a bed of roses, a feast of delights, an absence of pain and suffering, a round of unbroken pleasure which should beguile the passing hours in a delicious indulgence of every wish and every desire. It was no earthly paradise by which the yearnings of the Divine heart over the child of its love could find their satisfaction. The Lover looked beyond the shifting scene so soon to pass away; it was an eternal, not a temporal happiness that He designed to confer; *æterna charitate dilexi te*, "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31 : 3). Nothing would satisfy the cravings of that love save the bestowal of a happiness which should be without measure and without end. If in this world it had its gifts for those who accepted it and reciprocated it, those gifts were but the dim shadow of the gift to come. They were like a single drop of some delicious wine given to the weary traveller as a foretaste of the rich draughts he would enjoy when his journey should be at an end, and his Divine entertainer should hand to him the inexhaustible cup of heaven's bliss. Drink, O! my friends, and be inebriated, O! my dearly beloved. The fondest caresses of the Divine Lover bestowed upon His faithful spouses during the days of their toil and labor and suffering on earth, were to be as nothing to the rapture of the soul when the time should come when it would be merged in the ocean of the Divine love, and be bathed in the fires of the Divine charity till it becomes like to its God, as the iron dipped in the furnace partakes of the glowing intensity of the fire around it.

All this God wills to give to every one who at this moment lives upon the earth; no matter what their degradation now, God desires to raise them to a throne in heaven with a real, hearty, serious desire; however befouled they be with the mire of sin, He desires to clothe them in the white garments of the elect;

however ungrateful, base, filthy, corrupt, hardened they may be, God longs to change their ingratitude to the gratitude of a heart overflowing with joy, their baseness to nobility, their filthiness and corruption to purity and unspotted cleanness. However proud they are, cruel, debased, self-willed, depraved, rebellious, He none the less longs for the love of each, seeks to draw them near to Himself, is anxious to make them friends, willing to forget the past if only they on their part do not frustrate His Divine desire that they may share His glory and reign with Him in heaven.

I have called this desire a real, hearty, serious desire, and it is the more important to appreciate its reality as applied to every sinner as well as to every saint, because the Jansenists refused to acknowledge it. They said it could merely be called the will of God in a metaphorical and improper sense, just as it was the will of God that Isaac should be put to death when God gave his father His command to slay him. They limited its reality to the elect, to those who God foresaw would avail themselves of the Divine mercy and would attain to eternal bliss. With respect to those who would throw away their chances, and so were destined to perish, they said that God, foreseeing this, loved them and desired their love and willed their repentance and salvation in no truer sense than he desires the love or wills the repentance of the rebel angels. It is, they say, a mere manner of speech to indicate what would be the will of God under different circumstances, not what it is now. But this is not the doctrine of the Catholic Church. She teaches that in the case of the most abandoned and profligate it is God's will and good pleasure that they should do penance, return to Him against whom they have rebelled, be cleansed of their filthiness, restored to His love, and so be sharers of His kingdom in heaven. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live" (Ez. 33 : 11). "God dealeth patiently, not willing that any should perish" (2 Pet. 3 : 9), not even the blasphemer who curses Him and is destined to curse Him to all eternity; not the unbeliever who fights against Him, denies His goodness, mercy, power, nay, His very existence, and will continue to deny them to the very end. None is so utterly hopeless but that God loves him, longs after him, prepares sweet allurements which may entice him back to virtue, and persuade him to an acknowledgment of his fault, for "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of those things that Thou hast made, for Thou didst not appoint or make anything hating it. Thou sparest all, for they are Thine, O Lord, who lovest souls" (Wisd. 11 : 25, 7).

This universal love of God for all without exception has for its natural corollary another Catholic doctrine that many heretics

deny. It follows, from the seriousness and reality of the Divine will desiring the salvation of all without exception, that Christ our Lord died for all without exception, for those who would reject Him at the last as well as for those who were to form part of that *semen longævum*, that long-lived seed whom He should see and be satisfied. His thirst upon the cross was a thirst, not for the souls alone whose happy lot it is to be that to all eternity they should hunger no more and thirst no more, but also for those whose tongues will be parched forever in agonizing misery. He longed with no fictitious longing for their salvation; each pang, each additional element of suffering, was endured for their sakes, and not for the sake of the elect alone. Each one of them was present to His soul as He knelt in Gethsemane, swaying to and fro in the agony of that Divine conflict; each one of them was in His thoughts when the lash tore open His sacred flesh, when the piercing thorns sent drops of blood trickling over His forehead, when the spittle befouled His face, when the jeering insults rang in His ears. He gave Himself a ransom for *all* (1 Tim. 2:6). He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. What greater proof could God give of this universality of His desire for man's salvation than that He took upon Himself this crushing weight of sin that would not be propitiated, that He thirsted for the souls of those who refused to slake His sacred thirst, that He offered His sufferings, endured fresh sufferings, piled up the bitterness and repulsiveness of those sufferings, for the sake of those who would wilfully reject those sufferings as well as those whose grateful acceptance was to be a drop of consolation in the chalice of His agony?

I am anxious that my readers should have this fact of the universality of God's will for man's salvation clearly and distinctly present to their minds before I pass on to the serious difficulty which offers itself to one who carefully thinks over the relations of God to man. I am anxious that they should understand that it is no fiction of a desire, no unreal wish for what is impossible, no imaginary benevolence which we read into the Divine nature, but which does not exist there in reality. I am anxious that they should know that it is the doctrine of the Church, which to deny or doubt is heresy, that God does not desire only the salvation of the elect or busy Himself only with those whom He foreknows will turn to profit His mercies and benefits, but that He definitely sets before Himself as an object of His desire the salvation of every one whom He creates, that He thinks out means by which they may be drawn to Him, that He provides supernatural graces and helps which shall enable them ultimately to subdue temptations and conquer all difficulties, that He supplies means of making

virtue easy and attractive to them, that He pursues them with graces to the very last, that He never ceases from His desire, His longing after them until the sands of life's hour-glass have run out, and the soul quits the scene of its struggles, and failures, and successes, and sufferings, and joys.

But now comes our difficulty, our apparently insuperable difficulty. If this is the will of God, the genuine serious desire of Him who is omnipotent, how is it possible that it should be frustrated? If God desires all men to be saved, why are they not saved? You may talk (I fancy I hear my objector saying) of man's perverse will, but what is the use of God's being omnipotent if man's opposition can disappoint this? Does not the Apostle say: "Who has resisted His will?" And how can this be true if every sinner who dies impenitent resists the will of God with complete success—if success it can be called—disappoints the longings of the Divine love, renders nugatory and worse than nugatory all the graces God has conferred upon him, defeats the designs of God in his regard, prevents Him from carrying out His purpose, a purpose too which you tell me is a genuine reality and no mere figure of speech or metaphor?

The answer to this difficulty is to be found in a technical distinction, familiar to every Catholic theologian. Every will, desire, purpose, is either an *antecedent* or a *consequent* will or desire or purpose. The *antecedent* will is one which a man entertains antecedently to certain circumstances hereafter to happen; a *consequent* desire is the will entertained by him after these circumstances have happened, or after he has admitted them into his intelligence as a factor to be included in the case that is being considered. If I engage a servant, my *antecedent* desire is that he may serve me faithfully, and may succeed and prosper in his employ, but if I discover that he has robbed me, I have a consequent desire that he shall lose his place and be punished with imprisonment. If at any moment I can put out of my mind his ill deeds, I have a genuine and real desire that he may prosper; but the recollection of his dishonesty induces as the consequence a desire that he may suffer. I have an *antecedent* will satisfied with and favorable to his welfare; a *consequent* will inclining me to be satisfied at and favor his well-merited misfortunes. If I purpose to spend my summer holiday in Europe, I have an *antecedent* will to cross the Atlantic and spend the summer months in Switzerland, or Bavaria; but some pressing business makes my presence in America desirable, and I have a *consequent* will to spend my holiday at Newport, or camping out among the Northern lakes. My will to cross the Atlantic was a genuine, hearty, serious will; but the circumstances changed, and I was equally content to remain at home.

This difference between the *antecedent* and *consequent* will exists, *mutatis mutandis*, in God. He cannot change His will; in His case the distinction is not between an antecedent will ignorant of the future and a consequent will developing itself simultaneously with the development of unexpected circumstances. In God there is no past, no present, no future; everything is an eternal *now;* each detail of the life of every individual is ever present to His omniscience, and has been present from all eternity. But yet the distinction exists; not involving a distinction of time, but a distinction of logical order conceived by us to exist in the mind of God, so that He loves the sinner, heartily and truly desires his salvation, antecedently to and apart from the fact that in the end he will wilfully and deliberately reject the love of God, refuse His offers of mercy, and so die impenitent. It is as though God turned His thoughts away from and refused to look forward to this future and final impenitence, regarding the sinner as one who is, *hic et nunc*, an object of the Divine compassion, a possible recipient of the Divine goodness, one who, as far as his nature is concerned, is capable of becoming a saint of God in heaven, one who is, as far as the Divine action in his regard is concerned, intended for the company of the redeemed and for eternal happiness. It is by reason of this capacity for perfection that God wills his salvation with a will antecedently true and real, though always depending on the condition of man's co-operation. It is by reason of God's foreknowledge that he will reject the offer of salvation that He consequently wills his eternal punishment. What men will at different times and under altered circumstances God wills at the same time and under the same circumstances, and the incompatibility of the two simultaneous wills is the result of what men would call a different aspect of the matter, a different view of the same individual man, whether he is regarded as he is at the present moment, or as he will, through his own deliberate agency, be at some time in the future.

But perhaps it may seem that the difficulty still remains, or that I am degrading God to a human level when I suppose that first of all (in the logical order) He desires absolutely and in itself the salvation of man, and then afterwards is driven forth from His first desire by human malice and perversity, that He is disappointed and has to fall back on what is second best and the will of God only because He has been foiled of His earlier intention by man's exercise—even though it be a forbidden and unlawful exercise—of freedom. But this objection, like all others, brought against the providence of God and His dealings with the creatures He has made would ultimately lead to a contradiction. It is based on the hypothesis that God, whilst He leaves man free, is at the same time

bound to prevent that freedom from being freely exercised. It implies that man is to be free to obey, but not free to rebel; free to do right, but not free to do wrong; free to follow the dictates of conscience, but not free to follow the suggestions of pride, or appetite, or covetousness, or desire. Taking men as they are, such freedom would be no freedom at all. Assuming that God has decreed to give each one a certain amount of grace, sufficient indeed, and more than sufficient to enable him to avoid serious sin, but not sufficient to determine him to unbroken virtue, the liberty to depart from virtue and deliberately commit sin is attached to human nature, such as God has created it. Even before the fall and under the surpassing advantages resulting from the absence of original sin and consequent concupiscence, this liberty was an integral factor in the nature of our first parents. And after the fall, with the gifts of integrity and innocence withdrawn, with the debased nature handed down by Adam to his posterity, this liberty to offend as well as to obey is still more fatally prominent in the list of man's moral faculties. Except in the case of Him who, by reason of the hypostatic union, was necessarily impeccable, and of her whom God exempted from the universal vow, a special and unexampled interference, rebellion, partial or entire, inherited or self-originated, was the heirloom of every child of Adam. Even if there had been ten thousand cases of a submission, perfect and unbroken, to the Divine law instead of a single one, still this power to resist would none the less have been present in all, and the power of resistance implies that God, by the gift of freedom, chose for His own greater glory to allow the rational creature to escape as regards his individual action from the necessary submission to God's antecedent will. This greatest of all God's gifts to man was not only a partaking in the Divine nature in a sense in which no other gift was or could be, but also carried with it a sort of limiting of the Divine omnipotence, at least in appearance, if not in reality. He who had all His creatures under His perfect and absolute control allowed one portion of them to proclaim for a time a kind of mock independence, so that they deluded themselves sometimes into a belief that "God does not hear and the God of Jacob does not regard their assertion of independence and proclamation of open rebellion." They even could blind themselves for a time, though with difficulty, and only after a long course of stubborn perversity, to the very existence of the Supreme Controller, whose sway they refused to acknowledge, and whose claims upon their obedience they had long ignored; they could at last say in their heart as well as with their lips: There is no God.

I call this a mock independence, and an apparent limitation of the Divine omnipotence, because nothing more clearly brings out

God's infinite power and absolute supremacy than the way in which man, though he can defeat God's antecedent will, fails hopelessly and entirely when he makes an attempt to set aside God's consequent will. Vainly and fruitlessly does he struggle against that which God has decreed to effect independently of man's consent. His highest wisdom then turns to utter folly, and his most brilliant efforts prove ludicrous and contemptible failures; his most magnificent displays of strength do but display his puny weakness by the side of his Creator's power. Of all instances of such failure, the circumstances surrounding the death of Jesus Christ form the most striking and the most complete. Never was there a more brilliant triumph apparently achieved by the enemies of God. They had mastered One whom they recognized as at least Divine; even though they knew not that He was God, they had full power to wreak their utmost malice on an adversary such as they had never encountered before or since; they had completely in their power (*ut more humano loquar*) the Son of God. They had seduced one of his favorite disciples; had surprised and captured Him without a struggle; had overcome the scruples of the Roman governor who sought to save Him; had surmounted all the difficulties in their path, the contradictions of their false witnesses, the groundlessness of their accusations, the influence they knew that He possessed with the majority of the inhabitants of the city; they had not only secured their main object of getting rid of Him (as they thought) once and forever, but they had done it with an elaboration of malicious cruelty and brutality, with an accumulated refinement of barbarous tortures, insults, and mockery, which one would have thought would have satisfied the malignity even of the devil himself. The Son of God had become a poor, bleeding, helpless thing, in which the form of man was scarcely recognizable. His body was one great wound; His face was covered with bruises, and blood, and spittle; every outrage had been heaped upon Him; and the sight, the heart-rending sight of the Victim of Calvary would have moved a heart of stone. In this condition of agony and prostration they had sought to force Him to carry His cross up the hill of Calvary; they had devised tortures ever new; they had pierced His hands and feet, scoffed at the extremity of His agony, fed Him with gall, laughed at Him in His abandonment, scoffed at His torturing thirst, gloated over His approaching death. Yet, in each detail of this scene of incredible horror, every agent, every persecutor of Christ, every blasphemer of His name, scribes who jeered, and Pharisees who mocked at Him, slaves who scourged Him, soldiers who pierced His hands and feet, were but carrying out in its every detail the consequent will of God; not that God willed their sins either by an antecedent or

a consequent will, but He willed the death of His Son, and permitted the sinful actions which led up to it. They were, in spite of themselves, simply executing the Divine decrees, fulfilling His purposes of mercy, working out the redemption of the world, founding the Church of God, opening the fount of supernatural graces to mankind, crushing the serpent's head; nay, the devil himself, as chief agent in the work, was ruining his own power, heaping up for himself fresh torments, thrusting himself deeper down in the abyss of his prison-house to all eternity. They were but the slaves of Divine Omnipotence, carrying out His will, while they fancied themselves independent; while they thought they were destroying the Lord and His Christ, He who dwells in the heavens was laughing them to scorn. They were but the instruments in His hands, and the executioners of His designs, bringing about that revolution in the world's history by which the kingdoms of this world became the kingdoms of God and of His Christ. While they thought to overturn the throne of the Highest, they were but preparing themselves to be His footstool; at the moment of their most brilliant victory they were inflicting on themselves a crushing, irrevocable, eternal defeat.

The history of the world is but a series of scenes of which the crucifixion was the prototype, in which the malignity of the enemies of God is turned in some way or other to His honor and glory, to the advantage of His faithful servants and friends, to the final triumph when He shall crush all enemies beneath His feet. All men are, in fact, in spite of themselves, continually engaged in carrying out the consequent will of God. It is the consciousness of this fact, the knowledge that whatever happens is the will of God, that renders the servants of God so perfectly calm and untroubled amid all miseries, contradictions, and persecutions; nay, amid all the sins and ingratitude of wicked men. They know that it is—if I may be allowed the expression—God's will that His will should not always be done; that it is sometimes His consequent will that His antecedent will should be defeated. Thus the zealous missioner, eager for the salvation of souls, spares no pains, labors, prayers on behalf of his flock. No sacrifice is too great for him; no personal suffering counts for aught; no loss of health, comfort, friends, weighs for a moment in the scale, if he sees that the eternal welfare of one of those for whom Christ died, one of His wandering sheep, is in any proximate danger; eagerly, intensely, earnestly, he is ready to devote himself to promote the honor of his Master. As long as there is any hope of the antecedent will of God being also his consequent will, no effort is too great for his anxious zeal. But, when once the die is cast, when the sinner has passed away, to all outward appearance impenitent, or turned his

back on the offers of mercy; when he sees that it is not the consequent will of God that he should succeed in bringing that soul back to God, then no vain regrets disturb his peace of mind. Sorrowful he is, indeed, for the alien lost for a time, and perhaps forever, but not sad. No shadow of despondency, because of his apparent failure, falls on the brightness of his path. "God's will be done," that is, God's consequent will, is his consoling thought; and the knowledge that it must be done under all possible circumstances, the continual consciousness that nothing can hinder it, the union of our human will with the consequent will of God, is the only solid foundation of all peace and happiness for men.

It is this which is the secret of the unbroken joy and ever abiding satisfaction of the holy angels who are employed in ministering to men. We should at first sight imagine that a large proportion, perhaps a majority, of these guardians of men must be always sad. What miserable failures seem to beset their loving care and vigilance! They seek to ward off temptation, but the perverse children of men deliberately seek it. They dart into the minds of their clients holy thoughts, good desires, aspirations after virtue, only to have those thoughts, desires, aspirations wilfully rejected and set at naught. They see those committed to their care, and over whose eternal happiness they long with an insatiable longing, plunging into the filth of sin, or proudly raising the standard of rebellion against their God; and, worst of all, they witness a sight that the human lover of souls never witnesses,—they see the child of their love, the soul, made in the image of God, the destined denizen of heaven, through its own fault cast down in eternal reprobation to the depths of hell! What a failure, to all appearance, of that holy angel's mission, whose client thus dies impenitent! What a miserable disappointment, as men would term it! We should fancy almost that the guardian angel would be half ashamed to appear before his God when he had to confess such failures as these occurring, not once or twice, but many times. We should imagine him reproaching himself because he had not done more, and sadly fancying that, if he had been more active and vigilant, his poor client might have been saved. Not so, however, the happy spirits who see God face to face, see all the other beings in the light of God. No cloud passes over their unalloyed, their perfect happiness, when they have failed in their mission. They are none the less full of joy, and exultation and gratitude to their God, when their efforts on behalf of the child of earth committed to them have been a series of defeats, than when they rejoiced over his return to virtue, and witnessed his happy struggles with temptation, and enjoyed delicious repose in watching his perseverance in virtue and his advance towards perfection. True, in the one case, the antecedent

will of God was done; in the other it was not. But in the one case and in the other His consequent will was accomplished; the order of his providence ordained from all eternity was accomplished; the means he had chosen in His eternal wisdom for the manifestation of His glory were accomplished; and, therefore, those whose will was perfectly united to the Divine will desired nothing better than the unfailing accomplishment of the Divine decrees.

We may thus describe the antecedent will of God as that which God seriously desires, apart from any free choice of his rational creatures. The consequent will is that which He desires and determines when He looks forward to and takes into account the actions that He foresees they will freely perform. If man had persevered in original justice this distinction would not exist; had there been no sin, no imperfection, no falling away from the perfect will of God. God's antecedent will, inasmuch as it would always have met with obedience from His rational creatures in all its details, would thus have been also His consequent will. Man would have freely done what God desired him freely to do, just as the brute creation carry out the designs of God instinctively and spontaneously after the fashion of their own nature. Their action, indeed, is in one sense free, in that no external necessity forces them to this act rather than to that. But it is not voluntary; it proceeds from an internal principle, not from the mere action of an exterior motive force; but it does not proceed from a formal knowledge of the end in view, and from a deliberate choice of the means to be used to gain it. But man chooses deliberately the means necessary to gain his end, and he is free to choose them or reject them. He can wilfully set aside that which he knows is a necessary means to lead him to the end for which God has ordained him. It is this fatal privilege which gives him the power to commit sin; and it is by reason of sin that the consequent will of God differs from His antecedent will. Sin has introduced disorder into the world, and, as order is the law of God's creation, God must necessarily intervene to adjust the balance and restore the harmony which has been disturbed. There is a jarring element as long as there is a single rebel who has not been reduced to submission, willing or compulsory.

The consequent will of God leads up to and finally secures the universal submission of every creature to its Creator. Heaven will contain all those who have made a willing act of submission. Hell will be the lot of those who have been forced to bow the knee, and who do it with reluctance,—nay, with a loathing hatred of Him whom they acknowledge with an interior repugnance that will be one of the chief elements of their eternal misery. But, voluntary or involuntary, this final submission will be the culminating act of God's consequent will. Till then He is,

indeed, supreme; but this supremacy is disputed. He shall, indeed, reign until He has put all enemies beneath His feet; but His reign is one which, for the sake of free obedience and difficult obedience, tolerates the presence of rebellion,—a rebellion which throws into relief the generous devotion of His faithful ones and their true-hearted loyalty, where loyalty involves severe suffering, while treachery holds out the tempting bait of pleasure. For, though it is never the will of God that man should sin, yet it is His will that man should be free to sin. It is His will that sin should carry with it its necessary consequences of suffering, and misery and death. It is His will that it should work for the advantage of the elect, and indirectly for His own glory. In other words, it is the consequent will of God that sin and virtue should alike carry with them their appropriate fruits and consequences.

Thus in the first instance, and apart from all foreknowledge of the way in which man will use his freedom of choice between good and evil, God really and truly, not by any fiction or figure of speech, desires that man should enjoy a career of unbroken peace and happiness on earth, and should without fail attain to the joy of the redeemed in heaven. He wills all to be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth. Christ died for all, in order that all might avail themselves of the Divine will respecting them. He gave Himself up as a redemption, not for the sins of the elect alone, but for the sins of the whole world. It is in this sense that the salvific will of God is universal. But, given the fact of sin persevered in to the end, given man's persistent misuse of his own free-will and rejection of the Divine mercy, it is God's will that all who thus freely remain rebels until life is over should suffer the just punishment of obstinate rebellion and malice.

What concerns every one of us as individuals is, that we should remember that God's consequent will is still suspended as regards any final determination of our future destiny. He is waiting for us to see how we shall decide,—whether we shall submit or rebel. His antecedent will is therefore in full force, as far as we are concerned. He looks, longs, hopes, with a genuine and real desire, a yearning love, an affection that never ceases as long as life lasts, for our loyal declaration of obedience, for our voluntary act of submission. To this act He draws us, entices us, allures us, attracts us, invites us; sometimes seeks almost to drive us to it; sometimes holds out inducements that it would be thought none but a madman could set aside. In fact, he does everything but force us. He will not violate the freedom He has bestowed on us. We can disappoint Him if we choose; but, if we disappoint Him, it is we alone who suffer for it. His eternal, immutable, omnipotent will merely appears under a new phase; majesty takes the place of mercy; vengeance at last succeeds to long-enduring clemency.

THE CHINESE IN AMERICA.

WITHIN a comparatively recent period the public attention of the whole American people has been drawn to the question of Chinese immigration. The populations of the Pacific coast have been deeply interested in the subject for over twenty years; in fact, it has been the most important public question there for the greater part of that time; but it is only within the last three years that they have succeeded in attracting to it the attention of the States east of the Missouri. The Chinese immigration law has been the result; but, though its passage has officially prohibited the influx of Chinese immigrants, public opinion is by no means unanimous either as to the justice or the wisdom of the law itself. Not a few public men have pronounced in favor of making the United States the receptacle of every race of mankind, and treat the law which excludes the Chinese as opposed to justice, and to the true interests of the country at large. On the other hand, some of the advocates of exclusion have indulged in language against the Chinese as a race which cannot be justified either by reason or justice. To describe the Asiatic immigrants as a body of lepers or slaves, as has been occasionally done, is alike absurd and unjust. It is not by the use of indiscriminate abuse, nor of petty persecutions, that any great national question like this should be settled. The points at issue in the Chinese question, as regarded by American Catholics, may be briefly summed up thus: Is it just, morally, for the people of the United States, acting through their Government, to refuse the right of settlement here to the Chinese or any other race? Is it wise to do so? With these questions we propose to deal to the best of our ability.

With regard to the absolute right of any organized nation to admit or not to admit members of other nationalities to its soil, there cannot be a question. It is claimed and admitted by every civilized power, and has been admitted from the earliest times. Here in the United States, where a stream of immigration, unparalleled in any other age or country, has been pouring in during the last century, this right has scarcely been exercised, until now many have almost forgotten that it exists. A moment's glance, however, will show that it is fully recognized and acted on by every civilized government at will. Republican France sends unwelcome foreigners beyond her frontiers without ceremony; and in republican Switzerland a monthly tax has to be paid by foreigners for the privilege of residing in the city of Geneva, non-payment of which

entails expulsion. It is only a few years since many thousands of the natives of Alsace-Lorraine were forced to expatriate themselves in default of taking the oath of allegiance to the German Empire; and, however harsh the measure might be, it has never been asserted that Germany was not within her strict right in enforcing it. The passport system, which, till within a few years, prevailed all through Europe, was founded on the right of each nation to admit or refuse admittance to whom it might please; and it has never been deemed necessary to denounce the passport system as a national injustice. Custom, it is true, of late years, owing mainly to the increase of travel, has introduced a sort of international comity, which prevents the exclusion *en masse* from any country of the people of another in ordinary times; but the right still exists, and is from time to time exercised without remonstrance. As regards China, even such an international comity cannot be said to exist with this country. The Celestial Empire has never opened her territory to American settlement. The vast territories to the north and west of China proper, which equal nearly the whole territory of the United States in extent, are forbidden ground to all foreigners; and even in China itself settlement and travel are limited by the strictest law for all foreigners. Neither in strict justice nor in international courtesy is the United States bound to allow any immigration of Chinese into its own territory.

The discussion of the justice or morality of a nation's act may seem to many a waste of time in the present age. We may be told that nations, like corporations, have no souls to save, and no bodies to punish, and that the interest of the people is the highest law, to which all other considerations should bend. To that proposition we cannot, as Catholics, assent. In this country, at least, every citizen has a share, however small, in shaping the public policy, and it is his bounden duty to oppose, as far as his ability goes, every public, no less than every private, injustice. If the Chinese had a natural right in this country, such as the Indian tribes or the Southern negroes possess, we would condemn to the utmost of our power any attempt to deprive them of it, however such an attempt might command popular favor. As no such right, however, can be shown to exist, we shall proceed to the second and much wider question: Is it expedient for the present people of the United States to allow free entry into their country to the Chinese?

There is, perhaps, no point on which the public opinion of the country is more decided than that of inviting immigration of kindred races. From the earliest days of colonial settlement down to the present, the natives of every country of Europe have been welcomed to our shores. Germans, Swedes, French, Spaniards, Ital-

ians, Irish, and English Portuguese, and Russians have all been welcomed, as more or less desirable partners in the work of building up a great and free nation on this continent. That this policy has been a main cause of the astonishing material growth of the United States is not open to question. The experiment of transplanting the civilization of the Indo-European race to the New World, has been tried both on the system of inviting all its nationalities to a free share in the virgin soil, and on that of restricting immigration to a single people. The latter has been tried for three centuries in the Spanish colonies, and the former for scarcely two on this northern continent. What the result has been in each case is too well known to need description here. It is enough to say that a movement of peoples such as has never been since the break-up of the Roman empire, has built up peacefully a united nation in America, greater, even now, than any of Western Europe in numbers and wealth, and which promises soon to surpass in both any empire yet seen in the modern world. The settlers from the military empire of Germany, from the old monarchy of France, from republican Switzerland and oppressed Ireland, have all equally taken a part in building up this nation, and it would be impossible to decide what element is entitled to claim any superiority in the formation of its character. But it would not be safe to conclude that because the different nationalities of Europe have fused and are still fusing into an American nation, without serious difficulty, therefore every other race of mankind can join in the fusion. Great as are the differences of government, of language, and of social training, that distinguish the different nations of Europe from one another, they are trifling when compared with those which separate the whole European race from those of other origins. The bond of a common Christian civilization, the recognition of the equality of all men before the Creator, and the common right of all to just treatment from their fellows; the feelings of patriotism, and at least the traditions and love for political liberty, are common to all the races of Europe, while they are wholly foreign to the populations of the greater part of Asia and Africa. It scarcely needs argument to prove what a part the existence of these common feelings and traditions has played and still plays in blending together harmoniously the different race elements here. That the blending has gone on successfully where they exist gives no warrant that it would succeed with races such as the Chinese, among whom they are unknown.

The comparative ease with which some races unite into a common nationality, while others seem wholly incapable of blending together, even after the lapse of thousands of years, is a well-known fact in history. The Celts of old Gaul and the Iberians of the

Spanish Peninsula readily adopted the language and civilization of their Roman conquerors, and a century after their conquest were as much Romans as the Italians themselves. The German and Slavonian tribes, that moved in on the decaying Roman Empire, in like manner became soon amalgamated with the older populations. Celt, Saxon, and Norman gradually combined into the modern English people, just as Frank, Celt and Latin had previously grown together into the French nation, and as all the races of Europe are now combining to form the American people. Very different, however, was the case when the Semitic Arabs and Moors settled in Spain, or the Turanian Turks possessed themselves of Constantinople. While the paganism of the Germanic tribes, and even of the fierce Danish vikings, gradually yielded to Christianity, and the savage warriors of the North insensibly adopted the habits of their subjects, the alien races, Arab or Turk, remained to the last wholly distinct from the populations of European origin. Turkey to-day is not a nation in the same sense as the other countries of Europe are. It is rather a bundle of nationalities, held together by a central despotism, but showing no more tendency to unite into one people, and possessing no closer common interests, than they did four centuries ago when Mahomet the Second planted the crescent on the walls of Constantinople. The case was the same in Spain during the seven hundred years of Arab and Moorish dominion. Both instances serve to show the danger of bringing radically distinct races together, and the difficulty of uniting them into a common people. It is well to bear them in mind when there is question of opening the ports of America to a race still more foreign to European cultivation than either Turk or Arab.

We are aware that it is the fashion with a large class to-day to speak contemptuously of the teachings of history in judging modern events and their probable consequences. A certain class of writers and speakers seem to imagine that there is some hidden charm in our free institutions which will change the nature of men brought under their influence from any race. Writers of this class contend that Chinese or Hindoos only need to be admitted into our midst to convert them in a generation or two into genuine Americans. How childish such hopes are, a glance at the present condition of Asia will prove. For over three centuries European powers have held sway over different parts of the Asiatic continent. Portugal, France, Holland and England have all long ruled more or less extensive territories there. All four have tried colonization on different principles, and all four have also tried colonization in America. The fact remains, that while on this continent the Knickerbockers of New Amsterdam, the Creoles of Louisiana,

and the English settlers of Virginia and New England have each helped to build up the modern American nation, nothing like a new nation has been founded by any of them in Asia. The English in India, and the Hollanders in Java, are, to-day, merely foreign garrisons among Asiatic populations, and be their rule good or bad it produces nothing like the Europeanization, if we may use the word, of the native races. But, of all the races of the far East, none is more tenacious of the national character, or less inclined to mould itself on a strange civilization than the Chinese. Their form of government, their literature, their social system, and their policy, have remained almost unchanged since the days of Cæsar. The Roman empire has risen and decayed, the whole face of the Western World has been changed again and again; new languages have sprung up on the ruins of the old; despotism has succeeded republicanism, feudalism has grown up and died away, representative government has displaced absolutism, and often disappeared again, throughout the Western World, but still China continues almost as she was before the earliest of those mighty changes. Is it reasonable to expect that such a people will fuse into a nation like ours, because it offers them political advantages which they are incapable of appreciating, and a material civilization which they look down on compared to their own? If we allow an Asiatic population to grow up within our borders, we must expect to have such relations with it as exist between the Hollanders and Malays in Java, or between the English and Hindoos in India. To maintain such relations permanently would imply the existence side by side of a superior and a subject race. Could self-government exist alongside of such a state of things? We believe not; and it is too serious a matter to imperil our whole form of government for the sake of trying the experiment.

It may be asked whether China is capable of or likely to send such an immigration to our shores as would build up an Asiatic population on any part of this continent. With the facilities offered by modern navigation, nothing seems more likely. The population of the Chinese empire, however estimates of its exact numbers may differ, is certainly larger than the whole Indo-European race. By some it is placed as high as five hundred millions, and considering the density of both city and country population throughout the eighteen provinces of China proper, which is at least twenty times the extent of England, the estimate does not seem an extravagant one. From countries of Europe whose aggregate inhabitants do not reach a hundred and fifty millions the present generation has received six millions of immigrants. It would be easy for China to send double that number to the United States now

that her people have begun to share in the general movement which is so marked a feature of modern history. The number of Chinese who have already crossed the Pacific cannot be less than a quarter of a million, and is probably much over that number, considering the deaths and returned immigrants. At present there is only one line of steamers plying between China and San Francisco, just as forty years ago there was only one between Europe and New York. The passenger trade is a gainful one, and unless some legal obstacle be interposed there is no reason why the one line of to-day may not be followed by twenty or thirty lines in less than a generation, as has been the case on the Atlantic. These are more than mere possibilities. They are what the experience of mankind shows to be almost certain to come to pass, and it behooves the public to deal with the problem while it is yet time.

Even without reckoning with an influx of such dimensions, a much smaller immigration of Chinese is capable of producing very serious results.

The Pacific coast of the United States, though unsurpassed in natural resources by any section, is much less thickly peopled than the States east of the Missouri. The white population of California, Oregon, Nevada, Washington Territory and Arizona scarcely reaches a million and a half, and its remoteness from the thickly settled parts of the Union renders any such influx of immigrants as has built up Illinois and the adjoining States unlikely to come for many years. The flood of settlement, great as it is, rolls on gradually from State to State, as the older lands are filled up, and the comparatively barren belt between Nebraska and California has a marked effect in checking its rapid advance across the continent. An Asiatic population of a few hundred thousands would suffice to produce in California and Oregon all the difficulties which one of eight or ten millions would on the Atlantic seaboard and in the Mississippi Valley. Nor is it only that it would disturb the existing state of public affairs seriously by its presence, but it would surely be a serious bar to further white immigration. Nothing seems to have such an effect in turning away modern settlement from a country as the existence of an alien laboring population. Compare the progress of South Africa, where a large native population exists, with that of Australia or Canada, though all three are colonies of the same power, and this fact will be admitted even without reference to countries like India or Algeria, where difference of climate might be supposed to have offered a bar to white settlement. Let it be known once that on the Pacific coast the immigrants of European race will have to compete for work with Asiatics, and the flow of immigration will be quickly arrested. It is useless to urge the unreasonableness of such a course. Immi-

grants will not come. As a natural consequence the Asiatics will increase and become every year a more important element in the population. They may not be the ruling class, but they will form the masses, and to establish a distinction between the ruling class and the majority is to abandon the leading principle of the American constitution.

That unchecked Asiatic immigration is capable in a few years of changing the whole population of a country, even when already thickly settled, is not a mere matter of speculation. A very tangible instance of it is furnished by the British colony of Mauritius, which less than half a century ago was peopled almost exclusively by whites and negroes. The island is small, scarcely seven hundred square miles in extent, and the population was actually denser than that of New York or Pennsylvania to-day. About 1838 the system of importing coolies to work on the plantations was introduced, and to-day they form nearly two-thirds of the whole population. What has occurred in densely-peopled Mauritius is far more likely to happen in California and Oregon with their population of five or six at the utmost to the square mile. Indeed, we can see nothing to prevent it if no obstacle be raised by domestic legislation. The number of Chinese ready to leave their own crowded cities are counted by millions, the facilities for transporting them across the Pacific are practically unlimited, and the wide territory of the United States offers a far more inviting field of labor than the plantations of a small tropical island in the Indian Ocean.

In reckoning up the probabilities of Asiatic colonization on this continent, it is well to bear in mind that it is only within the lifetime of the present generation that the population of the Chinese Empire has begun to spread itself abroad. For centuries the law of the empire, as well as the profound contempt of the people for foreign lands, kept the teeming millions of China inclosed within their own wall. Even the Tartar provinces, the fertile wastes of Mongolia and Mantchuria, over which a few hordes of warlike shepherds, scarcely more numerous than the Sioux and Piutes of our Western territory, roamed, were closed to the natives of China. The Abbé Huc, who traversed those countries in 1840 and the following years, describes the overflowing population of China as insensibly flowing into the desert by isolated families, while emigration was strictly forbidden by the Imperial laws. Towards foreign countries the isolation of the Empire was complete. It was a maxim of public policy that all intercourse with the "outside barbarians" could only bring injury to the subjects of the Celestial Empire, and emigration was forbidden not less strictly than the admission of foreigners. The war by which England forced the opening of the five ports to foreign commerce, little over

forty years ago, was the first breach in the wall of exclusion with which China had for centuries surrounded itself. That the war in question was a gross violation of justice and a mere piece of unjustifiable violence on the part of a strong power towards a weak one, there in no longer any question. It is, however, with its effects, and not with its causes, we have here to deal. The opening of the ports led rapidly to the commencement of a movement of emigration in China, where the crowded population had long experienced the difficulties of a struggle for life far keener than any other nation can easily realize. The Chinese Government strove for many years ineffectually to hinder this movement, and retain its people at home. The British colony of Hong Kong, within a few miles of the coast, and the old Portuguese settlement at Macao offered facilities for slipping out of the Empire which Chinese adroitness was not slow in utilizing. In many of the European colonies, and in some of the lately emancipated South American states, there was a keen demand for slave labor, or at least for bond servants. China could supply this demand, and Chinese merchants quickly found the means to convey their working countrymen to the foreign lands, in spite of Imperial prohibitions. The Coolie traffic, or the export of Chinese laborers under bond to serve a certain number of years in payment of their passage, sprang to great dimensions. Peru, Cuba, and numerous other countries were eager to obtain Coolie laborers, and once the movement was set going, the emigration speedily extended. The Chinese speculators, among whom the love of gain is as fully developed as in the keenest speculators of our stock markets, quickly found that they might utilize the surplus labor of their countrymen for their own profit, without the necessity of selling them for a term of years to the planters of Cuba or Demerara. Companies were organized to transport Coolies or laborers to California, after the discovery of gold in that State. The projectors counted on being repaid for the cost of passage, and reaping besides a handsome profit for themselves out of the surplus wages of the Coolies. In fact, they proposed to deal with them on a large scale, much as the Italian "padroni" deal with the boys, whom they hire from their parents, to work at organ-grinding in London or New York. The experiment proved successful, and its field of operation was gradually enlarged. The war of 1857, between China and Great Britain aided by France, though still more unjust than the earlier war, resulted in a further "opening up" of China, as it was then termed. Among the articles of the Treaty of Tiensin, which ended that war, was one which permitted Chinese of both sexes to emigrate freely. The English press was loud in its self-congratulations over this article, which it was hoped would largely increase the productive

power (for England, of course, but not for the natives) of the British colonies in the Chinese and adjoining seas. In a purely commercial spirit the English Government wished to fill up its colonies in Asiatic countries with the population from which the largest revenue could be obtained, quite independent of any other considerations. It believed that such a population was the Chinese, and accordingly it desired to substitute them for Malays, Bornese, and Sumatrans in the districts which it held inhabited by these races. That such an arrangement was bad for the Malays and Sumatrans aforesaid was unquestionable, but as they were mere subject-races, the English people troubled itself little about their complaints.

Under the impulse thus given by pressure from abroad, the immigration from China rapidly assumed larger proportions. Not only the neighboring countries of Asia, but the English colonies in Australia and the Pacific coast of the United States, and even the West Indies, received it on a vastly increased scale.

Complaints began soon to arise against the new form of slave labor which the "assisted emigration" from China took, and by a curious irony of fate the earliest protest against Chinese immigration came from the colonies of the very power which had wrung permission for it from the reluctant Chinese Government. The colonists of New South Wales and Melbourne raised their protests against the influx of Chinese Coolies, which the Government of Great Britain had brought on them. A population of Chinese might furnish a larger revenue to the Home Government and the English merchants than a white population would, but it was found to be by no means so beneficial to the white colonists themselves. As usual, public feeling in England was interested in behalf of the Chinese laborers, from whom so much profit might be reasonably expected. The bombardment of the defenceless city of Canton, because its authorities had seized the smuggling, "Lorcha Arrow" under British colors, had been indorsed at a general election by the people of England as a righteous vindication of "national" honor. The encouragement of Chinese immigration to Australia was subsequently treated as a duty of national humanity. The colonists, however, were stubborn in their opposition to the Coolie traffic, by whatever name it might be called, and large head taxes were levied in several of the Australian Parliaments on all Chinese immigrants. The consequence has been greatly to reduce Chinese immigration to the great southern island, though a large Chinese population is still found in Queensland, the most northern of its provinces, and a certain proportion of inhabitants of the same race exists in all the colonies.

In America the Chinese question did not assume prominence as

soon as it did in Australia. California, during the early mining excitement, was the only part of the United States that received any number of Chinese laborers, and for some years the confusion of races was too great in California to permit any special attention being paid to one more than another. The immigrants, who came in thousands during 1849 and 1850, hailed from every part of the globe. Mexicans, Chilians, Kanakas from the Pacific islands, and men from every nation of Europe were mixed up with immigrants from every part of the Union, and no one nationality had a decided prominence over the others. The new-comers were all in search of gold, and troubled themselves but little over the character or nationality of their fellow gold-hunters. To the majority of the immigrants the presence of Asiatics on American soil was merely one new feature in a whole panorama of novelties. They scarcely distinguished the Chinese from the native Indians, or from the mixed races of Spanish America, which at that time formed a much larger part of the population. Gradually, however, as the mines ceased to be the only industry of California, and the attention of its mixed population began to be turned to other pursuits, and to the regulation of life on a social basis, the peculiarities of the Chinese element began to attract first remark and then complaint. It was observed that the Chinese, while gradually growing in numbers, made no attempts to establish any closer fellowship with the rest of the population. They lived apart and worked in bodies by themselves, and as far as their acts were regulated by law it was Chinese law, not that of California. The Chinese quarter was as distinct a feature in every Californian camp as is the European quarter in a Chinese city. Few cared to penetrate into its internal economy, as difference of language was to most an insurmountable barrier; but it was seen easily that the whole system of life was carried on there in a manner radically different from that of the white race. Family life there was none, and, as the rough ways of the early miners gradually changed to the normal conditions of civilization, the Chinese peculiarities in this respect attracted more and more comment. It was also noted that certain "companies" of the wealthier Chinamen exercised despotic sway over the mass of their countrymen. They regulated the rates of labor, the nature of business in which they should engage, the payment of debts among themselves, and in fact nearly all the concerns of life, with as much authority as the ministers of the emperor could in China itself. The punishment of stripes, and even of death, was freely inflicted by the courts of the companies, and all attempts on the part of the regular authorities to interfere with such practices were baffled by the veil of mystery which surrounded these proceedings for all but the Chinese themselves. Slavery, too, though pro-

hibited by the laws of California, was well known to exist among the Chinese; and slaves, chiefly women, were (and still for that matter are) regularly bought and sold for the vilest purposes. It was by no means rare for the Chinese speculators in slaves to call in the aid of the State authorities to recover runaway or kidnapped slaves. As a matter of course the claims were not made on that ground, but a pretended husband or father would apply to the police for the recovery of his wife or child; and, when the parties in question had been so recovered, they would be utterly unable to explain the facts to the court, and easily frightened into confirming through an interpreter the false statements of their owners. The repeated occurrence of facts of this kind has had no small share in forming public opinion in California into its present attitude on the Chinese question.

A very distinctive character of the Chinese population in the United States is its essentially migratory nature. The Chinaman, unlike other immigrants, does not come to stay. He only seeks to accumulate as much during his foreign sojourn as will enable him to live at ease in his own country, to whose habits and traditions he closely clings. He rarely or never brings his family with him, or cares to establish himself permanently outside the "flowery kingdom." As a natural consequence he can live more cheaply and compete advantageously in the labor market with the white workingmen who have families to maintain, and the usual duties of citizens to discharge, with which the Chinese never care to meddle, even were they permitted. In fact, the labor competition between whites and Chinese on the Pacific is not between workingmen under similar conditions of life, but between the surplus Coolies of China and Americans working under the ordinary conditions of human life. Chinese labor is not merely cheaper, but it is much more easily transferred from place to place, and generally speaking more under the control of the wages-payers. On a small scale similar migrations of laborers who have no intention of remaining permanently away from their homes take place in many other countries. The mountaineers of Savoy regularly descend into the French cities to accumulate the means of subsistence for their later years from their savings abroad. The West of Ireland reapers in their annual excursions to reap the English harvests, the Gallegos of the North of Spain in their annual journeys to help in gathering in the vintage in other provinces of the Peninsula, and the Italian railroad laborers in their excursions to Germany and France, are types of the kind of migration practised by the Chinese in America. But, while such movements among people of the same or closely-allied countries may be useful, they cannot but be objectionable when they threaten to supersede the

actual native workingmen. The effect, too, on the travellers themselves is very often highly demoralizing, and especially so has this been the case among the Chinese in America. A number of European laborers may leave home annually for a few months without losing the home influences which play so important a part, ordinarily speaking, in the maintenance of order and morals in every country, but they could hardly do so if their absence was to extend over a number of years. One or other might escape the danger, but the moral deterioration of the great majority would be inevitable. So it has been with the Chinese in America. We have no desire to sit in judgment on the character of the Chinese race, as compared with others under the ordinary conditions of life. That without Christianity there can be no high moral qualities in a nation, we know, but we do not feel ourselves called on to enter here into a discussion of the moral shortcomings peculiar to the Chinese people, except as far as they clash with the ordinary laws of society amongst ourselves. With those laws the Chinese immigrants here certainly do come into collision to a much greater extent than other classes of the population. The number of Chinese convicts in the State and county prisons of the Pacific coast is exceptionally large for their proportion to the population. To morality, in the restricted sense of the word, they scarcely make any pretension, and if they are tolerably free from the vice of drunkenness, they more than compensate themselves by the still grosser indulgence of opium-smoking. That, on the whole, their presence has a distinctly demoralizing effect on the surrounding populations, is recognized by every class in the States where they are largely represented. It is scarcely reasonable to attribute a conviction so widely felt, and which has only grown stronger with a quarter of a century's experience, to mere race prejudice. The men who employ Chinese laborers, and presumably profit by them, acknowledge it as freely as the workingmen who compete with them in the labor market. "The fool knows more in his own house than the sage in his neighbor's," says a Spanish proverb; and the people of California and Oregon must certainly be better qualified to form a correct opinion on the morality of the Chinese among them than the people of other sections of the Union, and this opinion has been unmistakably expressed.

What has been said now will enable us to form a pretty accurate idea of the value of the Chinese immigration as a means of spreading Christianity among the population of that empire. It would be unworthy of us as Christians to speak of the conversion of any heathen people, and much more of so large a portion of the human race as the population of China, as a matter of trifling importance. As Catholics we know that the possession of the true

faith, and the means of salvation which it affords, is the greatest of all treasures for humanity; and we cannot but earnestly desire that all the nations of the earth should share in its benefits. The spirit which led Francis Xavier and Peter Claver to devote their lives to spreading the doctrines of Christianity among the heathen populations of Asia and America must, in at least some degree, animate the heart of every true Catholic. But it is not because an object is desirable that every means is to be adopted for its attainment. The promiscuous mingling together of Christian and non-Christian peoples is so far from being a likely means of spreading a knowledge of the Faith that it often serves rather as an obstacle to its diffusion. The Turks, quartered among the Christian nations of Eastern Europe, have shown a far more inveterate hate towards Christianity than did their Turcoman ancestors in the time of Gengis Khan. The Hindoos of to-day, after a century of European dominion, are more inaccessible to Christianity than were their ancestors when first visited by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. We have no time at present to discuss the reasons of this fact; we only state that it is a fact which cannot be denied. There is nothing in the conditions of modern Chinese immigration to America which would warrant us in looking for more favorable results from it than have followed the settlement of Europeans in India. As a matter of fact, the immigrants are totally indifferent to religion in any shape. The absence of anything like home-life or settled habits among them, coupled with their isolation from the populations around, renders them far less liable to receive religious impressions than they would even be in their own country. The result has been, scarcely any instances have occurred of the conversion of Chinese in America to any form of Christianity. A certain number attend the mission schools opened by some of the Protestant denominations in San Francisco and a few other places, but it is admitted that their only motive is to learn English; and, certainly, if any of the pupils have become Christians in consequence, the fact has entirely escaped the public notice. Some Catholics are to be found among the Chinese, it is true. In San Francisco there are probably a hundred and fifty, or thereabouts, but the great majority had received the faith before coming to America, or were the children of Christian parents. Nothing leads to the conclusion that life in America has done anything to promote the growth of Christianity among the Chinese who come to its shores.

Our readers can judge from the foregoing facts whether the recent prohibition of Chinese immigration is wise or not. We believe it is, and in that we are actuated by no feeling of dislike or contempt for the excluded nationality. Their civilization and habits

appear to us to be incompatible with ours, and we believe both races are better apart. They have their land as we have this continent, and let each possess his own peaceably. That the Chinese already among us are entitled to the full protection of the law and to the same treatment as any other class of strangers, we firmly hold; we entirely condemn any petty persecution or manifestations of race enmity towards them, and we believe they should be allowed to work their way in their own fashion as far as it does not conflict with our laws. At the same time we hold that their unlimited immigration is a serious danger to our well-being, and that its prevention by law is an act of wise statesmanship, alike conformable to reason and to justice between man and man.

PURITANISM IN NEW ENGLAND.

History of New England. By John Gorham Palfrey. 3 vols. 8vo. Boston. 1865.

The Puritan Commonwealth. An Historical Review of the Puritan Government in Massachusetts. By Peter Oliver. Boston. 1856.

Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts. By George H. Moore. New York. 1866.

Nicholas Upsall. By Augustine Jones. Boston. 1880.

Notes on the History of Witchcraft in Massachusetts. By George H. Moore. Worcester. 1883.

The Puritan Conspiracy against the Pilgrim Fathers and the Congregational Church, 1624. By John A. Goodwin. Boston. 1883.

NEW ENGLAND has framed not only her own history, but to a great extent the whole history of this country as it is generally read and popularly understood. While other parts of the country were more or less cosmopolitan, with populations descended from settlers owing their origin to various parts of the British Isles and the continent of Europe, whose different views of civil and religious government and theory brought about some mutual forbearance and a spirit of toleration, New England, colonized chiefly from one part of England with men of determined and aggressive opinions, maintained a unity of purpose and a homogeneity not elsewhere observable. This gave its people a

distinct and peculiar character; and when emigration began from its comparatively bleak and sterile shores to more favored parts of our domain, the New Englander went forth, if not with the old faith of the original settlers, at least with the same faith in himself, and the same determination to make his views prevail and to force them upon less concentrated and self-willed communities. The New England influence is thus not confined to the original limits of the colonies between the Hudson and the Atlantic, it has to a considerable extent moulded the thought and activity of the West, and exercised a great influence in the Middle States, and in the Federal legislation.

Schools made New Englanders a reading and writing people, and no subject was more palatable than themselves. The first generation wrote its annals, and each succeeding generation has written of the past. Changes occur, and in each cycle of change New England writers adapt their writings to the exigencies of the time, and, according to the state of current public opinion, maintain the character of their ancestors by employing all the resources of the intellect to portray the theories, religious and civil government, public and private life of past generations, as from the modern point of view types of the highest excellence ever reached by mortal man.

The consequence is that the works on New England history exceed those of all other parts of the country. There are histories of New England, histories of each of the States from Maine to Connecticut, histories of counties and towns; histories written in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reproduced and carefully edited; works on the ecclesiastical history in manifold forms, from Cotton Mather's "Magnalia" to anniversary sermons; and with these stand the imposing array of volumes issued by the Historical Societies. These are all in the main pervaded by the same spirit of eulogy and praise, or carefully-studied justification and apology.

There have been few dissenting writers. It is to one not brought up in this literature a task of no slight magnitude to study up in detail any feature or character of New England life. It is a most repelling task to wade through the immense mass of printed material, and delve as far as life and leisure permit into unpublished material to fill out a truthful and impartial picture, and as the result will be to demolish some New England idol, the writer gains the ill-will of that part of the country and its scattered sons, and pleases few, leaving him only the consciousness of having endeavored to re-establish the truth of history. For his thesis, whatever it may be, the general public will care little, and popular history will continue its psittaceous utterances, as though he had never labored to set matters aright.

While the general histories of the United States, like those of Bancroft and Hildreth, are written from the New England point of view, and Palfrey's "New England" embodies in an especial manner the whole genesis and development of their distinctive autonomy, with all the extenuating circumstances, the deprecatory apologies, the clever and artistic arrangement in the background of the picture of all that might offend the present taste, very few writers have undertaken to present a different picture to the public eye.

The most extended work on this side is that of Peter Oliver, of the Suffolk bar. It was entitled "The Puritan Commonwealth. An Historical Review of the Puritan Government in Massachusetts in its Civil and Ecclesiastical Relations, from its rise to the abrogation of the first Charter. Together with some general reflections on the English Colonial Policy, and on the character of Puritanism." Though not a work to which the author's short tenure of life allowed him to give the years of study that would have made it of the highest authority, its plan covered the whole ground, and the book is a necessary guide to any one who studies New England history, as it leads the inquirer to sources overlooked or suppressed in current works.

In considering what may in general terms be called New England Puritanism, though the term "Puritan" is often misapplied, the great points are the ingenious system by which, professing to be guided and governed by English law, and to establish a free system, they centred the whole power in the hands of an oligarchy, the Church members, who could keep out of their body or expel from their body whomsoever they chose, and that without appeal; next, as a natural result of this, for assuming the power to grant or take away civil and religious rights, they could not regard the rights of conscience, property, or life, the tyrannical and persecuting spirit that pervade it, and the utter disregard of the rights of others to profess and exercise their religious views and practices, even those established by the authority of the English Government, which they professed to obey.

Under this come their hatred of the Catholic religion, their banishment of Episcopalians, their persecution of Mrs. Hutchinson and the Baptists, their persecution and illegal execution of Robinson, Stevenson, Mary Dyer, and other Quakers, and their persecution of Upsall, the only man who dared gainsay their acts.

Next comes, as emanating from this intolerant self-righteous spirit, the famous Witchcraft episode in New England history.

The treatment of inferior races, as instanced in their whole intercourse with the Indians, and the history of negro slavery and the slave trade in New England, form another department of history, which needs essentially an independent study.

During the minority of Edward VI. the Catholic religion, as it had been maintained by Henry VIII. in spite of his schism and persecution, was swept away. In the name of a boy-king a new set of doctrines and a new form of worship were set up by authority of the regent and a subservient Parliament. This vanished during Mary's brief reign, but reappeared in a modified form under Elizabeth, when the Church of England, in its present form as a state establishment, began the existence which has continued to the present time. By this time many in England had imbibed doctrines and ideas from the swarm of so-called reformers on the continent, and some of the more active of these had, during Mary's reign, taken refuge in various countries where their opinions were freely held. Returning to England under Elizabeth, these men were by no means disposed to take creed and worship from the government. What right God may have had to lay down to man what man was to believe, and what public worship he was to render the Divine Majesty, seems to have been a point regarded as of little importance; but as between the state and themselves, each set of believers held that it had as absolute a right as government to establish a code of belief and a form of latria. As neither side could show any authority from Scripture or reason, the whole question became one of power to compel obedience on the one side, and on the other of power to resist. Luther upheld the power of the prince, and where his doctrines prevailed the state did all and enforced submission. Calvin was essentially revolutionary, and in his view those who accepted his doctrines had the inherent right to frame their own church organization, their own ecclesiastical polity and worship, and overthrow any government that attempted to restrain them. Cranmer in England attempted to carry out the Luther view, and won the Calvinists by concessions. It is very evident that at first no importance was attached to priestly orders or episcopal consecration, to apostolic succession, or any union with the Church of the past. To all, these things seemed as of no importance; and it was only when pressed by the extreme Calvinists that the Church of England set up any claim to them. Episcopacy, a gown and surplice, some accessories of public service, were retained or introduced. Here began the first trouble. Some who returned from Switzerland inveighed against all this, and soon denied the power of the state to make any laws in regard to religion, unless they themselves were the state. The more moderate hoped in time to gain sufficient control to do away with what they deemed objectionable, and in the meantime were disposed to let things take their course. These were the Puritans, properly so called, who did not break away absolutely from the Established Church, though they censured many of its ideas and

practices. "The thorough-going Separatists denied that the state church was a Christian body, or that its ministrations and ordinances were of any validity."

The little band who came over on the first voyage of the "Mayflower," and landed at Plymouth belonged to this separatist body; their extreme views had brought upon them the heavy hand of the law in England, but they were gradually, as Independents, beginning to hold fellowship with Calvinistic bodies, though without adopting their system of government. Though then showing some disposition to recognize the Church of England as in their eyes Christian, they would not recognize its ministry, holding it to be fatally unsound from its descent from that of the Catholic Church. The Plymouth Pilgrim Fathers came over without any minister of religion, and for some years had none, choosing one of their number as Elder to officiate. The Rev. John Lyford, an ordained minister of the Church of England, of Puritan views, came over in March, 1624, but he never officiated at Plymouth, though he did subsequently at Salem.

The settlers of Massachusetts Bay were, however, Puritans; of the party who came over in 1629 and landed at Salem in May, two, Skelton and Higginson, were ordained clergymen of the Church of England, and in the settlement Skelton was chosen pastor and Higginson teacher.

Cotton Mather represents Higginson as saying, when England was receding from the view of those on the deck of the vessel: "We do not go to New England as Separatists from the Church of England." Speaking of Salem, Goodwin says: "For the first three years of its existence that ancient town worshipped exclusively in the form of the Church of England, as also at that time did all the scattered settlers around Boston Bay."

There was thus in the outset a broad line between the Separatists at Plymouth and the Puritans of the Massachusetts Bay colony. Yet the influence of Endicott and his friends at Boston soon made the Massachusetts settlement absolutely separatist. Higginson drew up a confession of faith and church government; the ministers were ordained by the imposition of the hands of the congregation. Obedience to this new form, probably concerted in England, was enforced rigorously. Of five persons, appointed by the Massachusetts Company as counsellors to Endicott, two, John and Samuel Browne, declined to accept this new system. Instead of attending its services, they continued to read the Book of Common Prayer together. They were at once arraigned before the Governor, and sent back to England, not having been permitted to breathe American air for more than five or six weeks. In this same early period we find Philip Ratliffe sentenced, in June, 1631, to

"be whipped, have his ears cut off, fyned £40, and banished out of the lymitts" "for uttering malicious and scandalous speeches against the government and the *Church* of Salem."

This was a decisive step. The Puritans at Massachusetts Bay, still under the obedience of the company, and of the English Government which created it, deliberately placed its veto on religious freedom, on all toleration of dissent, and they did this while the ink was still wet on the plan of faith and church polity which a few individuals had assumed the power to frame and enforce. Toleration, although it is now hypocritically and in sonorous phrases of deceptive form and sound proclaimed as one of the great virtues of the New England Puritans, who are portrayed by their descendants as champions of religious liberty, was in reality something so utterly distasteful to them that they denounced it in unmistakable terms. There is "no room in Christ's army for tolerationists," says Johnson, one of the pioneers. Cotton declared that toleration made the world anti-Christian. Shepard, in an Election sermon delivered in 1672, and styled in the eccentric style of the day an Eye-salve, maintained it to be Satan's policy to plead for an indefinite and boundless toleration. Nathaniel Ward, author of a revolting work, in which he styles himself "The Simple Cobbler of Agawam," says: "My heart hath naturally detested toleration of divers religions, or of one religion in segregant shapes." Others spoke of "the evil egg of toleration." President Oakes, of Harvard, laid down his principles unmistakably when he said: "I look upon toleration as the first-born of all abominations." "God forbid," said Dudley, "our love for the truth should be grown so cold that we should tolerate errors; I die no libertine." And Ward sums up all in one phrase: "To say that men ought to have liberty of conscience, is impious ignorance."

When, therefore, men talk of the founders of New England as advocates of the liberty of conscience, it is a clear and palpable perversion. The very words of the early founders and framers of its polity refute it.

The Brownes were not the only Church of-England men sent out of New England. Morton and Gardiner shared the same fate. Bancroft, in his Apology, treats the matter in this extremely strange fashion: "The Puritans established a government in America, such as the laws of natural justice warranted, and such as the statutes and common law of England did not warrant, and that was done by men who still acknowledged a limited allegiance to the parent state. The Episcopalians declared themselves the enemy of the party, and waged against it a war of extermination; Puritanism excluded them from its asylum." How the law of natural justice, which, if it means anything, means doing to others as we would

have others do unto us, justified the polity of the Puritans, is utterly incomprehensible, unless laws are to be construed as the same people construed some texts of Scripture, by the judicious insertion of a negative particle. But history is utterly silent as to the Episcopalians who, in New England, declared themselves the enemy of the Puritan party, or who "waged a war of extermination on it." That the Brownes read the book of Common Prayer, as had already been done, is true; that they denied the right of their fellow-emigrants to prevent them, is also true; but there is not a particle of evidence that they attempted in the slightest manner to interfere with those who differed from them. They did not declare themselves the enemies of Puritanism, or wage against it a war of extermination. "Puritanism," he admits, "excluded them from its asylum."

The religious intolerance of Puritanism and the natural cry for tolerance of an amiable heart were strikingly displayed in Roger Williams. Under the cry raised by Luther that the Church was Antichrist, the swarm of sects that pullulated throughout Europe all took up the cry. That the Church of Rome was absolutely wrong, its hierarchy a usurpation and a tyranny, its worship and rites, ceremonies and vestments, hideous in the eye of God, was adopted as a series of axioms. No one attempted to prove it, but all their votaries re-echoed it. This was adopted as a proposition that required no examination or investigation. A man must not take anything for granted without examination, but this he must take.

We have seen that the ministry of the Anglican Church was disregarded at Plymouth, and treated as worthless at the Bay, where the congregation reordained ministers. Roger Williams came, and, carrying his fanatical hatred of the old faith to the very highest point, condemned them for not going far enough. The orders of the Anglican Church were but an offshoot of those of Rome; if the latter came of Satan and not of Christ, the former must be not something merely to be laid aside as indifferent, they must be formally and openly rejected as sinful and unchristian. He declined to hold communion with any who would take this position, or would not publicly declare their repentance for having ever been in communion with the Church of England. The very flag of England, which still floated over them, little as they respected its church and laws, raised another fury of intolerance in this strangely constituted heart. There was the sign of Satan himself, the Cross emblazoned on it. No Christian could tolerate such an idolatrous symbol floating over his head. Impelled, as there is every reason to believe, by Roger Williams, John Endicott cut the Cross from the flag, and the community was at once embroiled.

As new questions of controversy arose between Williams at Salem and the other churches, he addressed a letter to his church, moving them to renounce all communication with the others in the colony, and he carried his power of excommunication so far that he refused to join in family prayer in his own house, or say grace at table when his wife was present, because the disobedient woman, rejecting his authority as husband, pastor and supreme pontiff, continued to frequent the communion of other New England churches. As Palfrey remarks: "While the imputed intolerance of others provoked Williams's vehement displeasure, he indulged himself in the largest liberty of being exclusive in ways of his own."

The General Court refused to admit the Salem delegates, and, as an ecclesiastico-political body, "ordered that the said Mr. Williams shall depart out of this jurisdiction within six weeks now next ensuing; which if he neglects to perform, it shall be lawful for the governor and two of the magistrates to send him to some place out of this jurisdiction, not to return any more, without license from the Court."

Thus was the intolerant future champion of toleration disposed of. On this affair Palfrey remarks: "The Brownes had been shipped back in the first year of the company's occupation. . . . . Gardiner, Stone, Walford, Gray, Lynn, Smith, and various others, named and unnamed, had been sent away for various reasons, resolving themselves into the persuasive reason that their presence was found inconvenient and dangerous by men who had a right to choose their company." A band of brigands or secret conspirators would in this reasoning find a justification for murder; it is the principle underlying their saying that "dead men tell no tales."

This banishment was in itself a direct violation of the whole theory of New England Puritanism, which was based on the independence of the individual churches. The system of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, of the Episcopal Church of England, and others secondarily constituted, was here followed, in disregard of all their boasted love of independence. According to their own theory, the Salem Church had a perfect right to choose its own minister, yet it was censured for taking one without the sanction of the General Court, the assembly of the delegates of the whole colony. This made them virtually the appointing power, and not the members of the separate church. To exclude the Salem delegates, and then sentence the Salem minister without trial, without an opportunity of defending himself, was an utter violation of all principles of justice—a strange commentary on Mr. Bancroft's statement that the Puritan government was such as the law of

natural justice warranted; in this case, as in many others, it was one in which that law was foully disregarded.

The General Court had here assumed to be the highest ecclesiastical judicial and executive power. When Mrs. Hutchinson began to disseminate her doctrines, and divided the church people into those who believed that good works ought to show the reality of conversion and justification, and those who, with this female theologian, denounced such an idea as a covenant of works, the General Court went further, and consulted the ministers, who gave it as their advice, "that, in such heresies or errors of any church members as are manifest and dangerous to the state, the Court may proceed without tarrying for the church." Yet they allowed her a form of trial, then passed sentence of banishment on her; subsequent to this, "the church, with one consent, cast her out." Then she was driven forth to perish by the hands of Indians. Of her adherents, many were fined, several were banished, others were disfranchised, and seventy-six disarmed. So shallow were the reasons put forth for these proceedings by the ministers and magistrates of the colony, that their apologist, Palfrey, calls our attention to the fact "that the government's exposition and defence of its course sometimes failed to do it justice." He concludes his own apology by saying: "If the treatment was harsh, it was effective." That is to say, all free discussion of religious doctrines was relentlessly suppressed, and we are asked to praise these Puritans as advocates of freedom of conscience.

About 1644 some Baptists troubled the church in Massachusetts, and a law was promptly passed, banishing any who came into the colony, as well as any settler who embraced their views, or who condemned infant baptism, or left the meeting-house when it was to be administered. Under such laws Obadiah Holmes was expelled from Plymouth and flogged at Boston. In 1647 another law forbade any Jesuit to enter the territory, pronounced the penalty of banishment on any who, in spite of this warning, presumed to land in Massachusetts, and if, after being banished, any one returned, he was to be put to death. This law all Puritanism held to be so consonant to reason and liberty of conscience, that it was used as an answer to those who remonstrated when a similar law was passed against Quakers.

The next to feel the heavy hand of Puritan persecution were the Quakers. In 1656 Mary Fisher and Ann Austin, who had embraced the doctrines of Fox, arrived in Boston harbor. They were seized on the vessel before they could land, imprisoned, and sentenced to banishment. A penalty of £5 was imposed upon any one who spoke to them, though, as the windows of their cell were boarded up, this was no easy task. Nicholas Upsall, a friend of

Roger Williams, and the earliest advocate of toleration in Massachusetts, offered to pay the fine for liberty to speak to them; he asked to be allowed to furnish them with food, and when this was refused, he bribed the jailer, and kept them from starving. This, be it remembered, is not a tale of the Spanish Inquisition; the persecutors were Puritans of New England, supposed by many to be the very exponents of religious freedom; Nicholas Upsall was not a Catholic but a Puritan, but it is not to be wondered at that some of his descendants ceased to be Protestant and Puritan.

There was no Massachusetts law against the Quakers, but the defect was soon remedied. The General Court passed an act on the 14th of October, 1656.

At the instance of the commissioners of the United Colonies, Connecticut, New Haven and Plymouth passed similar enactments. When the Massachusetts law was proclaimed by beat of drum, Upsall, before whose door it was read, expressed his disapproval, and in temperate language said that the magistrates should look to it that they were not fighting against God. The first man who dared to raise his voice in favor of toleration in New England was not permitted to do so long. He was at once arrested. He was an ancient citizen, a man of means, had been one of the first settlers, coming over with Winthrop in 1630, was one of the founders of a military company, the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Boston, but his doom was sealed. He was sentenced to pay a fine of £20, and to depart the jurisdiction within one month, not to return under the penalty of imprisonment. The fine was exacted, Governor Endicott saying, "I will not abate one groat;" and in the thirty days allotted him, the time spent in prison was made part, so that, with little space for preparation, this aged pioneer was driven into the wilderness at the beginning of winter, and while thus wandering his way out of the jurisdiction, property of his was seized to pay fines imposed on him for not being in his place in the meeting-house in Boston on the regular Sunday services! After three years' wandering he returned, and in compliance with the sentence was thrust into prison, and spent most of his remaining years in confinement.

Such was the New England penalty for advocating toleration. It was a crime and punished as such with unrelenting rigor.

The Quakers, in the enthusiasm of their faith, were not deterred by any fear of Puritan punishments. They came in defiance of the penal laws. Mary Clarke was scourged; Holden, Copeland, and Dowdney were whipped and imprisoned; Lawrence and Cassandra Southwick imprisoned for harboring Quakers. Penal laws failed to keep out Quakers or to crush sympathy out of the human heart. Then came new penal laws, inflicting mutilation on the undesired im-

migrants. One ear was to be cut off, then another; then the tongue was to be bored with a hot iron. Even this failed; then came an enactment inflicting the penalty of death on any Quaker who, once expelled, dared to set his foot again within the limits of Massachusetts Bay. William Robinson, Marmaduke Stevenson, and Mary Dyer were banished, but bravely returned. They were arraigned at the bar of the General Court for "rebellion, sedition, and presumptuously intruding themselves, notwithstanding their being sentenced to banishment on pain of death." They were all sentenced to be hanged on the eighth day following. There was such a general feeling against this cruel act, that the General Court set about justifying its conduct, and called out a strong military force to surround the place of execution. When the victims of Puritan intolerance endeavored to address the spectators, their voices were drowned by the roll of the drums. On October 27th, 1657, the two men, for Mary Dyer was spared for a time, met their death for professing the doctrines of Fox; the first execution under a penal law for religion that had yet taken place within the limits of this country. The place was Boston Common, their bodies swinging from a tree which tradition says was that afterwards known as Liberty Tree. Other executions followed, that of Mary Dyer among the rest, the bodies of the victims being stripped and thrust into pits.

The government in England had paid little attention to its American affairs, but the cry of these murdered Quakers reached the throne, and an order was issued from Whitehall requiring the immediate cessation of all capital and other corporal punishments of those of the king's subjects called Quakers. The hand of persecution was stayed. But as Bancroft says truly, the royal order "could not erase the stains which indelibly rest upon the Puritan church of Massachusetts."

Recent efforts have been made to excuse and palliate the conduct toward the Quakers, but these efforts only serve to bring the details into clearer light. As Protestants, claiming the right of private judgment, they could not fairly deny it to others. They had no law of England to justify their course; and on the side of the Quakers the acts complained of and paraded by the advocates and apologists amount simply to religious extravagance, such as under the Protestant idea so often occur. No resistance to authority, no plot to overthrow the government or incite Indian hostility, no injury to property or person of any resident is even alleged. They were punished simply and avowedly for the tenets which they professed. They suffered in both Plymouth and Massachusetts, and in a minor degree in the Connecticut colonies.

Rhode Island did not persecute, Roger Williams confining his dislike to writing a book against them.

Encouraged by the declaration of the royal commissioners "that liberty should be given to all sorts and sects of men," some Baptists in 1667 attempted to organize a church of their own, but flogging, fine, disfranchisement, and imprisonment, with banishment as a last resource, soon broke up the little congregation, nor was it till 1679 that a Baptist meeting-house was stealthily opened.

For writers to claim for the Fathers of New England the high honor of establishing liberty of conscience, or of favoring religious freedom, is a farce too contemptible for consideration. The whip, the pillory, the gallows, loom up from the pages of history to denounce such perversion of truth. An outlying part of the British realm, New England had no autonomy. And to quote the startling words of Oliver, himself a Boston lawyer, "regarded simply in a legal view, every execution was a murder; every mutilation a maiming; every whipping a battery; every fine an extortion; every disfranchisement an outrage, and all were breaches of the charter." The arguments put forward to justify the New Englanders for putting Quakers to death will serve the Mormons to justify them in putting to death persons whose presence in Utah is undesirable.

Both put forward the same claim to deep religious conviction, and sincere belief that they alone of all mortals exactly know, understand, and appreciate the revelation of God; both moved to a remote and inhospitable land to enjoy their own religious views; both treat the central government as a foreign rule to be obeyed only by compulsion, and both seek to govern themselves by laws of their own exclusive making; both combine civil and ecclesiastical powers in such a way that all power is in and through the Church.

History repeats itself. As the New England theocracy grew by the neglect of England to control it, till it become too strong to control, so Mormonism has thriven under the neglect of our Federal government till it is so strong as to defy all attempts to punish its disregard and defiance of laws.

The religious system established in New England pervaded the colonies it embraced. Church membership was a step to the rights of a freeman. A man whom the church in his own place would not admit as a member, could exercise no prerogative of a freeman. If he offended the church, he could be disfranchised as well as expelled from membership. No dissent was allowed; the right of private judgment, in so far as man used it to reject the doctrines and authority of the Church of Rome, was inalienable; but it did not authorize any man to question the views of any New England minister whom the General Court upheld. Such a use of private

judgment was the work of Satan. The right of private judgment was limited to judging that New England churches were right; freedom of conscience consisted in being free to justify praise and uphold the Congregational system. The man forced to walk a pirate's plank had just as much freedom.

Religion as they held had no softening characteristics, nothing to refine, to move the heart, to call out the affections or inspire a happy joyousness. It proscribed art, music, all exterior beauties that could serve as auxiliaries, or lead the minds of the less thoughtful, and that is the masses, of mankind to think of eternal things. With them all was severe, stern, and forbidding. Men were to be led to heaven by the threats of hell, not by bidding them look on the love of God and of the Incarnate Word. Their very meeting-houses condemned the Almighty for his gorgeous worship, his tabernacle, and temple under the old law.

The mind was there concentrated; all was severe. No joyous holidays divided the year, or allowed the heart to exult and be glad. Such a community could not but become intensely morbid. One of the strange inconsistencies of Protestantism is that while they deny that man can have any intercourse by prayer or otherwise with the good angels, they have held and maintained that men could hold intercourse with the fallen angels, obtain powers from them, and be controlled by them. It is a puzzle of puzzles to understand how they could regard the blessed spirits who always see the face of the Almighty, whose powers have never been marred or diminished by sin, as less potent than spirits suffering for their rebellion the wrath of God.

Yet such is the case. New England believed in no power of God's faithful servants, angelic or human. They were all impotent creatures, unable to acquire any knowledge of human affairs, or exercise any influence over them. But they did believe in Satan, and New England believed that Satan's great object was to overthrow their ecclesiastical and civil institutions. As Palfrey puts it, "the honest, *bonâ fide*, contemplative believer in that theory of man's nature, which is set forth in the Westminster Catechism, logically understood himself to be living in the midst of crimes of dark and mysterious enormity."

That Satan was endeavoring to gain influence over some of the weaker brethren, and use them to harm the Israel of New England, was too firmly believed not to call for legislative action. Plymouth, in 1636, declared the death penalty for "solemn compaction or conversing with the devil by way of witchcraft, conjuration, or the like." Massachusetts in December, 1641, and Connecticut, a year later, declared, "if any man or woman be a witch (that is, hath or consulteth with a familiar spirit), they shall be put to death." The

New Haven laws, printed in 1656, have a similar provision. In this they had a precedent in a law of Elizabeth, and one of James I., passed in 1615.

Much of the early history of New England Puritanism is occupied with the relation of marvels, sometimes shocking, generally childish, but never appealing to the nobler sentiments of the heart. The Puritans were inadequate to romance or poetry. The strange sounds they heard, the appalling sights they witnessed, the mysteries that encompassed their fields and waters, the witches who teased them by day, are mentioned in startling detail and cold matter-of-fact expression, which could neither point a moral nor adorn a tale. They derided the sign of the cross, but saw magic in a broomstick. They scorned the sacrificial service of the altar, but trembled before the senseless mummeries of old women. If the leaves of a prayer-book were gnawed by mice, they adored the wonder-working Providence of God; but let the lightning blast one of their most famous destroyers of Indian life, and it was only a deplorable accident. Their superstition was selfish as well as blind."[1] It is not astonishing, therefore, to find early executions for witchcraft in New England. Thus Margaret Jones, of Charlestown, was put to death in 1648; Ann Hibbins in Boston, in 1655; and, not long after, Goodwife Bassett and Goodwife Knapp, Greensmith, and others. The belief in diabolical machinations was steadily increasing and spreading. New Hampshire was persecuted by stone-throwing devils, who annoyed residents in different places, and made their homes unendurable. The Protestant feeling, roused against Catholicity under Charles II. and James II., gave new impulse to the belief in witchcraft. Hence, when a poor, old ignorant, Irish Catholic woman, named Glover, was accused, there was no hope of escape for her. How came she to New England, unless sold there as a bondwoman? She could say her prayers in Irish, and the Lord's Prayer tolerably in Latin, but, as she could not say it in English, that was deemed proof sufficient. Had she been able to say it like her persecutors, who repeated spurious words as the words of our Lord, she might have escaped. But as she said it correctly, and they spuriously, they hanged her.

Early in the year 1692 Salem became the scene of a witchcraft excitement. The daughters of Rev. Mr. Parris, the minister, accused several of bewitching them. Older persons supported the charges, and arrests followed. The mania spread to other towns, and in a short time more than a hundred women, many of them of unblemished character and worthy families, were apprehended, and examined with so little regard to justice that they were in all cases committed. Every means was then employed to extort con-

[1] Oliver.

fessions, and many yielded to the moral torture brought to bear, and confessed all that was required of them. In some cases they recanted all this, and endeavored to undo the work, but it did not avail.

The governor and his council took the advice of several ministers in the colony, but their words served only to increase the popular belief.

Bridget Bishop was tried, convicted, and executed in June, 1692; a few weeks subsequently, five more women were brought to trial. The jury found one of them, Rebekah Nurse, not guilty; but the people raised such an outcry, that they asked to be sent out again, and soon brought her in also guilty. Among the next victims was the Rev. George Burroughs, John Proctor and his wife, John Willard, George Jacobs, and Martha Currier. All were convicted, and all but one executed. In September, eight other women were hanged. Giles Corey refused to plead, and, under an old English law, was pressed to death, by the *peine forte et dure*. Nineteen had been executed; the prisons were full of accused women and men; no one was safe; children accused their parents; husbands accused their wives; one clergyman had already been sacrificed; but, when the wife of one of the most active ministers in arresting supposed witches was herself accused, when suspicion rested even on the wife of the governor and other ladies of position, the tide of feeling began to change. There were more acquittals and few convictions. Some clung to the old belief in the supernatural character of things that had occurred, but most people believed that the whole originated in the knavery and wickedness of a few young girls. Some of these actually confessed that their whole stories were pure inventions.

Many families were utterly ruined. The odium cast on them, the cost of maintaining and defending the accused till it absorbed all their means, the seizure of property where an accused person fled,—all these combined to hurl worthy people from comfort and prosperity to penury and distress.

The clergy were mainly at fault; they ere long admitted how grievously they had erred; but, though the victims or their descendants appealed to the General Court for redress, the New England clergy, who had helped to increase the delusion, made no effort to secure justice for those who suffered.

As early as October, 1692, a proposition was made for a Fast and a Convocation of the Ministers, and though the long preamble shows that the conviction was already strong, that innocent persons had perished, the ministers as a body made no effort, and the proposition failed. Cotton Mather, in 1696, admitted the fact. "Wicked sorceries have been practiced in the land, and in the late

inexplicable storms from the Invisible world thereby brought upon us, wee were led by the Just Hand of Heaven unto those errors whereby great hardships were brought upon innocent persons, and (wee feare) Guilt incurr'd, which wee have all cause to Bewayl, with much confusion of o Face before the Lord."

Chief Justice Sewall, when a general fast was finally appointed, "made his public confession of fault and repentance for his part in that bloody Assize of Witches at Salem," but the repentance of the ministers and leaders of the Puritan Church never reached the point of reparation which must be regarded as essential to true contrition. Though many historians state as a fact that an act was subsequently passed, reversing the several convictions, judgments, and attainders, Dr. Moore has shown clearly that no such act ever became a law. "A private act was passed in 1703 with reference to *three* of the surviving sufferers, and a few years later sundry appropriations were made from the public treasury in aid of families who had been ruined by this storm; but none," continues Dr. Moore, "were adequate to the occasion; all were scanty and insufficient, and, although the subject was revived from time to time during the next half century, nothing else was done." The whole sad affair stands a stigma on the Puritan Church of Massachusetts. More than the rest of the Puritan population, these men were, as John Russell Lowell says, "narrow in thought, in culture, and in creed," but they were none the less infallible in their own eyes and spiritual pride. They fanned the flame, they hounded in persecution and prosecution, they cut off the accused from communion, and, even when they acknowledged that they had sent innocent men and women to the gallows, and reduced innocent families to want and misery, they never exerted their potent influence to make reparation for the wrong.

Passing to another point, the treatment of inferior races, the native American Indian and the Negro, we find that New England Puritanism had not attained any high or noble position. The few leaders who arrogated to themselves the dignity of elect of God, making really God's election of the rest of mankind subject to their will, looked down on all whom they deemed unworthy of admission to church membership as reprobates doomed hereafter to eternal flames, and here spared for the benefit of the elect. Those in the colony, whom they excluded from church and civil rights, were a sort of helots, useful to some extent at least, but they were admitted to no ordinances of the church; for a long time, their children were not deemed fit subjects for baptism; the two sacraments nominally retained became, so far as a large and increasing body of colonists were concerned, practically null and void.

To their eyes, however, the Indians were worshippers and con-

federates of Satan, Chanaanites whom they were to exterminate. Many and great as were the cruelties perpetrated by Spaniards, there were from the first discovery zealous priests who strove to inculcate the doctrines of Christianity on the Indian minds, and to disabuse them of their errors. Every Spanish, French, and Portuguese colony has its mission annals, reaching back to the primeval settlements. But Robinson, writing from Holland, deplored that the Pilgrims at Plymouth began to slay the Indians before they began to convert them. His reproof fell unheeded. They traded with the Indians, fought with them, but it was long before they made any attempt to raise their thoughts to acknowledge God. The Indians were not slow in perceiving the difference. When a chief was reproached for liking the French, he replied: "Whenever I came to Boston, I was asked whether I had furs to sell; when I went to Canada, men met me who did not look at my furs; they asked me whether I knew of God."

Catholic missionaries labored and died on the upper Rio Grande, on the rivers of the Chesapeake, in Florida, on the upper lakes, before the Pilgrims or Puritans had breathed a whisper of religion to the native Indians within ten miles of Plymouth and Boston, The Indian's right to the soil was recognized as to what they actually cultivated. Roger Williams aroused indignation by asserting that the Indians had a title to their lands, and should have been paid for the territory taken from them. No compensation was made, and, as the tribes saw their hunting grounds gradually wrested from them, their sullen wrath took deadly form. No attempt was made to shield them from the influence of strong liquors. These men, who deemed themselves the elect of God, who prided themselves on not being as the rest of men, sold liquor to the Indians, and allowed others to sell it. The Puritan churches never raised their voices to denounce the unholy traffic; and what a contrast Catholic Canada presented! There the Jesuits and secular clergy, with their bishop, as soon as one was appointed, used every argument and weapon in their power to prevent the sale. They opposed the traders, and bravely met with censures the governors and other officials who favored the destructive commerce. Now, in some New England States, the use of spirituous liquors is regarded as a greater sin than any forbidden in the Decalogue, yet their lauded forefathers used it, and plied the Indians with it, and not till 1657 were even ineffectual attempts taken to check it.

In time missionary efforts were made; but the labors of Eliot, Mayhew, and their associates, were hampered by their dreary theological system; and their attempt to transfer to Indian dialects the abstruse theological arguments produced a result that must have

been utterly incomprehensible. They never lived among the Indians, so as to become familiar with their modes of thought, with the stock of real knowledge which they possessed. Their books remain,—Elliot's Indian Bible, chief of all, a work of wonderful labor. But there are more Catholic Indians to-day in New England, more by hundreds than there are of those whom Puritan missionaries won.

The origin of the New England wars does not impress us favorably. It has been said, and with truth: "Ten years before the Puritan Pilgrims began to inquire whether the aborigines had souls to be saved, an armed expedition sailed from the harbor of Boston on an errand of blood. Endicott, the general, received sanguinary orders. He was directed to put to death the male inhabitants of Block Island; to take captive their wives and children; and to possess himself of their little islet. He failed in his expedition, but provoked the Pequots to war. When that tribe was exterminated the adult males taken prisoners were put to death in cold blood; the boys sold in the West Indies; the girls and women kept as slaves. The Narragansetts, employed as aids in exterminating the Pequots, were in turn annihilated by the help of other savages, who paved the way to their own destruction."

The Puritans never won a single tribe in New England as lasting allies; and in this fact their conduct receives its strongest condemnation. The French secured the friendship of every tribe from the Kennebec and St. John's to Lake Superior; not a tribe ever warred against them till the Foxes, instigated by English agents, gave trouble for a time. The Iroquois, beyond their limits, influenced by Dutch and English, became the foes of Canada, but were often won by missionary zeal to peaceful intercourse; and at this day the mass of survivors of that once proud confederacy are on Canadian soil. The Dutch secured the friendship of these tribes; and the English of New York retained it; Penn secured the Delawares; Lord Baltimore the Patuxents; but the Puritans of New England, men who are lauded to us as the very embodiment of human sanctity, never could win, and, indeed, never used the means of charity and justice to win the enduring attachment of a single Indian tribe.

New England endured the horrors of Indian wars, and provoked them. When in time European wars threatened to involve the French and English colonies in America in hostilities, Canada sent to New England to propose a neutrality and a concerted action, so as to avoid Indian hostility. The application failed. When, at a later date, the complications in Europe led to a long series of wars, Canada renewed her proposal, New York accepted it, and the borders of the two colonies rested in security; but New Eng-

land rejected it, resolved to employ such Indian auxiliaries as she could. That her frontiers were ravaged far and wide was the result of her own obstinate folly. In our Declaration of Independence the use of savage auxiliaries is one of the crimes charged upon the English government. The Puritans were the first to use them; and used, when the more truly Christian sons of France asked that on neither side should the services of the red men be enlisted in the war. When the tale is thrillingly told of what New England suffered at the hands of the French and Indians, it should never be forgotten that this mode of warfare was forced on the French, who adopted it reluctantly when the Puritans insisted on adopting it.

The whole Indian policy was stern, unjust and cruel, with scarcely a redeeming feature that shows any Christian heart or feeling. When Charles II. was restored to the throne of his father, Indians, Quakers, Baptists alike appealed to the throne against the oppressions of Puritanism.

Puritan greed encouraged Indian wars, as it gave women and children as slaves and boys to sell to the West Indies. It thus established slavery and the slave trade. Roger Williams, indeed, argued against perpetual slavery of captives, but he asked captives for his own use. With all the loud professions of religion and morality in these Puritan leaders, some of their words sound strange. Thus, after the Pequot war Captain Stoughton wrote to Governor Winthrop: "There is one I formerly mentioned, that is the fairest and largest that I saw amongst them, to whom I have given a coate to cloathe her. It is my desire to have her for a servant, if it may stand with your good liking, else not. There is a little squaw that Steward Culacut desireth, to whom he hath given a coate. Lieut. Davenport also desireth one."

Not only did these Puritans believe in enslaving Indian captives taken in war, but in purchasing negro slaves. As early as 1638 the Salem Ship Desire brought in negro slaves from Providence, in the West Indies, and subsequently New England vessels brought slaves from the Coast of Africa. That negro slavery as practiced in New England had the more repulsive features of human bondage is evident from Josselyn and other early writers. This trading in slaves was directly sanctioned by the General Court of Massachusetts; and there is no trace that a single minister ever raised his voice in condemnation of either Indian or negro slavery. The clergy of Puritan New England had no Montestino, no Las Casas, no Peter Claver.

In some of the Indian wars the obtaining of slaves was an object directly in view, as much as it was with the petty African rulers on the slave Coast. Downing, writing in 1645, says: "A warr

with the Narragansetts is verie considerable to this plantation .... wee might easily have men, women, and children enough to exchange for Moores which will be more gayneful pilladge for us than wee conceive."

The Body of Liberties in 1641, renewed in 1660, authorized the enslavement of captives taken in war, the purchase of slaves from other parts, and authorized moreover persons selling themselves into slavery.

The child of a slave mother was a slave, and the property of her master "liable to be sold and transferred like other chattels." This is the opinion of Chief Justice Parker, of Massachusetts, and it shows that the assertion of New England historians to the contrary is false. In Connecticut it was decided in 1703, that "according to the laws and constant practice of this colony, and all other plantations, such persons as are born of negro bondwomen are themselves in like condition, that is, born in servitude."

New England made intercolonial regulations for the return of runaway slaves, and thus was the first to institute a Fugitive Slave Law.

As to the treatment of slaves, we find testimony in Eliot who, in 1675, remonstrated against "selling away such Indians unto the islands for perpetual slaves, who shall yield up y^m^selves to your mercy." Cotton Mather says of Eliot, "He had long lamented it with a Bleeding and Burning Passion, that the English used their Negro's but as their Horses or their Oxen, and that so little care was taken about their immortal souls; he look'd upon it as a prodigy, that any wearing the Name of Christians should so much have the heart of Devils in them as to prevent and hinder the Instruction of the poor Blackamores." Still later, in 1680, Governor Bradstreet reported few blacks as born in Massachusetts, "none baptized that I ever heard of!"

The importation of slaves, especially at the beginning of the last century, increased greatly, and the first Massachusetts census is one of slaves. With a large slave population we find all the vices of the system; marriage was not encouraged among slaves, and when a marriage ceremony was performed, it was no bar to a separation by a sale of one of them; young children were deemed incumbrances, and were frequently sold, and sometimes given away, as appears by advertisements of the time.

The first general direction for the instruction and baptism of slaves in America came not from the self-righteous Puritan of New England, who left them in ignorance, vice, and immortality, untaught in Christian doctrine and morality, and unbaptized, but from the Catholic king James II., who, in 1685, at the Council Board

ordered "that the negroes in the Plantations should all be baptized, exceedingly declaiming against the impiety of their masters prohibiting it."

Catholic usage everywhere in French and Spanish America, and in Maryland, treated slaves as possessed of immortal souls, as beings to be instructed and made partakers of the graces of the sacraments.

The theories and opinions of modern New England on slavery, the use of spirituous liquors, as on many other points, are completely at war with those held by their ancestors. The denunciations of Southern slavery which fanned the flames of the late civil war, all directly condemned the early Puritans of Massachusetts; the denunciations of liquor traffic, now prohibited under severe penalties in some New England States, are equally applicable to the founders of New England; the indignant protests against the modern treatment of Indians have but petty grounds compared with those furnished by Puritan history; the modern cry for religious toleration and freedom of conscience would have roused the wrath of the seventeenth-century Puritan. Evidently, the New Englander must either forego his present opinions or stop lauding to the skies the old Puritans who committed the very sins they now denounce; men who, saints in their own eyes, were tried by the standard of to-day, were the grossest of sinners.

Tried by the impartial standard of truth and history, the Separatists and Puritans of New England were narrow-minded, tyrannical, and intolerant in religious thought; cruel and unmerciful to white or red man who refused to submit to their ruling; grasping and avaricious in their intercourse with the Indians; full of superstition and easily led by it into any excess. In the original settlement they showed an utter want of forecast, and came over without learning anything from the experience of others, an experience which should have taught them to avoid such errors as swept away so many settlers at Plymouth and Boston; they were, in fact, far behind Lord Baltimore in wisdom and judgment, as may easily be seen by comparing the first years of Maryland life with those of New England.

But when the survivors bravely set to work to build up homes in the New World, we cannot but admire their energy, courage, and determination. With a rugged soil that gave sparingly and only by severe toil, with seas often stormy, they went on building up a commonwealth of energetic, industrious men. Though no cultivators of science, literature, or art, with nothing refined or refining, they made a limited degree of education general, laying a foundation at least, but only a foundation. It is, indeed, curious

to note how the terrible bondage of religious slavery cramped and narrowed the mind. New England had no school, or indeed scholars, devoted to the topography of America, its botany, natural history, to mineralogy and geology, to natural philosophy; for two centuries this reading people added scarcely a line to human knowledge, while Canada was far in advance, aiding the study of botany by contributions, some of them of considerable extent; it mapped the vast interior of the country, noted its mines, its mineral resources, studied and recorded the languages, manners, and thoughts of the Indians, preserving data that enable us to supply in some measure the neglect of similar work in the English colonies.

To the New England Puritans we can give credit where it is due, and more credit to the men excluded from the membership in the churches and from the rights of freemen, than we can to the exclusive arrogance of the pharisees who ruled with a rod of iron. It was the outcast masses who really built up New England, and who, in the enforced simplicity of their homes, were often models. That many, as in Connecticut, returned at the first opportunity to the Church of England to escape the tyranny of standing order, is but a sign that, in their independence, they would have yielded submission to the true Church had her claims been presented to them, as in our century so many of New England origin have, down from the days of Thayer, the Barbers, Kewley, Young, Brownson, Tenney, Shaw, till in our day there are in every one of the great cities of the land enough Catholics of old Puritan stock to make a New England Catholic Society, which would honor their ancestors without canonizing the very faults entailed by their erroneous belief.

THE IMPENDING CONFLICT IN FRENCH POLITICS.

FRANCE is once more the country upon which the civilized world looks with anxious expectations and ill-concealed misgivings. In every direction her future seems to be shrouded in obscurity and her "to-morrow" hidden from sight by a heavy fog. Leroy Beaulieu, the famous French economist, acknowledged quite recently that "seldom in the whole course of history has the situation of France from an international standpoint been more precarious." We may, therefore, well ask, why is this so? Is it because of the foreign complications?

The foreign policy of France, it is true, has been a policy whose wisdom it is difficult to perceive, for it certainly involved the country in unnecessary and quite serious difficulties in the East. The affair in Madagascar is not yet over before Tonquin looms up. The military necessities of the French forces in that territory and their conflict with the possessorial rights of China may almost at any day result in a complete rupture of diplomatic relations and a declaration of war. Open hostilities are being carried on for some time, though only in a semi-official way, and produce, as was to be expected, a strained political tension which seems to defy the skill and ingenuity of Marquis Tseng and the French cabinet. The prospect of a peaceful adjustment of the difficulties through the good offices of England appears very uncertain, and the indications, at the date of writing these lines, point strongly towards war between France and the Celestial Empire. What little hope of a different issue may still be entertained, rests simply upon the fact that the commerce of England as well as of China would be seriously jeopardized, if France and China go to war. In that event the French nation will, of course, be called upon to make heavy sacrifices both in men and in money. The mere distance of the theatre of war from home would entail an enormous outlay for transports and require the expenditure of immense amounts of money. Then, again, we must remember how jealously France watches her "*gloire militaire*." The prestige of the French armies was so much impaired by the Franco-German war, that as this is the first opportunity of the French Republic to show its military strength, it is safe to presume that France will insist upon the rehabilitation of the lost prestige at any cost. These brief considerations suffice to render it perfectly clear that the imbroglio in Tonquin presents, indeed, no cheerful aspects. Nevertheless, we

would strangely deceive ourselves by the belief that these foreign troubles make Europe and the civilized world rivet their attention upon France. If Tonquin is perhaps the most threatening cloud on the horizon, it is by no means the darkest. The real cause of general apprehension is not of political, but of social character.

France has been for some time pregnant with a social disturbance. The events transpired within the last year (1883) prolong this state beyond its natural term, and the crisis brewing within the borders of the Republic must, now before long, come to an issue. Père Hyacinthe quite recently predicted a communistic outbreak of appalling dimensions within a year, and it is some such event which is looked forward to by all observant minds. The social problem, as is well known, awaits a solution not only in France, but in nearly every state of Christendom, and the reappearance of the Ghost of the Revolution of 1789 after a lapse of nearly a century would consequently possess a very deep significance even outside of France, for it convulsed almost the whole Continent of Europe by its first appearance. France seems of all countries the one where the much-dreaded problem will come first to an issue, and it is this consciousness, or belief, or conviction which imparts an unusual and otherwise inexplicable importance to the present ominous state of affairs in the young French Republic.

Socialism, communism, nihilism, etc., acquired prominence on the political stage at a comparatively recent date. When they first appeared, society and even astute political leaders displayed a wonderful and long-enduring indifference towards them, from which they were unpleasantly roused but yesterday. Thiers, great statesman as he was, spoke shortly before his death of socialism as an *epidemic*, as if it were only a momentary scourge. The credit of having sounded the first note of warning belongs beyond contradiction to Disraeli, who afterwards, as Lord Beaconsfield, watched the growth of the monstrous giant with a keen eye. Bismarck, the iron chancellor, found himself also compelled to acknowledge that his dead reckoning with the new force had been false, and he prepared himself accordingly to fight the new enemy. But it was Russia which opened, as it were, the eyes of the world. The convulsions in that empire and their tragic culmination left no room for doubt, even to skeptics, as to the character and nature of the spectre which endangers our times with its pale face. Society began to realize that its strata had been permeated by an element whose existence had too long been ignored, and in nearly every state party-lines were drawn, based upon the views entertained in regard to it. Everywhere there is now a conservative element arrayed against a radical element, but nowhere are these found in stronger antithesis, nowhere more perfectly personified by typical figures than

in France. And since "communism," the form under which the social discontent is best known in France, has principally risen into prominence since the advent of the radical party into power, it may be well to define here what is to be understood under Radicalism.

This is all the more necessary, because of a common and widespread belief that Radicalism and Republicanism are interchangeable terms. But this is a grave mistake. For one may hold that a limited monarchy and a hereditary second chamber have no place in an ideally perfect constitutional scheme of government without accepting a single radical principle. Radicalism, as opposed to conservative views, holds that religion, as far as it withdraws men's minds from earthly objects of concern and fixes them upon the unseen future in the world beyond the grave, is for society a source of evil and not of good. This view, utterly subversive of true progress and liberty, must not be believed, however, to be an upstart of to-day. It has gone for nearly a hundred years, through a process of evolution, which it may not be superfluous to sum up in a few words.

The disorganizing doctrines of the French philosophers originated the revolution of 1789. They called for the destruction of monarchy and for the abolition of religion. Thus the spirit of revolution pursued to a certain extent the same objects as Freemasonry, in which it found on that account a powerful ally. During the reign of Napoleon I., Freemasonry celebrated its resurrection in France; and the open opposition to religion, and particularly the Church of Rome, which manifested itself from the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814 up to 1830, is now being ascribed to the working of the various lodges. During this period of fifteen years, which has been well termed "*la comédie de quinze ans*," the influence of Freemasonry is, however, not so pronounced as from 1830 to our days. Most of the events of these fifty years can be traced directly to the universal agency of the secret societies. Their influence, and their influence alone, enables us to account for the otherwise inexplicable occurrences of the revolution of 1848, its rapid spread, its almost simultaneous appearance all over middle Europe. Under Napoleon III., himself a member of the Carbonari, Freemasonry flourished in France and threw largely the secrecy aside which generally covers up its tortuous path. Several books that appeared lately acquaint us not only with the policy pursued by Freemasonry as such, but give also an insight into the Internationals and the part which that central organization plays in directing unsuspecting trades-unions, labor-associations, and the like to such work as will further ulterior objects. One of these objects being the emancipation of society from religion, it is, of course, natural that Radicalism and Freemasonry joined hands in fighting

the greatest stronghold of Christianity, namely, the Catholic Church. For the attainment of what both aim at in common, war against Rome is an imperative necessity, because the Catholic Church has ever been an outspoken opponent of both, possesses a perfect and powerful organization, and a social influence which so far has held its own against the most virulent attacks. Catholicity is, therefore, the foe most hated, most persistently hunted down, because the foe most to be dreaded. How far socialism, communism, etc., are indebted for their phenomenal development to assistance granted by Freemasonry under the direction of the International, it is for historians to ascertain; it suffices for us to note that coöperation between them is a pretty well-established fact. And in this alliance of Radicalism and Freemasonry which has now found general recognition at the hands of most statesmen and governments; in the ramifications of secret societies, with objects undefined, employing means that shrink from daylight; in this influence hostile to existing institutions which looms up here and there, the key for a proper understanding of the interest taken in the affairs of France is furnished.

The present condition of things in France is, of course, the resultant of the forces at work in the past, and we will, therefore, cast now a hurried glance over the last few closed chapters of French history.

The erection of a Republic, after the downfall of the second Empire upon the smoking ruins of abandoned battlefields and communistic incendiarism, was watched by all governments with considerable uneasiness, for the establishment of a Republican form of government in France had heretofore proved a rather dangerous experiment. The fears, however, were considerably allayed when Thiers, the statesman, was put into the office of chief-magistrate of the nation. His administration, like that of his successor, MacMahon, was practically conducted on the principles of a monarchical government, that is, on strictly conservative principles. Instead of a titled chief-magistrate, clad in royalty, which we are wont to associate with monarchies, France offered thus the spectacle of a republic without republicanism. During Thiers's and MacMahon's presidency the conservative elements gradually lost their strength. Gambetta, who had suddenly risen into prominence as Minister of War and the Interior during the siege of Paris, acquired more and more influence, and secured finally, after the memorable campaign against the "Septennate," a ruling majority. The Marshal-President, finding a longer tenure of office incompatible with his views, and not prepared to sacrifice his principles for the sake of continuing in office, resigned on January 30th, 1879. In the April number of this Review for 1879 we took occasion, in a

paper on "The Outlook, Political and Social, in Europe," to remark that the change in the person of the chief-magistrate meant a transition from conservative to radical principles. Mr. Grévy, the new incumbent, a distinguished member of the French bar and one of the "*batonniers*" of the bar of Paris, had, by his firm opposition to the plebiscite of 1870, made for himself a name and the reputation of an irreconcilable enemy of the Empire. The esteem in which he was held and the popularity which he enjoyed are well-illustrated by the majorities by which he was elected President of the Assembly, namely, by 519 against 17 votes in 1871, and in 1876 by 462 against 6. That he stepped without bloodshed and barricades into the presidency was an agreeable surprise to everybody, and an event quite acceptable, in as much as it promised a prolongation of the status quo. Under Mr. Grévy's régime the line of demarcation between the Conservative and Radical party was unmistakably drawn. The feud between the French government and the authorities of the Catholic Church increased in severity, because free-thinking and irreligion were now openly made the creed of the party led by Gambetta. Since Gambetta's death, the party of the left is without a leader, and the government may be said to be playing the part of the Satyr, blowing hot and cold air with the same mouth. Mr. Grévy's administration is, however, chiefly memorable because during its term two Frenchmen died who are equally deserving of our notice because they are typical figures not only of the parties in France, but of the two opposite principles asserting themselves everywhere, and these two are Gambetta and the Comte de Chambord. While the direct influence of the latter upon France and French politics has been very limited, being in fact confined to the manifesto issued in 1871, he stands indirectly in the very closest relationship to that party which ever is a staunch and fearless opponent of Radicalism. Two greater contrasts can hardly be conceived than Gambetta and Chambord. Nowhere outside of France can two historical figures be found who serve as better apostles and exponents of principles and party, nowhere two men separated by a wider gulf from birth to grave. There is nothing in common between them, save that they are both Frenchmen filled with a strong love for their country and eager to serve France each in his own way. If ever the saying, "*les extrêmes se touchent*," was with singular appropriateness applicable to two men, it is so to the Demagogue-Dictator and to the putative King of France. The one, the last male descendant of the elder branch of Bourbons, was, in the popular meaning of the word, all failure; the other, the tribune of the people was all excess. The one failed through unswerving adherence and high-minded loyalty to those principles which had come down to him from his ancestors as a bequest of

ages. The other was all success through "opportunism," that is, lack of principles. Thus the strength of the one forms the weakness of the other.

Gambetta was raised into prominence in the confusion subsequent to the crushing defeat of the French armies by the united German forces, by the part he took in proclaiming the downfall of the Empire. A man of unbounded energy and unquestioned ability, he espoused the cause of Radicalism, and expended his vital power, his nervous force, his mental ability with prodigious prodigality in its furtherance. The cry, "*Liberté, églalité, fraternité*," uttered by him, thrilled again the country, and conjured up the ghost of the Revolution of 1789. Gifted with matchless oratorical powers, he possessed in the highest degree the faculty of electrifying vast assemblies with the magnetism of his own ambient genius. With an ambition as great as his energy, he combined a singular adaptability to circumstances. His eloquence, in swift succession, swept with overwhelming force through the depths of passion, of ire, of joy, of patriotic fervor, to combat successfully the foe of his selection, "clericalism." He threw down fearlessly the gauntlet, and openly declared war, *à l'outrance*, against religion and the Church of Rome. Unrelenting in his hatred against that institution, his main efforts were directed to the removal of all that tends to preserve religious feeling in society. His strenuous efforts to remove that great stumbling-block out of the way of his ambitious schemes, sharpened by his keenness of perception, led him to proclaim that, to begin at the beginning, religion must be rooted out from the hearts of the little ones by making education a matter of state, and by excluding from it religious instruction. The sworn antagonist of the source of all authority, he appealed constantly to the human propensity of rebellion by proclaiming "*L'alliance du proletariat avec la bourgeoisie*." His greatest success was achieved when he assailed MacMahon and the "Septennate," and succeeded in placing the government in the hands of the Radical party. It was then that he coined the famous apothegm, "*Se soumettre ou se démettre*." The short ten weeks of his premiership, in the fall of 1881, are distinguished principally through the failure of the "*scrutin de liste*." As a statesman he belonged to the category of those who say, "What care I what happens after me," and not to those who never neglect to consider what the following age may bring. Nor did he hold, like Cicero, that "nothing can be truly useful unless it be completely just;" he went even far beyond the slippery maxim of Macchiavelli, that "many things are useful that are certainly not just." His unscrupulous desire to complete the ruin of religion led him even to forget that, no matter how strong political sentiments and political passions may be, the

religious sentiments and religious passions are always stronger. Raised in a moment to the highest pinnacle of popularity and influence, he perished with equal suddenness. A child of the Revolution, in every sense of the word, he is, as such, a typical figure indeed. His career was the brilliant flashing of a light which had but a short time to live. His greatness was based mainly upon the strange personal influence which he knew so well how to wield. Almost before his obsequies were over he ceased to be an influence, and continues only as a memory, growing fainter and fainter as he recedes into the past. Such is the representative of Radicalism; such its polity, its creed. Some critics questioned the sincerity of his purpose by trying to turn his patriotism into egotism. With these we cannot agree. We tried to do no injustice to Gambetta, but to sketch truthfully the traits most prominent, the influence most pronounced, the party politics most conspicuous in that type of Radicalism which expired on December 31st, 1882, a few minutes before the advent of the new year, as if the same year should not bury also that other type, "Chambord."

Henri Charles Ferdinand Marie Dieudonné d'Artois, Comte de Chambord, et Duc de Bordeaux, was born on September 29th, 1820, seven months after the assassination of his father, the Duc de-Berri. Baptized in water brought from the Jordan by Chateaubriand, he travelled while his education was being completed until 1843, when he took up his residence in Belgrave Square, London. Three years later he married the daughter of the Duke of Modena, Princess Maria Theresa, but the marriage remained without any issue. The largest portion of his uneventful life was spent in quiet retirement at Frohsdorf, a castle which he had purchased in Austria, not far from the capital of that empire. He was neither highly gifted nor did he become prominent through what he accomplished; but he was a character such as is rarely seen in our times, far above the material grossness of this world, true to himself and to his principles, not open to bribe, even by a throne. When, after the capitulation of Paris, in 1871, the country was struggling to restore order out of the chaos into which disastrous foreign and civil wars had plunged it, the throne of France lay within his grasp on condition that he would waive the *fleur de lis* for the tricolor. It was then that he issued the manifesto to which we have already alluded. Assuming the name of Henry V., he declared that "France could be saved only under the white flag of his historic dynasty." This act will ever serve as an unequalled proof of that high-minded loyalty to principle of which he was a unique prototype. The tricolor, let it be remembered, forms the emblem of revolutions. Upon the smouldering embers of the Revolution did the empire itself rest. The acceptance of the tricolor on his part would have meant,

therefore, a compromise with the spirit of '89, and no compromise, so Chambord correctly believed, could restore France to her greatness. He was ready not to ascend the throne rather than waive what he considered one of the conditions under which alone it became him to do so. He was ready to make this great sacrifice, but he was not ready to part with honor, with self-respect, with loyalty to God, to country, and to the trust put by his ancestors into his safe-keeping. He gave the throne for the *fleur de lis*, an act which has been called that of a senseless fanatic. If it was an act of fanaticism, it was an act of the highest type of chivalrous fanaticism, which weighs not what is at stake whenever it is a question of doing what is recognized as right. Chambord has been called an incongruous relic of an earlier world, and so he was; but it was of the world in which virtue was preferred to success, in which religion, gallantry, patriotism, and true liberty had taken up their abode. His was the world where probity is chosen before wealth, character before fame, integrity before position; the world in which men did not pause with hesitation before immolating prospects of their own advancement upon the altar of moral righteousness. He was, indeed, a believer in the divine rights of kings, but for that reason he respected all the more the rights of his fellow-man. It is this rare steadfastness of character, this insurmountable propensity to be truthful in small and in great things, that made him also declare openly, with genuine French valor, in the manifesto of 1871, that he was a supporter of the temporal independence and sovereignty of the Pope. That declaration was made in the face of the very powers who had made the Vicar of Christ a prisoner at the Vatican. It was made at a time when silence on that point would have secured to him powerful allies among the Protestants of Europe in his aspiration to the throne of France. The support of the governments was then all-important. But his very aspirations led him to undeceive a world, which, by silence, he might have deceived. Of such high-minded nobility of character history has but few instances on record. It was his imperturbable firmness also which, in 1873, secured to him the formal recognition as head of the royal house by the Orleans princes, thereby healing up the breach which had existed between the Bourbons and Orleanists since the days of Philip Egalité. He, like Gambetta, personified a principle and a party, *that* principle of the full meaning of which the words, "noblesse oblige," convey, perhaps, a better definition than any verbose explanation; and *that* party which, under the name of "conservative party," is found everywhere alongside of its deadly enemy, "Radicalism." With his death the regal claim descended upon the Comte de Paris; and the world, in admitting as much, admitted also that Chambord, apart from royalty, was,

indeed, a type of those signally French virtues which depend not upon personality. Chambord is dead and buried, but what he personified lives in his heirs, in the French as a people; nay, in society at large, and will continue to live on until mankind loses forever the knowledge of the principles of truth and righteousness. If material success alone measured the greatness of men, history could refuse to assign a conspicuous place in the annals of France to the illustrious dead exile. But history accords to posterity the privilege of burnishing up the records of the past, of giving fame to those whom their own times did not recognize as famous. Death already surrounded Chambord's name with that priceless halo with which fidelity to God and country, integrity of purpose and firmness of will, are rewarded by mankind,—a tribute which society has not yet unlearnt to pay, and which has been paid to the dead at Frohsdorf as soon as he had passed away to join the great majority, even before his calm and lifeless features had been interred in mother earth.

If we compare the two great men whose lives and characters we have endeavored to sketch with a few strokes of the pen, as exponents of the two opposite cardinal principles which, though encountered in nearly every civilized state, appear in such pronounced form in France; if we take their careers as prophesies indicative of the fate of the parties they represent; if we look at the sudden rise of the one, like a meteoric flash, his short-lived, brilliant triumph, purchased at the expense of character, his sudden and ignominious death, and if we look at the other, coming down from the past and reaching into the future, because what shaped and fashioned his course forms the unchangeable patrimony of the human race, if we look at them in this light, as well we may, then we have before us a picture of the Radical and of the Conservative parties, bold, indeed, but true in all important features. Lest we be accused of too free, if not of an altogether illegitimate, use of the word "conservative," we will state, by way of parenthesis, that it has been used throughout this paper in its broad sense, meaning the opposite of what has been defined as Radicalism. In that sense "conservative" may comprise Legitimatists, Bonapartists, and even Republicans.

From what has been said so far it is evident, we trust, that the real issues in France are not of political but social character, far outweighing the import of any war with China or any other country. It would not be striking at the root of the problem to ask, simply, Will France again kindle the torchlight of revolution and throw its firebrands of desolation across the frontier? Has a long century of revolution, of despotism, of anarchy, broken by but a few placid intervals, paralyzed the French character, and dis-

solved the unity of the nation? Has the vitality of France ebbed away, and is she succumbing to the disintegrating influences which distort her fair features? For the problem, stated in its full force, is the repercussion of an echo of old that reverberates from age to age, ever since man revolted against His Maker. The existence of the old, time-honored Christian society, which is based upon the acceptance of natural and revealed spiritual truths, appears threatened by the substitution of the universal rule of naturalism and materialism in its place. Shall the practice of the decalogue and of the gospel-law and the injunctions of the sermon on the mount, shall these disappear as a low superstition in the presence of the "rights of man?" Shall morality have, henceforth, no other sanction than the penal code? Shall the family as a unit of the social order be dissolved in the turbulent sea of animalism? These, we take it, are the questions to which France, and society at large, must soon frame final answers. It is a choice between religion and atheism, between the worship of God and the worship of "self." Freedom through self-restraint stands on one side, slavery through license on the other; order and prosperity through legitimate authority battles against anarchy and desolation through the law of force.

The social upheaval, which the flight of time brings nearer from day to day, embraces, in point of fact, all that from the beginning of history commanded the deepest and best thoughts of the greatest intellects of all times. It endangers all that concerned the human race more than anything else in every age. Every form of social life and of domestic felicity is involved, and hence it is impossible to affect indifference. It would be suicidal policy to trifle with matters which reach back into the very dawn of antiquity and forward into countless unborn generations. If *that* is withdrawn which makes life worth living, personal safety, right to property, family, state, all is abolished, because deprived of the sanctification which makes men respect these institutions.

France, in all probability, will be called upon to make her choice before other countries will be compelled to do so. Now, we may safely hold that, inasmuch as there is no darkness impenetrable to light, nor darkness that does not fade out of sight before light, France's children will not be led away into a state of fatal intoxication. The masses in the cities, laborers discontented, lawyers without practice, fomenting strife and revolt, demagogues haranging the scum of large cities, they may, for a time, upset the social equilibrium. But the marrow of a nation is not made up of these elements. It is the rural population, which follows the plough, tills the field, and gratefully takes from the soil the bounteous gifts of nature, which more than counterbalances the proletaria of the

cities. Less learned and less read, maybe, than the malcontent city-inhabitants, their earnings suffice for their wants because they are free from the expensive vices contracted by city-life. To them a kind Providence is not an empty sound, and they bless the bell that rings them from labor to rest, and bids them return into their families' gladsome circle. It is not this great majority whose life-blood is poisoned. Their views do not parade before the world in high-sounding empty phrases, but are content to rest as convictions within their hearts. They also love their country, but not with the loud-mouthed destruction-seeking love of Radicalism, but the love that is ready to suffer for the beloved. In their meekness they may submit even to a temporary reign of Radicalism, but as true props of society they will shake off with a mighty shake the fiend of peace, of disorder, of despair.

If the views of anti-Catholic German thinkers possess any value, we must believe with them that, after all, material pleasure and satisfaction are neither the highest ambition of our nature nor able to satisfy its yearnings. With genuine German depth and gravity, Schoppenhauer has drawn a dreary picture of life if deprived of all immaterial enjoyments. True, he did not look to religion and a God-man as the corner-stone of felicity, because his whole tendency of thought was negative and not positive. But as a pessimist he furnishes in his opinions incontrovertible proofs that no solution promises social permanency which ignores a proper recognition of the supratelluric forces and their direct bearing upon human concerns. It is asserted that not one in a thousand is influenced in the daily pursuits of life by the thought of what may be waiting for him after death. If this be so, it would only show that we have become triflers and neglectful of what is of the most lasting import. It is not, under any circumstances, an argument in favor of discarding a belief in a Creator, and a direct relationship between him and his creatures. Mankind cannot be made to disbelieve in the existence of such independence, and as long as this belief remains alive, so long society must needs rest upon the plane established by that dependence. Every effort to effect a social organization upon a platform ignoring the power above has proved abortive. Reconstruction can be brought about only by using again that great corner-stone which defies decay, grows firmer with time, and laughs at the puerile attempts to build a structure on quicksand. Men neither can nor will be brought to believe that "after death" means staring blankly at absolute nothingness. Our inner consciousness forever revolts against this arbitrary and unjustifiable view. That view denaturalizes nature, and is contradicted by science itself, which concedes the possibility of a future existence to a form of force of sufficient complexity to constitute

individual consciousness. Science shrinks to call this "soul," because it shrinks to acknowledge that theology taught, ages before the development of any evolution theory, what the latter discovered only at this late date.

The "*élan*," an element belonging in a peculiar manner to the character of the French, that strange impulsiveness which drives them to give heart and soul, and life even, for the object of enthusiasm, has singled out the nation from all others as the one in which political as well as social questions come to a focus within a shorter lapse of time, and in more vehement forms, than elsewhere. It is the dreary philosophy of life which found in England, in George Eliot, such an ardent and highly-gifted expounder, which asks in vain for general acceptance in France. No God, no soul; and as their substitute, love for humanity, indefinite unrealities for a definite reality, this is propounded by the English apostle of modern sociology. But it is difficult to conceive that devotion or self-sacrifice in the cause of the "*grand être humain*" can ever take the place of belief. All truism, in whatever shape it may be presented, will never drive out Christianity. Paris, the great metropolis, has been and still is that strange place, with two opposite elements in its bosom, two such different cities, that strangers, not acquainted with both, can, according to the sphere in which their lot is cast, with equal truth declare, one, that in the whole world there does not exist a more dissipated, insane, and boldly-wicked town; and the other, that nowhere can there be found one more devout, more exemplary, more exceptionally pious, or more actively charitable. The more religion is antagonized by Radicalism the more is the true Catholic spirit roused. Nor is it true that, as Young said, it is

> "This hard alternative, or to renounce
> Thy reason or thy sense—or to believe,"

which society in France as elsewhere must choose between. For it is self-deception to believe that the subjection of Church to State is conducive to the welfare of the greatest number; it is an untenable and irrational proposition to assert that authority can have its origin in man, without resulting in the absolute control of society by the strongest; it is fatal to look upon an indefinite licence of divorce as not dissolving the family. Reason is surrendered only by discarding the lessons of the past in judging of the future. The doctrines of Radicalism and freemasonry are wanting in this, that they banish from sight "experience," and an empty promise has never yet succeeded in outliving the collapse of its emptiness. There is in France, as we took pains to emphasize in a paper in the January number of 1881 of this Review, not only the proletaria of large populous cities that has to be reckoned with. The

great majority of the nation, living in rural districts, is as yet untainted by the contamination of anti-religious communism. Radicalism has there failed to gain any important victories. The pulse of the nation can, therefore, not be measured by the feverish pulsations of the large cities alone.

Outside of France the "culturkampf" has been practically ended by the iron Chancellor by a second Canossa. The Church of Rome, uncompromising in principle as ever, has found recognition as the one conservative element without which the social problem in Germany cannot be brought to an issue. The Crown-Prince's visit to the Pope is still fresh in every memory, and proclaims the bowing down of the great power "state," before that still greater power "religion." This event cannot remain without its influence even in France. It will certainly be weighed in its full import by those who inherited the claims of the Comte de Chambord. The Comte de Paris and the other Orleans princes have shown themselves to be true and loyal Frenchmen, courageous soldiers and sailors, well-trained and sagacious statesmen. They have been content to serve their country in any position where it placed them, under any form of government, and without consideration of personal advantage. In the event of a restoration of a monarchy, any of them would rule with wisdom and moderation and due respect for the legislative authority. In the new deal, however, a republican form of government, with perhaps an Orleans at the head of affairs, is by no means excluded, though we, at least, incline to the belief that republicanism will not succeed in establishing itself in France as more than an ephemeral phase of transition. In any case, we take it, the conservative, loyal, genuine French character will carry the day, and the nation become once more the most Catholic daughter of the Church of Rome, as which she will prosper and earn again the epithet, "la grande nation."

THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF FAMILY AND STATE IN REGARD TO EDUCATION.

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"THE child belongs to the State before belonging to his parents." This winged word of a sanguinary revolutionist is, either implicitly or expressly, the basis of modern public education in most European States. By the Reformation the bond of religious unity has been severed. Christian traditions have been abandoned, and religious principles framed to the caprice of men. Matrimony, established by God as a holy institution, and elevated by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament of His Church, was degraded to a mere natural contract, or, in the quaint phrase of Martin Luther, to a "worldly thing." The State, with uplifted hand, ratifies and blesses the marriage-union of the youthful couple, and receives again into his loving arms the hopeful citizen that may chance to be born of that blissful alliance, and if he consign the babe to the solicitous and tender care of its natural mother, to be nursed for a few years, it is only to reclaim it again to be educated and trained in the evils of peace and war for the aggrandizement and protection of that country in which it has had the privilege first to see the light. If the child happens to be of the weaker sex, it will, none the less, be received under the State's tuition, that, in its turn, it may one day become a Spartan mother, who will embrace her son and say: "Go, my boy, fight for your country; conquer or die." Sparta was no more delicate in her

parental attentions to her subjects than are our modern European States.

Also, from this side of the Atlantic, we look across with no small amount of admiration upon this Spartan policy. Educationalists have been, for many years, hard at work in this country compiling and popularizing European systems of education. In imitation of revolutionary Europe, we have established a system of secular or godless education. We are educating millions of American citizens without religion and without God. Compulsory education has, also, to some extent, been introduced into several States of the Union. Americans, too, have made the acquaintance of the novel dignitary called truant-officer. In short, American, like European States, are gradually turning schoolmasters. How far this is in keeping with the genius of the American constitution, with American character and American freedom, we will leave to politicians to decide. In this struggle, however, between individual, domestic, and religious liberty on the one hand, and State monopoly of education on the other, it is well to fix some principles as landmarks by which we may be guided in our views on this all-important subject of education.

Taking for granted that man, coming into this world as a rational being, helpless, and dependant on others for his physical, mental, and moral development as a social being, with social qualities and social wants, as a religious being, having certain fixed religious duties towards his Creator in common with his fellow-men, is, by the very fact of his existence, a member of three distinct societies, each complete in its own sphere—the domestic society or family, the civil society or State, the religious society or Church—the question arises, which of these three societies has the duty and right of procuring his education, or, if this task is common to all the three, what portion of it falls to the lot of each? The object of this article is to give a clue to the solution of this question. For the present, however, we will confine ourselves to the rights and obligations of the family and State. We shall begin with the rights and duties of the *family*.

The family, or domestic society, has been instituted by God himself at the creation of our first parents. He not only laid down as a general law in the nature of man, but also sanctioned by a positive command (touching the species in general, not the individual) that man and woman should leave father and mother and cling to each other for the propagation and education of the human race, for the multiplication of His children, for the extension of His kingdom on earth and in heaven. So firm are the bonds of this union between man and wife that, being once legitimately contracted, they cannot, without divine intervention, be severed

except by death. So sacred is this alliance, that the Apostle calls it a great mystery, and does not hesitate to compare it with that holy union which exists between Christ and His Church. If this union is so inviolable and holy in the eyes of God, its object must be of the highest dignity and moment. It must be something of a more exalted character than the procreation and rearing of citizens for the State. It is nothing less than the accomplishment of the eternal design of God to communicate His goodness and felicity to His creatures. It is the grand object for which He has created the universe, and made it subordinate to the dominion and subservient to the use of man, the same divine end for which His only-begotten Son has assumed our nature and expired on the Cross—the eternal happiness of man in the enjoyment of his Creator. The marriage-union, so holy in its institution, and sublime in its object, must have certain sacred and inalienable rights and binding and indispensable duties consequent upon it. Foremost among those rights and duties is the education of that offspring with which God may chance to bless that holy alliance, according to the intent of the Creator, to His service and glory.

Now, what is meant by education? This question can be best solved by the consideration of the concrete circumstances in which man first appears upon the stage of this world. While inferior animals, by the providence of the Creator, enter existence endowed, to a great extent, with the means of self-preservation and self-defence, we see man come into this world as a helpless creature, destitute of all means of self-subsistence and self-development. If abandoned to himself, he would soon pine away and die. For years he is dependent on others for his support and for his bodily and mental development. Yet God has deposited in the child the most wondrous faculties. He has impressed upon him the image of His own greatness, power, wisdom, and goodness. But this image must be brought out and perfected by the coöperation of his fellow-man. His physical, intellectual, moral, and religious faculties still slumber. They must be aroused, moderated, trained, by external agents. Should the child be excluded from human intercourse, though his bodily organism might be developed, yet he would grow up in deplorable idiocy. But, besides those natural faculties which God has deposited in the child, He has also implanted in the soul of the Christian the germ of supernatural life, a new creature of His omnipotent hand, when, in the sacrament of baptism He regenerated him of water and the Holy Ghost. This supernatural principle of life will live on in the soul of the child until it is blighted by sin. But it, too, is a fruitful principle, endowed with as many supernatural forces as there are infused virtues, theological and moral. This supernatural germ, also,

which we call sanctifying grace, and which far transcends in perfection the natural principle of life with all its admirable faculties, must be aroused, actuated, and developed by the early and continued practice of Christian virtue, else it will not take deep root in the soul, and like a languid spring-flower it will be killed by the first onset of the nightly frost of temptation. Now this is what is meant by education: The harmonious development of both body and soul of the child, by exterior training, according to the idea of the Creator; the developing and perfecting of all his faculties, whether corporal or spiritual, natural or supernatural; the bringing out of the image and likeness of his Creator, which is impressed upon him; his habilitation for the fulfilment of his duties towards himself, his fellow-men, and his Creator,—above all, the practical initiation and direction on the way that leads to eternal happiness. Anything that does not take in all those functions is defective and cannot be called education.

Thus man, that wonderful little world of natural and supernatural treasures, is cast into this world by the Creator altogether at the mercy of his fellow-beings. Yet, weak and helpless as is the child, he has received from the Creator an inviolable right which is stronger than all the military forces of nations. With his whining, inarticulate cry, he can claim the assistance of his fellow-man, and woe to him who despises or tampers with his right. Every child, then, who is born into this world has an inviolable right to the necessary education, else the Creator should be wanting in His providence to him whom He has made king of creation. This being the case, there must exist a corresponding obligation of imparting to him this education, for every right implies a corresponding duty, otherwise it were no right. With whom, then, does this obligation rest? Certainly, in the first place, with the child's parents.

By the very fact of procreation there arises the strict obligation on the part of both parents to preserve the life and procure the spiritual and temporal welfare of their progeny. For this end the Creator has infused into the hearts of parents an inborn and indelible affection for their children. For this end He has inviolably sanctioned the unity and indissolubility of matrimony. For this end sacramental grace is dispensed to Christians who join in lawful wedlock. But in this sacramental contract they also undertake the sacred and strictly binding duty of procuring their offspring a physical, moral and religious (Christian) education. From this obligation they cannot be dispensed. How far this duty extends cannot so easily be defined, as it depends a good deal on particular circumstances, and especially on the parents' position in life. Neither does it lie within our present purpose to investigate the extent of this obligation in detail. So much, however, is certain

that parents are strictly bound to provide for their children such a physical development that they may be at least able to procure their living honestly by the work of their own hands, and such a mental development as to insure their possible success in the ordinary pursuits of life. For this physical and mental training of their children, however, neither the study of pedagogies, as Herbert Spencer would recommend for intended parents, nor a course of hygiene such as is sometimes pleaded for with much pathos in American journals of education, is required for parents. That parental love and solicitude implanted in their hearts by their Creator, aided by common-sense, is a sufficient guide, as long as it is not stifled or obscured by vicious habits. Still greater care, however, than on their physical and mental development must be bestowed by parents on the moral and religious education of their children. They are obliged to watch over their innocence, to guard them against all demoralizing influences and associations, to imbue them practically with an early sense of modesty, truthfulness, filial piety, obedience, etc. But above all they must, at an early age, endeavor to imprint upon their yet tender hearts religious sentiments—love of prayer, reverence for whatever is holy, fondness of the Christian doctrine, and of all religious practices, love of God and detestation of sin, etc. It is scarcely necessary to add that they are bound to procure them a solid religious instruction.

Those duties are common to all parents. The duties of a higher education, literary or scientific, vary according to particular circumstances and conditions of life. Here the question might be put whether parents, in general, are bound in conscience to have their children taught to read, write, and reckon. Certainly, if we abstract from particular circumstances, no such obligation can be proved, as such knowledge is necessary, neither for the temporal nor spiritual well-being of man. Neither is it required for an ordinary mental, moral and religious development, as may be seen in the case of many illiterate persons who have more mental grasp and a good deal more delicate and defined moral and religious sense than many of their comparatively well-informed brethren. We know that some of the poets of the Middle Ages, whose works take the highest rank in literature, could neither read nor write. We need only recall the name of Wolfram von Eschenbach, the sweet Minne-singer, who is known as the author of the famous "Parceval," one of the finest literary productions which have reached us. However, if we take the circumstances into consideration, such are the inconveniences of illiteracy, in our days, in most places, and such the facility of acquiring those rudiments of knowledge, that the parents who, in normal social circumstances, brought up their children unlettered, could scarcely be considered blame-

less. Yet, reading, writing, etc., as may be readily seen, constitute the least important part of education. Such knowledge is only accessory to the true essentials. Whatever, then, may be said of those useful and ornamental acquirements, with which civilized society in our days can hardly dispense, it is certain that parents are strictly bound to procure the essential physical, moral and religious education of their children. The sense of this duty is so deeply impressed on the nature of man by the Creator that it cannot be wholly effaced even by the grossest barbarism.

To facilitate the fulfilment of the duties of education, parents have been gifted by the Creator with the most wonderful educational talents. He has infused into their hearts an unspeakable love and tenderness for their offspring, an unwearied patience with their children's weaknesses, an unremitting watchfulness over their every step and movement. Who has taught the mother to enter into the very soul of her child, to read his thoughts and desires, to take the liveliest interest in his childish pastimes? Yet no Kindergärtnerin of Fröbel's school has ever learned to penetrate into the secrets of the mystery of childhood as does the untutored mother, guided only by the voice of nature. Who is better adapted to make early and lasting impressions on the susceptible heart of the child than his own mother? How often do we find that an early lesson of a mother, recalled to the mind of a wayward son, effects that which no other motive, however strong, can accomplish? 'Tis true, those natural gifts are not dispensed in like measure to all parents, and can be wholly or partially eliminated by vicious habits; but this does not weaken the force of the general fact, which evidently proves the intention of the Creator that parents should be the educators of their own children.

To this intent, also, God has infused into the hearts of children a love and reverence for, a confidence and docility towards their parents which they can rarely acquire towards others, and this dictate of filial piety has been sanctioned by the positive law of God: "Honor thy father and thy mother." It requires no small degree of depravity to stifle this voice of nature in the heart of the child. As the parent, then, is by divine institution the natural teacher of the child, so the child is the divinely-appointed pupil of his parents. The family, therefore, is a divinely-constituted school, with an inviolable charter, framed and written by the finger of the Almighty in the hearts of parents and children. This school has existed before all universities, and will survive them all, because it is a divine institution which forms part and portion of human nature. Whoever, therefore, meddles with this divine creation, violates the most sacred rights of parents and children, and thwarts the intentions of the Creator. For, if parents have the strict duty of edu-

cating their children according to their own convictions, they have also the inviolable right to do so; and, if children are bound by the law of nature to submit themselves to that education which their parents are, in conscience, obliged to give them, they have also the right not to be impeded in the fulfilment of this duty. They may be arrested by truant officers, and dragged into State-schools against their own will and that of their parents; they may be submitted to educational tyranny worse than Spartan, but the voice of injured human nature cries up to the Creator for vengeance against that State which thus disregards the unprotected rights of its subjects.

Though the duty and right of parents to educate their offspring is inalienable, and though this obligation is personal, yet it does not follow that they may not make use of the assistance of others in discharging this office. As parents can employ a trusty servant to nurse their children, so they can employ a reliable teacher to instruct them in reading, writing, good manners, Christian doctrine, and the various arts and sciences, to superintend their physical, mental, and religious development. And as parents frequently have not the necessary time and knowledge to give their children a complete education, there is nothing more natural than that they should call in the aid of others, to whom they should consign a share of their parental office, with a corresponding portion of their parental rights. But, as it would involve too great inconvenience and expenditure for every family to employ one or more pedagogues, and one teacher can instruct and train several with the same or with greater facility than he would a single child, the suggestion is obvious that several families should unite and employ one or several trustworthy teachers in common to assist them in the education of their children. This circumstance first gave rise to *schools*, which are nothing else, in reality, than supplementary institutions to assist parents in the work of education. Whatever, then, may be the lofty idea which the worthy pedagogue may have of his exalted calling, he has only a subsidiary office, and so much authority and jurisdiction, in the natural order, as parents choose to confer on him. But, like every other employé, he, too, can contract with his employer. He can propose certain conditions on which alone his services are obtainable. Hence, it is quite natural that schools should, in course of time, acquire a certain degree of autonomy, should have certain constitutions, certain laws and regulations, to which parents and children should be obliged to submit if they wished to avail themselves of their advantages. Yet, from the nature of things, schools should be ultimately at the mercy of parents, for, on them should finally depend whether

they sent their children to such institutions or had them otherwise instructed and educated.

Such was the *idea* of school which prevailed with all ancient nations, if we except *Sparta*. In this commonwealth the children were born, so to say, into the arms of the State. Immediately after its birth the child was laid upon a shield and addressed with the words of the Spartan mother: "Either with this or upon it." It was then submitted to a wine bath to test its physical soundness. After this it was examined by the elders, and if found free from bodily defects it was allowed to live and to be reared for the service of its country. If any symptoms of physical inability were discovered, it was condemned to be flung into a crevice of the Taygetus as a useless specimen of humanity and a burthen to the State. Those children who were allowed to live were left to the care of their parents up to their seventh year, when they were removed from the family to begin the rough routine of State education, no more to taste the sweets of family life.

Very different was the system of education in *Athens*, the high school of classic antiquity. Here, too, the supreme end of education was good and enlightened citizenship, but the duty and rights of education rested with the parents. It was only on condition of the fulfilment of this duty on the part of parents that the children on their part were by law obliged to support them in their old age. Up to the seventh year the child was consigned to the care of a nurse, who was usually required to be well up in years. At the age of seven, the boy was intrusted to a pedagogue, whose ordinary office it was not to teach, but to watch over his charge and conduct him to and from school, while the girl was left to the care of her mother, to be brought up in close seclusion. The schools were exclusively the undertakings of private individuals, though the edifices used as schools were built at the expense of the State for this and other public purposes. The instruction given in those free schools, however, was subject to the inspection of the State.

In ancient *Rome* parents enjoyed a still more perfect freedom in the education of their children. Till after the fall of the republic there were no such things as public schools. The child was educated in the family circle. The father remained the natural educator and instructor of his own children. At an early period, however, we find schools of a private character in Rome, which were at first held in the streets and public places, and received the name of *ludi* (plays), as the teachers bore the title of *ludi magistri* (masters of play), to attract the playful children. These primitive institutions gradually assumed the form of real schools, with a graded course of instruction, but still maintained their private character. It is only under the emperors that we find the first at-

tempt at public schools, with teachers paid by the government. Such was the Athenæum erected by Hadrian in Rome, and the auditorium of Constantine in Constantinople—the latter, a university, with thirty-one professors paid by the State. But, besides those imperial institutions, private schools continued to work as formerly.

By the *coming of Christ*, the great Educator of the nations, new life was breathed into education. There was no more the narrowness of national prejudice, no more the distinction of Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian. All men were destined to become one great family, the children of God and heirs of His Kingdom. Education has received a higher aim, which was not mere citizenship and national character, but the Sonship of God and the conformity with His only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ. And what were the principles of this divine pedagogy? The same principle which God had established in the beginning,—*family-education*. Wherefore, our Lord recalled matrimony to its primeval purity, unity, and indissolubility, and raised it to the dignity of a sacrament of the Church. He Himself is born, grows up, is educated (as far as this can be said of the Son of God) in the bosom of the family. It is only once we read of His sitting at the feet of the Jewish doctors. For the rest, He remained with His parents in the Holy Family of Nazareth, and "was subject to them" until the hour of His public teaching arrived. But Christ not only infused a new soul into education, and reëstablished the rights of parents. He Himself came into the world as the teacher of the nations, who taught "as one having power." And like all His other saving institutions, He made His teaching-office permanent in His Church. With the same divine power, which He had received from His Heavenly Father, He invested His apostles to teach all nations, assuring them and their successors of His infallible assistance unto the end of the world. He has conferred on His Church a divine charter to teach, which the world can violate, but not invalidate. Christianity has given a new aspect to education, restoring it to the primordial ideal of the Creator. The child should no longer be the pupil and property of the State. He is to be "taught of God," and for God by divinely-appointed teachers—the parents who have received their divine mission in the Sacrament of Matrimony and by the Minister of God, sent by the Church, in the power of Christ. The history of the Church might almost be summarized in the exercise of this function of education. Nor did she ever cease to raise her voice in vindication of the inviolable right of parents to educate their own offspring, nor fail to remind them of this important duty.

But in modern times the old Spartan system has been in great

part resuscitated. The germ of the present system of State monopoly of education was sown by the Reformation. The teaching-office or the Church, instituted by Christ, was abolished, and private judgment enthroned in its place. Every man alike, according to the new Gospel, was priest and teacher. The Supreme teaching-office was transferred into the hands of the people, and right well they made use of their prerogative to dispense themselves from the duty of being taught by others. In his own days, Martin Luther could complain with reason that already "the village parson was the most despised of all men, that every peasant considered him as mud and dirt, to be trodden under foot, the which, he was sorry to say, was not seldom literally executed."

No better was the lot of the teacher, as is natural to expect, for Luther's abuse was levelled alike against priest, monk, and scholar. Hence we soon hear the general complaint that no parent would any more send his child to school. To this was added that the greater part of the school property was confiscated, and the salaries of teachers so curtailed that few were found willing to devote themselves to the work of education. The result of all this was a general decadence of education in the reformed countries. What, then, was to be done but have recourse to the State, into whose hands the properties of educational establishments had fallen, to erect and endow new schools, and thus resuscitate education from the tomb. This the State also did, but tardily, and, at first, only for the privileged class. But the foundation was thus laid for what is now called State education.

This modern system is a complete revival of the ancient Pagan form of national education, nay, it even surpasses in absolutism anything we find in the civilized nations of Pagan antiquity. It is Spartanism on a refined scale. This modern Spartanism has found its heralds among the lights of modern philosophy, especially in Germany. *Gottlieb Fichte*, in his "Addresses to the German nation," pleads for national education in the true Spartan sense. He will have great *public* institutions in which the students are to be educated *in common* in the *national spirit*. Those should be *exclusively State institutions*, besides which no others should be tolerated. The State should be the only educator of the nation. His worthy follower, *Hegel*, proceeding from his evolutionary pantheism, came to the same conclusions. In his phrase, "education is the art of regenerating man to a new spiritual nature. The growing youth," he says, "who is suckled on the breast of morality (the State), but lives yet as a stranger in her absolute contemplation, is brought more and more to her acquaintance, and thus passes over into the universal mind (Geist). The (youth's) mind must divest itself of its individuality, and thus make its transit into

the universal mind." This pantheistic metamorphosis, which he calls education, is nothing else than the total sacrifice of individual liberty and character to the all-absorbing omnipotent deity of the State, which he describes as the "realization of the moral idea, the self-conscious moral substance, the moral mind, the manifest, self-revealing will;" in other words, the last and highest evolution of the God-universe. Who can dispute the right of the State, thus deified, to educate the children it has begotten and nourished in blissful unconsciousness on its all-embracing bosom? And who can refuse to doff the swathings of individuality, and don this magic cloak of national universality? Let this sample of the theories, on which State education is brought to rest, suffice, and let us now proceed to examine the natural rights and duties of the State with regard to education.

Man is by nature a social being, says the Stagyrite. His social wants and inclinations extend beyond the limits of the family circle. Without a more extensive coöperation of his fellows, the individual is unable to procure for himself that peace and comfort which constitute our temporal happiness in this life. The individual and the family must be defended in their personal and domestic rights. Those material goods which make life enjoyable, and without which felicity cannot subsist, must be brought within the reach of all. This cannot be done without the coöperation of many,—at least of those who live within certain fixed boundaries. But as coöperation is impossible in our present (fallen) state without a ruling authority, possessing legislative and co-active jurisdiction, there arises the natural necessity of civil authority, or the power of efficaciously directing a given community to temporal prosperity. Civil society, therefore, or what we generally call the *State*, is a natural institution, the outgrowth of our rational human nature. There is no need of a social contract to explain its origin and existence. Wherever on the face of the globe a certain number of human beings exist in contiguity a civil society will soon spontaneously spring up, whether individuals will or not.

Therefore we find civil society and civil authority in a more or less developed state with all nations. But as the necessity, so also the object, and the limits of civil authority are defined by nature, its object is to procure for the individual and the family by common effort those necessary goods which they cannot procure for themselves by private and domestic means,—the protection against the assailants of their rights, and the promotion of such comforts and facilities as tend to the general temporal prosperity, without the violation of personal, domestic, or divine rights. The State, therefore, exercises two functions towards its subjects,—one pro-

tective of their natural or acquired rights, another promotive of their temporal well-being.

Now, does education fall within the scope of civil power? In other words, has civil authority been instituted by the Creator to teach the nations? Certainly education does not fall within the protective function of the State, for no right is thereby violated that parents educate their own children, or intrust them to private individuals or institutions to be educated, according to the dictates of their conscience. On the contrary, this, as we have seen, is the intention of the Creator, and the most perfect execution of the Divine order. The only case in which State interference can be warranted is that in which the necessary education of children is notably neglected, as in case of exposed children and orphans, for whom provision is not otherwise made by the Church, or by private charity. Every child has a right to the necessary education, and if his claims are not satisfied in the natural divinely sanctioned order, it is the business of the State to take measures that the child may come to his right. By so doing the State does not act as an educator more than it becomes the administrator of public property by punishing theft, or enforcing the restitution of stolen goods. It only defends the personal rights of its subjects within lawful bounds. But the State that takes education into its own hands, and monopolizes schools, violates in the most glaring manner personal, parental, and divine rights.

The child under ordinary circumstances has an inviolable right, though he may have no means of enforcing it, to be educated in the way intended by the Creator, not under the iron rod of the State official, but under the loving care of his parents, either in the bosom of the family or in that place where parents believe him to be best cared for,—not according to that manner of pedagogy which may seem to philosophers to make him an enlightened citizen and patriot, but in that way which will bring him nearer to his Creator, and guide him most effectually to his last end. Therefore the child who is violently wrested from the arms of his parents and thrust into a public school is injured in his most sacred personal rights; and this violence is the more crying in the sight of heaven because the child has no means of self-defence, nor even the consciousness of the wrongs inflicted upon him.

State education is, furthermore, a violation of domestic rights,—nay, it frustrates the object of domestic society, which is not merely the procreation, but mainly the education of the human race. Procreation without the divinely-intended education, is a curse rather than a blessing for the individual as well as for the race. It were better for that child not to be born who is not educated in the way of the Commandments of God; and parents cannot be indifferent,

whether they are the cause of a blessing or a curse, to their children. They cannot, therefore, leave them a prey to the ambition of the State. It is their duty and their inalienable right to have their children brought up according to their conscientious convictions. Hence the State that compels parents to send their children to schools which in their minds do not direct, but impede, them in the attainment of their last end, tramples their most sacred rights under foot.

But the State which monopolizes education goes still further in its injustice, it violates the divine right; for, if God has both naturally and positively sanctioned the law of domestic education, He cannot be indifferent as to its fulfilment. Whoever, then, conduces to or connives at the upsetting of this divine ordination, not only violates the rights of men, but lifts his unhallowed hand in rebellion against the Creator Himself. He opposes himself to the teaching of Christ, and impedes His Church in the discharge of her teaching office; for, supposing even the best case in which the minister of the church has access to the schools to teach the Christian doctrine, yet this is not the full exercise of the charge the Church has received from her founder. Abstracting from the fact that primary education is essentially religious, and is consequently altogether subject to the jurisdiction of the Church, in virtue of the commission given her by Christ to teach, preserve, and defend His doctrine, the Church has the divine right of supervision over the teaching of the various branches of profane science, in this sense that she can assure herself that those branches are taught in such a way as not to convey any error in faith, or anything manifestly leading to such error, nor to contain anything dangerous to morals. Hence a profession of faith is exacted by law not only of the professors of sacred but also of the teachers of profane sciences in ecclesiastical institutions. Therefore the State that takes education into its own hands, though it may permit religious instruction, violates the most fundamental of the divine rights of the Church. Whatever view, then, we choose to take of State education, it is a most flagrant injustice, a most impious and sacrilegious violation of the holiest rights of God and man.

If State education subverts the natural order instituted by the Creator, we may justly expect that it entails the most serious consequences for morality. And in fact we need not go far to find the pernicious moral effects of State or secular education. The catalogue of crime which is daily and weekly chronicled in our newspapers bears ample testimony to the effects of our public education. And how could it be otherwise if the schools are secularized, religion no more taught, if children are no more impressed with the eternal maxims, which alone (though only aided by the interior

grace of God) can restrain the impetuosity of the passions of man? History, sacred and profane, should have long since convinced the nations that man cannot be made moral without religion.

"Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure," says George Washington, in his last injunction to his country, "reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." We are well aware that the advocates of godless education in this country are fond of telling us that crime is committed by the unlettered, not by the educated. They love to wax eloquent on the chastening and civilizing influence of the typical American schoolmarm, and the salutary moral effects of the coeducation of the sexes. And yet proverbial "young America," with all its amiable qualities, has, in great part, sat at the feet of those victims of civilization, and enjoyed all the blessings of mixed education, with "Bible-reading without note or comment," and "daily instructions in morals and manners." And who are the writers and readers and venders of dime novels and such like trash, which is deluging our country? Who are those who exercise and promote peculation and corruption and all manner of public dishonesty and swindling? Who are the Socialists and Communists and Nihilists who are now disorganizing society all over the world? Who are bursting the bonds of domestic society in this country, and practicing and abetting those abominations which Dr. Morgan Dix has recently revealed to the American public? Is it the much-decried, illiterate mass? No; those are men and women who have enjoyed all the blessings of education, *minus* religion, and we doubt not but the bulk of them have received "moral instructions" not inferior to those generally supposed to be given in our American common schools. And yet American educationalists muster numbers, and endeavor to prove to us statistically that illiteracy is the cause of crime, and express a holy horror of illiteracy as the source of all moral and social ills. "Let us fill the schools," they say, "and we shall empty the prisons," as if there was any connection between secular education and morality, or the exemption from crime.

A glance at the progress of crime in countries, where State education is in fullest bloom, and illiteracy a thing almost unknown, will convince the reader of the fruitlessness, or rather the demoralizing influence of public education. Let us take a few instances from the German fatherland, which, being eminently the land of modern civilization and public schools, cannot but be considered a fair representative. The growth of crime is simply alarming, especially amongst the youth. A Berlin preacher, in a report on the progress of crime in that city (1873), says: "At present

the prison cells, allotted to juvenile criminals, are so crammed that the room is no longer sufficient for them. In the course of 1872, no fewer than 392 such juveniles, from twelve to eighteen years of age, have been imprisoned, among whom 158 were under sixteen years. A lad, of fourteen, being asked in court of what denomination he was, replied: 'Denominations no longer exist; religion is no longer taught in the schools.'" And then the reporter goes on to say: "The great mass of crime has grown upon the soil of religious indifference and radicalism. Most of the criminals show an appalling ignorance and carelessness in religious matters, and such a confusion of all moral ideas as would move any thinking man to compassion." This growth of crime has alarmed even the great champions of modern culture. Herr von Puttkamer, then minister of public instruction in Prussia, after expressing his regret that the influence of religious education was paralyzed in the State, said (1879): "I am convinced that on the day on which we cease to make the saving teachings of the Gospel the basis of education, the fall of our national civilized life will be inevitable." *Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor.*[1] Such are the fruits of State education in Germany; and yet we must remember that German State schools, as a rule, are not non-religious. Cases of non-religious schools have been exceptional, and religious instruction has been generally given according to the denomination of the children, in a solid and systematic way; but this circumstance affords a striking evidence of the inefficiency of religious instruction if the education is secular, or, as it frequently happens, hostile to religion. When will our American advocates of non-sectarian schools learn this lesson?

If such are the moral fruits of State education, what must be its *social* effects? If citizens are brought up without religion, without conscience, without God, is it to be wondered at that society is disorganized, that the social order is shaken to its centre, that rulers are trembling on their thrones? If religion and morality, which, to use the words of George Washington, are "indispensable supports of political prosperity," the two "great pillars of human happiness and the firmest props of men and citizens," are once undermined, the whole

[1] The percentage increase of crime in *Prussia*, from 1871 to 1878, was an average of 100 per cent., or double the number, the increase of population being only 4.4 per cent. Increase of crimes against morality, 148 per cent.; personal outrages, 143 per cent.; murders, 45 per cent.; against property, 226 per cent. In *Saxony*: murders, 85 per cent; against morality, 181 per cent.; personal outrages, 200 per cent.; the increase of population being 7.4 per cent. In *Baden*: murders increase 69 per cent.; against morality, 122.9 per cent.; against property, 127 per cent. In *Wurtemburg*, 1872-77: average increase of crime, 83.5 per cent.; the increase of population, 3.3 per cent. In *Bavaria*, 1872-76: average increase of crime, 32.6 per cent.; of population, 3.3 per cent.

structure of society must needs totter to its fall. This is the practical outcome of State education.

But considered even from a theoretical point of view, the principle of State education is fraught with the most baneful consequences. "If the State owes its children an education at the common expense," says Bishop McQuaid, in a recent number of the *Journal of Education*, "there is no escape from the Communists' demand for food, clothing, and shelter at the common expense." The principle of State education, therefore, is essentially communistic. "If the mental wants of the rising generation ought to be satisfied by the State," says Herbert Spencer, "why not their physical ones? The reasoning which is held to establish the right to intellectual food will equally well establish the right to material food; nay, it will do more, will prove that children should be altogether cared for by the government." Spencer logically concludes that the principle of State education annuls all parental responsibility. And Stewart Mill does not hesitate to call State education an insupportable despotism, inasmuch as it forms the opinions and sentiments of the people in such a way that the State may lead them whither it pleases.

We are no admirers of the philosophy of Spencer and Mill, but the greater their aberrations in other respects the more importance must be attached to their views on this one point, in which they did not allow themselves to be carried away from the path of common-sense by the current of modern notions. And, in fact, if the State may regulate and superintend the mental development of its children, we do not see why it should not, in like manner, watch over their physical growth. If the State supply the schoolmaster, why not the nurse? If it prescribe the mental régime, why not also the physical? Why not enact a national bill of fare, based on the most approved medical principles? Why not legislate on the clothing, habitation, corporal exercises, of its youthful subjects? This principle of State education, if synthetized to its last consequences, would with logical necessity lead us to the adoption of the famous black-soup mess of the Spartans. However humane and philanthropic, then, the principle of State education may appear at first sight, if once admitted it necessarily paves the way to communism and despotism. And it matters very little whether the State that adopts it is a republic, or an oligarchy, or a monarchy. History teaches that the one of these forms as well as the other is liable to those excesses, as soon as it begins to disregard the natural laws which the Creator has traced out on human nature for the direction of civil society.

It is needless to point to the pernicious effects of State education on *religion*. When teachers and pupils are subtracted from

the salutary influence of the Church, when God and religion and all those things which appertain to man's last end and should be first and foremost in the training of youth, are proscribed for six days of the week, how is it possible to imbue children with religious sentiments, to ground them in the principles of their faith, so that they may learn to act on religious motives through life? Religion, at most, will be a matter of secondary importance with them. And even though regular religious instructions may be permitted, yet the education will be far from being a religious one. Primary education, especially, must be blended with religion; the children must be brought up in a religious atmosphere; religion must become familiar and easy, and, as it were, a second nature to them, and this is a thing impossible if the instruction is secular, if the Church does not exercise a direct influence on teacher and pupil. Infidelity or religious indifference is the inevitable consequence of such secular instruction. We have many sad instances to illustrate the truth of this assertion in our own country. For what is the cause of the progress of infidelity in this country, if not mainly the godless education given in our public schools? And if the number of Catholics in the United States which, thanks be to God, is considerable compared with other denominations, is not more than half what it ought to be, we believe that this is chiefly, though not solely, owing to public-school education.

But State education, we maintain furthermore, far from being beneficial, is highly injurious to the advancement of true *civilization*, to the true progress of education. Here we must remind the reader that the true civilization of a nation does not consist in its material power and resources, nor in the most perfect utilizing of the forces of nature for social comfort and industrial facilities. All these things of course are the outcome of culture in a certain department, which, though of great importance, is by no means the highest of civilized life. Neither does true civilization consist in the total exemption from illiteracy; for, as we have already shown, a high degree of mental culture and good taste is not incompatible with illiteracy. Many an unlettered Italian will pass a better judgment on the artistic merits of a work of art than an American high-school graduate, who has heard much talk of good taste and æsthetics. The true civilization of a nation is the perfect, harmonious development of the higher faculties of the people as such. Now, can this harmonious development of the higher faculties of a nation be obtained under State education? We emphatically deny the possibility; for how can the development be harmonious if the religious and moral side of human nature be altogether or partially neglected? How can even the intellectual faculties be properly de-

veloped when, as is generally the case in State schools, the whole education has a materialistic drift? How can the æsthetic faculties be awakened, chastened, and cultivated, if Christianity, in which alone lofty ideals are to be contemplated, is banished from the school-room and expunged from the school-books?

But the most lamentable effect of this purely secular education is the rise and spread of error. As soon as science is divorced from positive religion there is no safeguard against error. Science has no longer the bulwark of infallible authority to keep it within the proper bounds. The human mind has no longer the unerring monitor to check its vain curiosity, to say to it: "So far shalt thou come, and no farther!" It has no longer the beacon-light of faith to light it on its way through the shoals and cliffs, with which the great ocean of the intelligible is beset; therefore it is that, in our days, in which the human mind has emancipated itself from the restraint of authority, "men have become vain in their thoughts, and their foolish hearts are darkened, and, professing to be wise, they have become fools." They have, in truth, changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the image of the corruptible world, and rational men into the likeness of the ape, and reduced Creator and creation to a mere combination of matter and movement. This lamentable degradation of science in our days is the natural outcome of its divorce from positive religion. If any one looks on this as progress, he may boast that secular education is the mother of civilization. We will not reason with him.

Science has its God-appointed moderatrix in revealed religion. Nor does this subordination in any way derogate from the dignity of science; nay, it enhances the same, inasmuch as it guards science from error, which alone can degrade it. On the other hand, who does not see that it is the most unmitigated despotism against the human mind and against science, that their growth and development should be ruled by the State, which has no vocation, not to say capacity, for that task. Instances of this intellectual thraldom are not wanting in the history of modern philosophy. It is a patent fact that, as long as Hegel was in favor in the cabinet of Berlin, almost exclusively his followers were promoted to the higher chairs of learning in Prussia, which circumstance, more than anything else, has given popularity to his absurd system of philosophy and pedagogics among the learned; but, as soon as the wind of doctrine began to veer in ministerial circles, the young Hegels were almost systematically debarred from professional eminences.

Moreover, as competition is the life of trade, so also of education, and as State monopoly is prejudicial to any branch of business, so it must be to education. Of course, the State, having extensive resources at its disposal, can afford material facilities,

which private communities in our days can hardly attain to; but the faculty or teacher, whose position is secured by government funds, will rarely devote the same energy to the work of education as those who altogether depend on their own efficiency for their support. Still greater will be the self-devotion of those who have sacrificed every temporal emolument for God's sake, in order the more freely to give themselves up to the task of education, whose affections are undivided by the cares of this world, and whose every thought belongs to the youth intrusted to their care. But State monopoly destroys that healthy competition, and leaves no room for those higher impulses. State professors, who have large numbers of pupils, will always have as many clever ones as will be able to save their reputations, but, if they are not actuated by higher motives, what cannot be indiscriminately supposed, they will allow the weaker talents to lag behind, or abandon their studies in despair. Anyone who is in the least acquainted with European State schools, knows what a wide gap separates teacher and pupil, what an absolute want of sympathy exists between them. One need only set his foot in a private institution to experience the difference. Here you can find the greatest mutual confidence and sympathy; students having the greatest attachment to their teachers, and teachers having the most lively interest for the progress of every individual of their pupils. Whatever view, then, we take of State education, whether moral, social, religious, or pedagogic, we find it highly prejudicial to the cause of true education, culture, and civilization, a bane to the individual and to society, a crying outrage against the claims of human nature and the laws of the Creator.

It might seem to the reader as though we exempted the State from all concern for the education of its subjects. This, however, is far from being the case. It is the task of the State, or civil government, to provide for the weal of the community, as far as this can be done without infringing on the personal and domestic rights of its subjects, or on those no less sacred and inviolable rights which Christ conferred on His Church; and nothing contributes more to the well-being of a people than a good education. It follows, then, that the State has the duty and the right to promote education within the limits of right. But to promote education it is not necessary to monopolize it; nay, such monopoly, as we have shown, is highly injurious to the progress of education. The State has, then, undoubtedly the right to erect and endow schools at the public expense, where such are necessary or useful and not otherwise provided for. For such schools the State may make regulations and appoint teachers; provided, however, it leave the Church full freedom to superintend and conduct the religious ed-

ucation in the same. The State may, also, and ought to, supply such facilities for higher education, as are too expensive for private enterprise, such as museums, observatories, art galleries, public libraries, botanical and zoölogical gardens. It should, moreover, organize and equip scientific expeditions, patronize all kinds of useful scientific research, and reward men of eminent literary and scientific merit in such a manner as to stimulate, not to pamper, genius.

That education, then, may be an object of government legislation is certain beyond all exception. The limits of this right of legislation must, as we hinted, be defined, on the one hand by the common good as a positive norm, and on the other hand by personal, domestic, and religious rights as a negative norm. We cannot in this paper enter into a detailed investigation of these limits. One question, however, we do not wish to pass over in silence. It is the vexed question of *compulsory education.* Can the State enforce compulsory education; that is, can it force parents to send their children to school up to a certain age, say twelve or fourteen years? Certain it is that the State cannot oblige them to send their children to any school in particular, much less to a school whose teaching is merely secular or hostile to their religious convictions. This would be against the most sacred rights and highest interests of parents and children. Neither can the State compel parents to send their children to any school at all if their education is otherwise provided for. So far, we believe, all right-thinking men agree. Now, the question arises whether the State can by law oblige parents to have their children taught reading, writing, reckoning, and the other elements of secular knowledge. On this point even Catholic authors are at issue. For our own part we believe that parents in our days are, under ordinary circumstances, bound in conscience to give their children the advantage not only of a religious education, but also, at least, of an elementary secular education; but we deny that the State can make or enforce laws to this effect. Parents are also in conscience bound to afford their children healthy food, clothing, and habitation; yet who will infer from this that the State has a right to regulate the kitchen, nursery, and other apartments in families, or make laws to prescribe the material and make of the children's dress according to the various seasons of the year? God has given this responsibility to parents, and it is only in cases of utter neglect that they are to be interfered with by outside authority. This extreme case of utter neglect in education cannot occur unless the child is altogether abandoned; then it is the duty of the State to interfere and provide for the necessary education.

But the advocates of State education urge that it is the duty of

the State to defend the rights of its subjects, and that the children have a right to an elementary secular education at least; that the State, therefore, can and must provide that every child within its jurisdiction is taught at least the elements. Here we must distinguish in education what is essential from what is non-essential. What is essential in mental education is the knowledge of those things which are necessary for the attainment of our last end, as in physical education that is essential which is necessary to preserve the physical life of the child, and to this the child has a strict right *ex justitia.* All further knowledge is non-essential, and can only be claimed by the child *ex æquitate;* in other words, the parents are bound to give their children more education than is merely essential to their eternal salvation, in virtue of the law as to what they owe to their offspring; but they are not bound under the title of justice, and cannot therefore be compelled by coactive measures to the fulfilment of that duty of parental piety; the same way as a rich man who disinherits his children, and disposes otherwise of his property, sins against parental charity, but does not violate the right of another, because he only disposes of what is his.

But cannot the State legislate also in cases of mere equity? Certainly it can, but only within its own sphere and for the general good. But neither of these conditions is realized in the case in question. Education, as we have shown, does not fall within the sphere of the State, but is the proper function of domestic society. It is, therefore, only in utter default of parents that the State can assume this duty, and further interference is not for the common good, as we have seen, but leads to communism and despotism.

They further advance that the honor of a civilized State requires that all its subjects are able to read and write. Illiteracy, they say, is a disgrace to the nation. We do not plead for illiteracy, but we are unable to perceive any great ignominy or serious inconvenience to a State in the fact that some of its colliers and ploughmen and cowboys and dairymaids are not able to read the morning paper and carry on an epistolary correspondence with their friends, provided they are honest and thrifty and understand the simple science of their own craft. But such citizens, they say, are not fit for free suffrage. Why not? Unless because they are debarred of their franchise by their literate brethren. Further, they exclaim, such citizens are unfit to be true patriots and to defend their country. We have seen spectacled German students under arms, but we could not imagine that they were braver than the unlettered Crusaders of old, or more patriotic than the illiterate portion of the Irish Brigade.

All the arguments which are advanced in favor of compulsory education are, to our mind, utterly void of convincing force. All

they prove is, that the State should favor and promote education within its due limits, and that we fully agree to. In our days there is no need of coercion to induce parents to give their children the necessary secular education, if facilities are offered them. Self-respect and self-interest suggest this so strongly, where the state of society requires it, that coactive measures are needless. Where illiteracy is a considerable inconvenience, it will generally be found that in those cases in which mental education has been notably neglected, the physical has been a good deal more overlooked. And yet, though it is a true principle in education,—*prius est vivere; dein philosophare*,—no State ever thinks of making inquiries into the physical rearing of children, which falls within the province of the State more than the mental training. Why, then, should the State be so solicitous that the physically-neglected child, whom it has permitted to be half-starved, ill-clad, and ill-housed, should at the age of twelve con his A, B, C? Such delicacy we consider highly preposterous, not to say pharisaical. Compulsory education, therefore, in whatever shape or form it may be adopted and enforced by a State, we hold to be an overstepping of the divinely-constituted limits of political authority, and an egregious outrage against private and domestic rights.

To sum up our views in a few words: Abstracting from the prerogatives of the Church, we say that, according to the natural law, which is the basis of the moral order and of all positive legislation, education is the business of parents to the exclusion of all others; that they have, therefore, the sacred and inviolable right to educate their own offspring, or intrust them to the care of those who will educate them according to their moral and religious convictions; that the State, according to the same divinely-constituted order, should not be the educator of its children, but only the promoter and patron of education; that this is its only function with regard to education, by which alone it can lead the people to true civilization; that any further interference on the part of the State in the matter of education is not only violent and unjust, but must needs prove destructive to religion, to morality, to genuine culture, and to the social order of nations.

WHAT DID "THE REFORMATION" REFORM?

THE so-called Reformation of the sixteenth century started out with the professed object of removing evils which, it was claimed, had crept into the Church. The claim, in some respects, was entirely true. On this point there is no room for controversy, and about it there never was a controversy between the "Reformers" and those who opposed them. The real questions in dispute were, what the actual evils were, and how and by what means they should be removed? Both parties at first agreed that the existing evils, whatever they might be, were not inherent in the Church, and did not originate in her essential constitution, nor grow out of it.

But very soon the "Reformers," hopeless of bringing the Church and its hierarchy over to their ideas, took other ground, and maintained that the Church was corrupt in its very constitution; that from the temple of God it had become a synagogue of Satan; that its visible Head, the Pope, was Antichrist; that the Papacy must be destroyed; that new doctrines, different from and opposed to those which were taught, and had been taught, must be introduced, and, in fact, a new Church created. The Bible, it was alleged, furnished the necessary instruction and authority for such an undertaking.

But the followers of the "Reformers" soon found that such an attempted justification of their movement must be qualified, so as to conceal, and, if possible, explain away its direct contradiction of our Blessed Redeemer's declarations respecting the perpetuity and indefectibility of His Church. Accordingly, in their various, divergent, and contradictory creeds and confessions, they resorted to various rhetorical subterfuges to keep out of view the real thought which underlay all those creeds and confessions, and the realization of which was the real object of their movements.

They set up the figment of an *invisible* Church of Christ, to be created and re-created at the will and pleasure of its members, though all history testified that, from the day of the Church's first establishment, it had been a visible, divine constitution, in the world yet not of it, endowed with divine authority and powers, which it was perpetually to possess, and with a divinely constituted hierarchy to exercise that authority and those powers. They tried, in some instances, too, to trace up a succession from the Apostles, through various despicable, heretical sects and schisms, the

Hussites, the Waldenses, the Albigenses, the Lollards and the Cathari, and their Manichean predecessors. But the claim was too preposterous to be generally and vigorously made. Conceding that they were the legitimate successors of those sects, it simply proved that they were bad descendants of bad ancestors. For those sects had advocated principles and practices plainly incompatible with pure morality, and utterly irreconcilable with social and civil order. But even this miserable claim could not be made good. Many of the ideas of previous heretical sects, it is true, were adopted by the "Reformers;" but there was no connection between those sects and the so-called Reformation showing any real historical continuity. Luther, Melanchthon, Carlstadt, Osiander, Munzer, Zwingli, Beza, Bucer, and Calvin, on the Continent of Europe, and Henry VIII., Cranmer, Ridley, Latimer, and Elizabeth, of England, were not, in any historical sense, children of previous sects or schisms, but went out incontestably from the communion of the Catholic Church. They could not, therefore, with any consistency or truth set up even the miserable plea of sectarian continuity for their rebellion. Their movements were movements instituted *de novo;* and the only plea that can be made in defence of the Reformation, consistent with either history or logic, rests on the assumption that the Catholic Church, the only then existing religious organization that even claimed to be the Church of Christ, had become an apostasy, and that *they* (the "Reformers") had the right to re-create it from the Bible. This assumption, beyond all question, was the basis on which Luther himself placed his movement from the day he openly threw off the authority of the Catholic Church to that of his death; and back to it all the various creeds of Protestantism are driven by an invincible logical necessity.

The agreement on this point of the vast majority of members of Protestant sects, however opposed to each other in doctrine and practice, is conclusive proof. Whatever their controversialists may say, and however subtly they may endeavor to explain away and qualify the fact, Protestants generally, as a final resort, discard all testimonies of history to the continuity of the Catholic Church from the days of the Apostles as impertinent to the question, and fall back upon the Bible—that is, their own interpretation of the Bible—in defence of the origin of their respective sects.

The movement, miscalled "The Reformation," was, therefore, in its objects and purposes, as regards the then existing Christian Church, not a *reformation* in any sense. It was, essentially and in its fundamental idea, a rebellion against the Church,—an effort to destroy it, and to construct a religion for Christian Europe, *de novo*, from the Bible—that is, from such parts of the Bible as the "Re-

formers" acknowledged to be inspired, and which they claimed to have the right of interpreting and expounding according to their own individual notions. As regards the then existing Christian Church the lines written by Luther with a piece of chalk on a wall of his chamber, during his last sickness, were the keynote of the whole movement:

"Pestis eram vivus, moriens mors tua ero, Papa."
("Living, I was your pest; dying, O Pope, I shall be your death.")

The question, then, fairly confronts us, was the movement (intended avowedly and obviously to destroy the existing Christian Catholic Church), so far as it succeeded in introducing another religious belief and practice, a real reform of religion?

I. Did the so-called Reformation introduce or promote purer *doctrine?* There are two ways of arriving at a correct answer to this question. One is by examining the fundamental doctrinal ideas of the "Reformers," and developing their logical consequences. The other is by examining the results as shown in history and the light of actually existing facts to-day. We shall employ both methods.

1. The Reformers, rapidly driven on by the irresistible logic of their movement, broadly disclaimed the testimony of the Church Fathers as to what was true doctrine, and the authority alike of Pope and Councils. They appealed, or at least Luther did, at first to the Pope, but almost immediately defied him. They appealed from him to a Council, but never could be gotten to pledge themselves to submit to its decision. Their final resort was invariably an appeal to the Sacred Scriptures as *they* interpreted them and to those parts of them only which *they* acknowledged to be inspired. And this principle of the "Reformers" is interwoven with the warp and woof of all Protestant "Confessions." Tear it out, and the entire fabric of each and all of them falls asunder. It is embodied in the false popular tradition that "Luther unchained the Bible."

But, in thus setting up "the Bible" as "the rule of faith," the Reformers broke loose from all Christian antiquity. If the doctrine of the Reformers on this point is the pure one, the true one, then the Christian religion was impure and Christian doctrine untrue, from its very start. Protestants for a time professed to make great account of the early ages of Christianity, and asserted they could find in them proofs that would vindicate their assumed "rule of faith." Latterly, with more prudence or less recklessness, they say very little about the ages of "primitive Christianity." Yet, going back to whichever of the earlier ages of the Christian Church they choose, they fail to find any such rule of faith. It did not exist in the age of St Gregory the Great. Nor in that

of St. Leo the Great, Sts. Celestine, Hilary, Chrysostom, Augustine, Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, Vincent of Lerins. Nor yet in that of Sts. Athanasius, Basil, Ephrem, Damasus, Cyril of Jerusalem, and the Gregories of Nanzianzen and Nyssa, the age of the Council of Nice.

Going back before that Council (which Protestants profess to acknowledge as an Ecumenical Council of the "undivided," "pure" Church), we hear Tertullian appealing, not to the Sacred Scriptures in his treatise on "*Prescription*," but to the tradition of the Church; and insisting that heretics have no right to appeal to the Scriptures; that they are the exclusive property of the Church; that the Church may rightly say to heretics, in reply to any such appeal:

"Who are *you?* Whence do you come? What business have you, strangers, with my property? By what right are you, Marcion, felling *my* trees? By what authority are you, Valentine, turning the course of *my* streams? Under what pretence are you, Apelles, *removing my* landmarks? The estate is MINE; why do you, other persons, presume to work it and use it at your pleasure? The estate is *mine; I* have the *ancient, prior possession of it;* have the title-deeds from the original owners. *I* am the *heir of the Apostles;* they made their will with all proper solemnities in *my* favor, while they *disinherited* and cast *you* off, as *strangers* and *enemies.*

Thus wrote Tertullian to those who in his time appealed to the Sacred Scriptures against the Church.

If we consult St. Cyprian we hear him warning the Christians of Carthage who were inclined to follow promulgators of new opinions in the following pregnant words:

"I counsel and warn you, trust not rashly pernicious words, assent not lightly to declarations which are false, take not darkness for light, night for day, famine for food, thirst for drink, poison for medicine, death for salvation."

Then he lays down "the *rule*" by which false doctrine is to be distinguished from true:

"God is one, and Christ is one, and there is one Church, and one Cathedra founded on the Rock by the Lord's voice. No other altar can be set up, there can be no new altar, by reason of the one altar and the one priesthood. He who gathers elsewhere, scatters. Adulterous, impious, sacrilegious is whatsoever human passion may institute, in violation of the Divine arrangement. Keep far away from the contagion of such men, and avoid their word as you would flee from a cancer or a plague, mindful of the Lord's warning: 'They be blind leaders of the blind; and if the blind lead the blind both shall fall into the ditch.'"[1]

[1] Epistle 43. It might almost seem as though the above brief quotation and other parts of this letter, written by St. Cyprian upwards of sixteen hundred years ago, had been intended, not only for the immediate instruction of the Christians of Carthage, but, by prophetical inspiration, as a warning to modern Ritualists and other would-be Protestant-Catholics who discard the so-called "right" of private judgment and claim to be Catholic though remaining outside the communion of the Church.

And then, to settle the whole question as to the rule by which error was to be determined from truth, heresy from the orthodox doctrine, schismatic movements from the normal action of Christianity, when Novatian set up pretensions to being Bishop of Rome and sought to secure the support and obedience (due to the Primacy) of the African Bishops, St. Cyprian wrote a number of letters showing that Cornelius (then Pope) was the true Bishop of Rome, and Novatian a pretender and schismatic. In one of these letters he refers to Novatian personally and to his claims to teaching "pure" doctrine.

"Be he who he may, and how much soever he may arrogate to himself, he is profane, he is foreign, he is without. And since after the *first* (Cornelius, then the true Bishop of Rome) there *can be no second*, whoever is made after one who ought to be alone, he (Novatian) is not second now, but none. . . . It is not *necessary to ask* WHAT *he teaches*, since he *teaches without*. Whoever and whatever he may be, he is no Christian who is not in Christ's Church. Boast as he may of his philosophy, or make vain parade of his eloquence, the man who has not kept fraternal charity and ecclesiastical unity has lost even all that he had before. . . . And whereas there is from Christ one Church divided throughout the world into many members, likewise one Episcopate spread abroad by a *concordant* multitude of many Bishops, *he*, after this order has been handed down by God, after this compact full unity of the Catholic Church has been everywhere settled, now undertakes to *create a human* Church, and sends forth his *new* apostles into many cities to plant this *recent* institution."

Then, again, because of this and other schisms and heresies likely to mislead the faithful, St. Cyprian wrote his renowned treatise, *De Unitate Ecclesiæ*, in which he lays down this *rule*:

"A summary *test of truth* is immediately at hand for *faith*. The Lord addresses Peter: I say unto thee that thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall also be loosed in heaven. Again He says to the same, after His resurrection; 'Feed my sheep.' On that one He builds His Church and to him commits His sheep to be fed. And although after His resurrection He gives like power to all the Apostles, and says, 'As my Father hath sent Me, even so I send you; receive ye the Holy Ghost, whosesoever sins ye remit they are remitted unto them, and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained,' yet still, to make the unity clear, he provided by His authority that the origin of this same unity should start from one. The other Apostles were also indeed what Peter was, endowed with like partnership both of honor and power, but the beginning proceeds from unity, and the Primacy is given to Peter that there may be shown to be one Church of Christ and one Cathedra; . . . . that the Church of Christ may be demonstrated one. . . . Will he who withstands and resists the Church, presume still that he is in the Church, when the blessed Apostle Paul also sets forth the *sacrament of unity* in like style where he says: 'There is one body and one spirit, one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God?' . . Tear a sunbeam from its place; the unity of the light suffers no division. Break off a bough from a tree; it has no further power of growth. Cut off a stream from its fountain; it must soon become dry. So the Church of the Lord. . . . She sends forth her abundant streams abroad, far and wide in every direction; yet is there but one head, one origin, one mother of continually prolific grace. Of her womb we are born; by her milk we are nourished; with her

spirit we are animated. . . . Whoever is out of her is a stranger; he is profane, he is an enemy. No one can have God for his father, who has not the Church for his mother. If one might escape who was out of Noah's ark, then may he also escape who is out of the Church."

Going back a few years farther, we come to St. Irenæus, born only about twenty years after St. John was called to rest from his labors, and a pupil of St. Polycarp who was a pupil of St. John. St. Irenæus lays down "the rule of faith" for Christians, the rule by which they may distinguish truth from error, as follows:

"It is necessary to hearken to the Presbyters of the Church, who have the succession from the Apostles, and along with the succession of the Episcopate have received the certain gift of truth according to the good pleasure of the Father. . . . The true knowledge is the doctrine of the Apostles, and the ancient constitution of the Church in the whole world, and the character of the body of Christ according to the succession of the Bishops, to whom the Apostles have committed the Church in every place."

Then, showing that the ways of heresy are many and various and that the doctrine of the Church is one and unchanging, he says:

"She (the Church), though spread throughout the world, with the greatest care, and as occupying but one house, preserves the faith that has been handed down, and believes it, having but one soul and one heart; and proclaims it, teaches it, hands it down, with marvellous agreement, as if she had but one mouth. The languages indeed are different, but the matter of the tradition is still one and the same. . . . If the Apostles had left us no writings, ought we not still to follow the rule of that tradition which they handed over to those to whom they committed the churches? To this rule many nations of barbarians do hold in fact, which believe in Christ and have His salvation inscribed by the Holy Ghost, carefully following the tradition. . . . which we have received and hold from our Church, and which the Spirit of God continually renovates, like a precious jewel in a gold casket, imparting to it the quality of His own perpetual youth."

Then, as if to clinch the matter, St. Irenæus shows that this tradition handed down from the Apostles is not left to the Bishops, singly and independently, but united in a general corporation, the several parts of which are held together in unity, the centre of which is the Church at Rome.

"As it would be tedious," he says, "to enumerate the succession of all the churches, we confound all those who in any improper manner gather together . . . by pointing to the tradition of the greatest and most ancient church, known to all, founded and established at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles Peter and Paul, and to her faith announced to men, which comes down to us by the succession of Bishops. For with this church, on account of her more powerful principality it is necessary that every church, that is the faithful who are on all sides, should agree, in which the Apostolic tradition has been always preserved," etc.

This brings us to the very verge of the age of the Apostles, and going back to it we find St. Ignatius, the personal pupil of St. John, and St. Clement, whose name St. Paul declares is "in the book of

life." On his way to Rome to be devoured by wild beasts by the order of Trajan, St. Ignatius wrote seven letters; four from Smyrna and three from Troas. In these letters, full of earnest practical instruction, he dwells constantly on the necessity of concord and unity, and constantly lays down the *rule* by which in the several churches it is to be secured—*obedience to the* Bishop:

"Do nothing without your Bishop." "For where there is division and wrath God dwelleth not." . . "It is therefore fitting that you should by all means glorify Jesus Christ, who hath glorified you, that by a uniform obedience ye may be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment, and may all speak the same things concerning everything, and that being subject to your Bishop and Presbyters, ye may be wholly and thoroughly sanctified."

"Wherefore it will become you to run together, according to the will of your Bishop, as also ye do. . . . . Let us take heed, therefore, that we do not set up ourselves against the Bishop, that we may be subject to God."[1]

"Be ye united to your Bishop, and those who preside over you, to be your pattern and director in the way to immortality. As, therefore, the Lord did nothing, neither by Himself nor yet by His Apostles, without the Father, so neither do ye anything without your Bishop and Presbyters. . . . . Have one common prayer, one supplication, one mind, one hope, in charity and in joy undefiled. There is one Lord Jesus Christ, than whom nothing is better."[2]

". . . . . Use none but Christian nourishment, abstaining from pasture which is of another kind, I mean heresy. For they that are heretics confound together the doctrine of Jesus Christ with their own poison. . . . . Wherefore guard yourselves against such persons; and that you will do if you are not puffed up; but continue inseparable from Jesus Christ, our God, and from your Bishop, and from the commands of the Apostles. He that is within the altar is pure; but he that is without, that is, that does anything without the Bishop, and Presbyters, and Deacons, is not pure in his conscience."[3]

". . . . . Flee divisions and false doctrines. . . . . Where your Shepherd is there do ye follow after. . . . . For as many as are of God, and of Jesus Christ, are with their Bishop. And as many as shall with penitence return into the unity of the Church, even these shall also be the servants of God. Be not deceived, brethren; if any one follows him that makes a schism in the Church, he shall not inherit the kingdom of God; if any one walks after any other opinion he agrees not with the passion of Christ."[4]

Thus we might go on adding quotations from other letters which St. Ignatius wrote to other churches on his way to Rome, but we abstain. Not being able to write to several other churches, he requested St. Polycarp, in the last of his seven letters, to do it for him; and, in his letter to that Saint, writes as follows, indicating what he wished St. Polycarp to write:

"Hearken unto the Bishop, that God also may hearken unto you. My soul be security for them that submit to their Bishop, with their Presbyters and Deacons. And may my portion be together with theirs in God. . . . . Let none of you be found a deserter; but let your baptism remain as your arms; your faith as your helmet; your charity as your spear; your patience as your whole armor."

We have reserved for last reference, among the epistles of St. Ignatius, his letter to the church at Rome, the fourth in the order

[1] Epistle to the Ephesians.
[2] Epistle to the Magnesians.
[3] Epistle to the Trallians.
[4] Epistle to the Philadelphians.

of his letters from Smyrna. In this letter he chiefly entreats the Roman Christians, in their charity and prayers, not to obtain from God that he should be spared by the wild beasts, to which he was to be exposed, and thus be prevented from receiving the crown of martyrdom, which he so ardently desired. "I beseech you," he writes, "to show not an unreasonable good-will towards me. Suffer me to be the food of wild beasts, whereby I may attain unto God." He seems to exhaust his powers of language in heaping upon the Church of Rome epithets of reverential admiration, designating it as

"the Church that has obtained mercy through the magnanimity of the Most High Father, and of Jesus Christ, His only begotten Son; the Church *beloved* and ENLIGHTENED through His will, Who wills all things that are according to the charity of Jesus Christ, our God, which PRESIDES in the place of the Roman region, being worthy of God, most comely, deservedly BLESSED, most *celebrated*, properly *organized*, most chaste and PRESIDING in charity, HAVING THE LAW OF CHRIST, bearing the name of the Father."

We come now immediately to the age of the Apostles. While St. John was still living at Ephesus, dissensions arose among the Christians at Corinth. These dissensions primarily had reference to Priests with whom some of the Corinthians were dissatisfied, and whom they undertook to depose. They involved also disputes respecting doctrine (particularly that of the resurrection of the body), and respecting subjects of practical Christian duty, as is evident from the topics embraced in St. Clement's letter. For authoritative settlement of the whole trouble the Corinthian Christians passed by the Apostle John (still living at Ephesus), St. Ignatius, then Bishop of Smyrna, St. Polycarp, then Bishop of Antioch, and other Bishops to whom they stood in close relation, either by local nearness or by nationality and sameness of language, and invoked the intervention of St. Clement, then Bishop of Rome. He complied with their request by sending to them (along with certain messengers or delegates) a letter of instruction, exhortation, rebuke, and warning, which is still extant.

It is only necessary to glance at this letter to be convinced that both St. Clement, its writer, and those for whose benefit it was intended, moved in an order of thought utterly irreconcilable with that which gathers around the assumption that the Bible is the rule of faith. It dwells on the sin of disturbing the divinely-established unity and order of the Church. It proves with a wealth of arguments and illustrations, drawn from the operations of the natural world, the constitution of civil society, the dealings of God with the Jews through the whole course of their history, and the manner in which the Apostles had not only chosen successors to themselves but had instructed those who should succeed them to keep up the

succession, by appointing others who were to follow them in office, when they themselves fell asleep, that unity, and order, and authority in the Church are based both on natural necessity and on express divine appointment; and that to maintain order, and unity, and authority requires the subordination of the several parts to the whole, and of the inferior to the superior. Speaking of the Jews under the Old Testament dispensation, he says:

"The High Priest has his proper functions; to the Priests their proper place is appointed; to the Levites appertain their proper services; and the Layman is confined within the limits prescribed to Laymen."

Referring to the organization of an army as a further example, he says:

"All are not prefects nor rulers of thousands, nor rulers of fifties, etc. But each man in his own rank executes the orders given by the king and governors."

Like St. Paul he illustrates the doctrine he is enforcing by reference to the human body, pointing out that

"even the smallest limbs of our body are necessary and useful for the whole body, but all the members must conspire[1] and unite *in subjection*, that the whole body may be preserved."

Then, coming still closer to his point, he repeats what he had before referred to, and says:

"The Apostles received the Gospel for us from the Lord Jesus Christ; Jesus Christ was sent forth from God. So then Christ is from God, and the Apostles are from Christ. Both, therefore, came of the will of God in the appointed order. Having, therefore, received a charge . . . . they appointed their first fruits, when they had proved them by the Spirit, to be Bishops and Deacons unto them that should believe. . . . And our Apostles knew through our Lord Jesus Christ that there would be strife over the name of the Bishop's office. For this cause, therefore, they provided for a continuance that, if these should fall asleep, other approved men should succeed to their administration. . . . Wherefore, then, are there strifes, and wraths, and factions, and divisions, and wars amongst you? Have we not one God, and one Christ, and one Spirit of grace that was shed upon us? And is there not one calling in Christ?" . . .

Then, evidently referring to his supreme Pontificial authority in the Church, as Bishop of Rome and successor to St. Peter (a fact which, being well known to the Corinthians, it was unnecessary for him explicitly to assert), St. Clement significantly adds:

"Ye, therefore, that laid the foundation of this sedition, submit yourselves unto the Priests, bending the knees of your hearts. Learn to submit yourselves . . . laying aside the arrogant and proud stubbornness of your tongue. . . . But if certain persons should *be disobedient to the words spoken by Him* [Jesus Christ] through us, they will *entangle themselves in no slight transgression and danger*."

". . . Yet ye will give us great joy and gladness if ye *render obedience to the things written by us* through the Holy Spirit, and root out the anger of your unholy jealousy, according to the entreaty which we have made for peace and concord in this letter."

[1] "*Conspire*;" breathe together; have the same spirit.

Then, St. Clement informs the Corinthians that, along with his letter, he has sent to them persons who in our day would be styled Papal Legates:

"And we have also sent," he writes, "faithful and prudent men that have walked among us from youth unto old age unblameably, *who shall also be witnesses between you and us. And this we have done that ye might know that we have had, and still have, every solicitude that* ye might be at peace. . . . *Now send ye back speedily unto us our messengers* [naming them] *in peace and with joy that they may the more quickly report to us the peace and concord which is prayed for and earnestly desired by us, that we also may the more speedily rejoice over your good order.*"

The quotations we have given from this ancient and precious relic of Christian antiquity, pointed as they are even in the detached form in which we have had to quote them, are less forcible and significant than when read along with their context in the letter itself. It was written before the last of the Apostles had fallen asleep, by one who had learned his doctrine from their lips, whose name St. Paul, in writing to the Philippians, declares is in the "Book of Life," and who sat in Peter's chair at Rome, the third in the order of succession from that great and glorious Apostle. No wonder it was reverentially read on frequent stated occasions in the Church at Corinth for many years after its reception. Till the settlement by the Church of the canon of the Sacred Scriptures, centuries after, it was bound up in the same volume with one or another of the Gospels or Apostolic Epistles, and was regarded by many Christians as of equal, or almost equal authority with the divinely-inspired Scriptures. Apart from its plain ear-marks of its antiquity, and its allusions to then present circumstances, it might easily be accepted as a Pontifical brief or letter from the present Sovereign Pontiff of the Church, admonishing and encouraging the faithful, and warning and rebuking the seditious and rebellious.

And all the quotations we have given, pointed and direct as many of them are, are even less forcible in the evidence they furnish in separate form that no such "rule of faith" as Luther set up was acknowledged by the Christians who learned Christian doctrine directly from the lips of the Apostles, or from those who immediately succeeded the Apostles, than are those quotations in their combined, circumstantial, and overwhelming proof of this fact.

They show that the whole order of thought and belief, up to the time of the Apostles, was different from, and irreconcilable with, that of the so-called "Reformers." If any one proposed to appeal to the Sacred Scriptures in support of a refusal to accept the teaching of the Church, the very proposal was treated as preposterous. "What business have *you* with the Sacred Oracles of God?" was the challenge that at once put an end to his pretensions.

"They are *my* property, given to *me* by Christ, who appointed *me*, to preserve, defend them, expound, teach His Gospel. *You* are intruders, invaders, devastaters. What business have *you* on *my* estate? What right have *you* to cut down *my* trees, remove *my* landmarks, divert the course of *my* streams?"[1]

[1] Gieseler, a Protestant, furnishes, in his notes and references, countless proofs of it.

Mosheim, the classic Lutheran historian, says: "Cyprian and the rest cannot have known the corollaries which follow from their precepts about the Church. For no one is so dull as not to see that, between a certain unity of the universal Church, terminating in the Roman Pontiff, and such a community as we have described out of Irenæus and Cyprian, there is scarcely so much room as between hall and chamber, or between hand and fingers."

Neander, the classic rationalistic Protestant German church historian, commenting on phrases used by St. Cyprian (the genuineness of which some persons dispute), says that those disputed clauses contain nothing that is not elsewhere affirmed by St. Cyprian.

His Eminence, Cardinal Newman, while still a Protestant, and striving to actualize his "fond dream" of a *Via Media*, by which Anglicanism might be reconciled with Catholicity, wrote:

"Did St. Athanasius or St. Ambrose come suddenly to life it cannot be doubted what communion they would mistake [not *mistake*, but *intelligently take*.—G. D. W.] for their own. All surely will agree that these Fathers, with whatever difference of opinion, whatever protests, if we will, would find themselves more at home with such men as St. Bernard or St. Ignatius Loyola, or with the lonely priest in his lodgings, or the holy Sisterhood of Mercy, or the unlettered crowd before the altar, than with the rulers or the members of any other religious community."

Dr. John Williamson Nevin's learning and intellectual acuteness and vigor are unquestionable. He is frequently quoted as correct in his historical statements, even while striving to find a basis for Protestantism, by Archbishop Kenrick, in his treatise on the Primacy of the Apostolic See. After an exhaustive examination of ancient Christian writings, he was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that all attempts to vindicate Protestantism, or the "Reformers," on the ground that the so-called "Reformation" was a return to "primitive Christianity," or, to use his own favorite expression, "a repristination" of it, were worse than useless, involving a direct contradiction of the plain facts of history. He subtly evaded the evident conclusion that the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is the one true Church of Christ, and that Protestantism is a heresy and a schism, by setting up the theory that Protestantism is an evolution in the onward course of history; and that the *Church of the future*, yet to be evolved, would unite such elements of truth as were to be found in Protestantism with all its manifest contradictions and tergiversations, with those which the Catholic Church has preserved and taught. He says, referring to the assumed agreement of Protestantism with "primitive Christianity," "that Protestantism . . . . . is still farther away from this older faith than the system by which it is supposed to have been supplanted in the Middle Ages. No defence of Protestantism can well be more insufficient and unsound than that by which it is set forth as a pure *repristination* of what Christianity was at the beginning of either the fourth century, or the third, or the second. It will always be found, on examination, to have no such character in fact; and every attempt to force upon the world any imagination of the sort in favor of either Episcopalianism or Presbyterianism, or Independency, in favor of all or of any one of the threescore and ten sects which at this time 'follow the Bible as their sole rule of faith,' must only serve in the end, by its palpable falsehood, to bring suspicion and doubt on the whole cause which is thus badly upheld." (Mercersburg Review, vol. iii., p. 481.)

"We owe it to ourselves here to see and own the full truth. The religion of these Fathers was not of the shape and type now usually known as Evangelical, and paraded commonly as the best style of Protestantism. They knew nothing of the view which

Protestant historians—we mean those who have really examined the still existing remains of ancient Christian literature—admit this, and it is to-day practically accepted as true by the whole Protestant public, who, without regard to sporadic attempts of Protestant ministers, here and there, to escape the monstrous conclusion to which it irresistibly leads, summarily and contemptuously set aside the testimony of Christian antiquity as of no account, and claim the right unqualifiedly of taking "the Bible as their guide," that is, such parts of the Sacred Scriptures as they acknowledge to be inspired, and, so far as they really acknowledge their inspiration, constructing a "pure Christianity" from their own ideas.

Our point here is not the right or the wrong on the part of the "Reformers" in thus breaking loose from all Christian antiquity, and setting up a new rule of faith. What we are here concerned in is the *fact* that they *did* it.

If the Protestant rule of faith be the right and true one, then the Christian Church at once fell into apostasy and our Blessed Redeemer's promise to His Apostles when He commissioned them to go forth and teach all nations was falsified the moment the Apostles proceeded upon their mission. For there is not the slightest sign in secular or ecclesiastical history that the Fathers of the Church in the ages even of Saints Ignatius, Polycarp, Irenæus, and Cyprian departed in any way from the instructions given them by the Apostles, and constructed a new and different rule of faith from that of the Apostles. They *could not* have done it without the knowledge of *other* Christians who had received *their* faith and learned *their* doctrine from the Apostles. The faith had been disseminated, and churches had been thickly planted by the immediate hands of the Apostles or of their colaborers, Saints Mark, Barnabas, Timothy, Titus and others, in Syria, Lesser Asia, Greece, Italy, and Egypt, before Saints Peter and Paul had received their crowns of martyrdom. And these churches and the countries in which they existed were in constant communication. Yet we must suppose, to make the hypothesis on which the so-called Reformation can alone be vindicated, that not in one but in all of these countries the faith was suddenly and quietly changed, corrupted; and that, too, not simply as regards particular doctrines but as regards the *rule of faith* itself; as regards the very standard and test by which truth was to be known and separated from error, without any protest or opposition on the part of the members of those churches, without indeed a word or sign that has came down in

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makes the Bible and Private Judgment the principle of Christianity, or the only rule of faith. They took Christianity to be a supernatural system, propounded by the Saviour to His Apostles, and handed down from them as a living tradition (including the Bible) by the Church." (Mercersburg Review, vol. iii., p. 487.)

history that they were aware that any change *had* been made. They went to sleep at night with "the Bible as their rule of faith," and woke up in the morning, finding without astonishment or surprise that that rule of faith had been discarded, and a new one based on "hierarchical pretensions,"—on the divine authority of the Church to teach—had been quietly foisted upon them.

It is incredible; it is false. It would be far easier to suppose that Calvinism in New England has largely given place to Unitarianism, and that, in turn, to the recent forms of Rationalism, without any sign or indication of the changes that have occurred; that there was no controversy, no conflict, no struggle between the outgoing and the incoming systems.

Thus, on every side we are shut up to the conclusion that the order of Christian thought and doctrine (as well as the doctrine itself), and the rule of faith for distinguishing and separating true doctrine from false, were the same in the post-Apostolic age as in that of the Apostles. And what the rule of faith laid down by the Apostles was, is clear to any one who will take up their Epistles and read them with a mind free from the mist and prejudices of Protestant tradition.

The Church is exhibited in those Epistles as a divine constitution, a veritable kingdom of heaven upon earth, in the world yet not of the world, endowed forever with heavenly powers, destined to withstand "the gates of hell," to endure through all time; commissioned and constituted to teach the everlasting Gospel of Christ; to exercise His authority, to dispense His grace; to be the House of God, the Church of the Living God, the Pillar and Ground of the Truth. As such a real, actual divine constitution the Church comes before us in the New Testament, with rules, laws, and officers to enforce them; all the members (officers included) not acting independently but bound together into one body, obedient to one law, submitting to one rule, having one faith, one doctrine; to separate from which body was schism, and to accept or profess another doctrine was heresy, to be guilty of which not only damned the souls of those who wilfully were guilty, but stamped them so unmistakably with the mark of Satan that they were to be avoided and shunned by faithful Christians. To set up a new doctrine on any pretence, or exercise private judgment against the doctrine of the Church, or refuse obedience to its authority, was at once to fall into condemnation. The test of true doctrine was the living tradition of the Church handed down by Christ to His Apostles and by the Apostles to their spiritual children. To *believe* was not merely to accept intellectually a doctrine, but to submit, to obey. "O senseless Galatians," exclaims St. Paul, "who hath bewitched you that you should not *obey* the truth?" To believe or teach any

different doctrine from that which *was* taught and had been "received" (though the teacher were even one of the Apostles or an angel from heaven) was to be "*anathema*" (Gal. 1 : 8, 9).

This is the constitution of the Church and the rule of faith that confront us in the days of the Apostles. And in the very nature of things it must have been so. The Apostolic Church *could* not have stultified herself (appointed as she was to be the pillar and ground of the truth), so far as to make certain records, as understood and expounded by individual judgment, of what it was her divine mission and work to teach, to be her guide and the rule of her faith and that of her members. She *could* not, we say, unless the Church and the Apostles with her had proved false to the COMMISSION received from the lips of our Divine Lord. Immediately connected with which, too, was a declaration of the plenitude of power HE possessed in heaven and on earth, and a declaration of His abiding presence in the Church throughout all time till "the consummation of the world." "Go, TEACH." "He that heareth *you*, heareth ME."

The so-called Reformation, therefore, was a breaking away from the existing order of things (and a rebellion against it), not only in the Church of the Middle Ages, in that of the times of Saints Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Chrysostom, the Gregories, Basil, and Athanasius; in the days of the Saints and Fathers before the Nicene Council and up to the Apostolic age; but in the very age of the Apostles. The conclusion, then, is irresistable that whatever else the so-called Reformation was, or was not with respect to other interests of society, as regards the Christian religion and the Church, as they actually existed in the world from the days of the Apostles down through all ages, it was not a reformation or improvement of what went before it, but a reconstruction, *de novo*,—an attempted re-creation of Christianity and of the Church by the so-called "Reformers" on the basis of *their* ideas of the meaning of the Sacred Scriptures, or of those Scriptures which the "Reformers" received. If the "Reformers" were right, then the Church, from their time up to Apostolic times and even in the Apostolic age was apostate; and the teacher, defender, pillar, and ground of error instead of truth. And then the promise and declaration of our Divine Lord failed almost at the moment of His uttering them. From this impious conclusion, according to the "rule" set up by the "Reformers," there is no escape.

How this conclusion, too, stultifies all history and common sense, we need not say. That a Church and a religion, as actually and authoritatively taught in and by that Church, and as enjoined upon its members and practised by them, became at its very outset so hopelessly in error, so corrupt and apostate, as to falsify the true

rule of faith, the test by which truth may be known and may be distinguished from error, should yet have destroyed the delusions, and exposed and refuted the falsehoods of ancient heathendom; should have raised human society immeasurably above all that it had ever been before; should have emancipated woman from her slavery to the lusts and passions of men, and taught to her and taught to men her dignity and her true relation to the family and to society; should have broken the bonds of slaves and freed captives from their cruel thraldom, teaching the universal brotherhood of men as resulting from the universal fatherhood of God, their Creator, and from the redemption purchased for them by the passion and death of His only Begotten Son; should have taught those who believed in this Church and its doctrine to practice honesty, humility, gentleness, purity and chastity; to crucify all selfishness; to habitually cultivate self-denial; and to live, and if necessary die, for others; to esteem charity above all things else; should have carefully and reverentially preserved and perpetuated the Sacred Scriptures (the very writings which Protestantism asserts are a witness against it); and when barbarian invasions, like successive waves of a destroying deluge, buried under the ruins they created all the classic writings of heathen antiquity, should have searched for, discovered, restored them, and lit anew the torch of intellectual knowledge even while the storms of constant wars were striving to extinguish it; should have taught the arts of peace to those rude and barbarous peoples; should have softened their savage cruelty, and eventually led them out of it; should have opposed a gentle, constant, yet firm and determined resistance to the stern tyranny of the feudal system; should have in like manner constantly stood as a mediator and intercessor between arbitrary kings and rulers, and rebellious peoples; teaching them their respective rights and duties, prescribing the proper bounds and limits to their respective claims; should have multiplied schools and established universities and promoted learning, civil order, liberty, and peace throughout all Europe; should have, in short, been a beacon whose rays of light shone through all the darkness of the Middle Ages, and guided all the nations with respect to every interest and concern of society; should have rendered the splendid services to human civilization which Protestant and infidel writers, as well as Catholic historians testify this Church has done;—to imagine that such a Church, so apostate, blinded, corrupt and tyrannical, would or could have done all this passes, we say, the bounds of common sense, and stultifies all history.

But we pursue this point further. We affirm (and the affirmation, to our mind, carries with it its own proof), that the so-called Reformation, in setting up "Private Judgment" as its "rule of

faith," its test of truth and error, the ultimate tribunal by which each was to be tried, acquitted or condemned, has introduced a rule that is essentially revolutionary and destructive; impracticable of application to any human interests, concerns or societies, secular or religious; and if it could be or were applied to them, would inevitably dissolve them into a collection of jarring, warring, independent, repellant atoms, incapable of being brought into even an approximate union. No savage tribe, however faint and weak may be the sense of union, authority, and law that rules it, allows or can allow the so-called right of private judgment. No voluntary association, not even a foot-ball, rowing, or base-ball club, allows the meaning and intention of its rules and by-laws to be interpreted by the "private judgment" of its individual members. Not even a band of robbers permits its rules to be so interpreted. And the higher you advance towards a more perfect society, the less the exercise of this so-called right is allowed with regard to society's authority and laws.

No government or people in the world, we repeat, barbarous, semi-civilized, or civilized, will allow "private judgment" to assert itself, either against its laws or in the interpretation of them. Private judgment, exercised in this illegitimate way and outside of its proper scope and limits, would not be tolerated for a moment. And rightfully so. What would the common law or the enactments of the legislature of any people amount to, if left, as regards the interpretation of their meaning and their application to the varying circumstances of men, to the private judgment of each individual? It is the unwritten, traditionary law, the "*common*" law, of every nation, which forms in greatest part its "*corpus juris;*" and the statute law finds its firmest support in the *common* or unwritten law. Both the statute and the common law, too, are vigorous and practically effective in proportion to their correspondence with, and their truthful expression of, the actual, living, traditional consciousness of the people for whom they are the law. No advocate or lawyer, in any tribunal of justice in any country on earth, civilized or uncivilized, could obtain even a moment's hearing who would undertake to set up his private judgment against the recorded decisions or the unwritten traditions of that tribunal. And the citizen who would attempt it would be regarded as an incorrigible, defiant rebel and outlaw, or else as an idiot or a madman.

It is needless to add, that were it possible to carry out the assumed right of private judgment—on which the "Reformers" planted themselves over against the Church—to its legitimate consequences, it would destroy every existing government, would dissolve human society, and, in fact, make it impossible for society

to exist. Mankind would be sundered into as many units as there are persons, each one entirely independent of all others, and an absolute law to himself.

And, so far as this assumed right of private judgment could be, and was, carried into practical effect, it did produce just such consequences. The "war of the peasants," and the outrageous violations of common decency and morality of various Protestant teachers and leaders, their "free-love" doctrines and practices, etc., were the logical outcome of this assumption. For if Luther and Zwingli, and others, had the right to interpret, and not only interpret but interpolate the Sacred Scriptures, to suit their private judgment, why had not Carlstadt and Munzer and their followers? And the almost constant conflicts of peoples with rulers, and factions with factions, as well as of nations with nations, which convulsed and desolated Europe immediately after the so-called "Reformation" became a power, and for generations afterwards were the legitimate consequences of the same false assumption.

We have been stating only actual self-evident facts with regard to the secular concerns of human society. And if what we have said is true with regard to them, how much more true must it not be with respect to the interests which are embraced in man's redemption from sin, his reconciliation with God, and the attainment of his eternal destiny?

For Christ came not to destroy but to fulfil. He has declared that not one jot or tittle of the divine law shall pass away till all be fulfilled. If, then, human law, so far as it *is* law, be "the perfection of human reason," and the reflection and expression of the divine law in its application of the principles of justice to the temporal affairs of men, it follows, of necessity, that in the constitution which Christ gave to His Church—through his Apostles, whom he personally instructed, and to whose remembrance the Holy Spirit brought all things He had commanded—He could not (nor could his Apostles and their successors in all ages) contradict in His "rule of faith,"—the test for distinguishing truth from error,—a universal principle by which the action of every society on earth is governed.

The so-called Reformation, therefore, in setting up its new "rule of faith," not only broke loose from the authority of the Church, and its perpetually-living traditions, but, in the exaltation of private judgment into the ultimate tribunal before which all questions between truth and error were to be decided, it placed the individual above all law, human and divine, except that which his own judgment would accept and approve.

II. We now turn directly to the question whether the so-called

Reformation produced any real reformation as respects morality by the influence its doctrines exerted.

The doctrine of "justification by faith alone," which precedes, in order of time, the express formulation by the "Reformers" of their assumed right of private judgment, was in reality a corollary of that assumption. As private judgment, if allowed, practically abolishes all law, human and divine, by denying that there is any authority to interpret and apply the law higher than the individual himself, it at once became necessary for Luther and the other "Reformers" (unless they squarely and openly denied all the truths of divine revelation) to find some other way than that which had always been taught by the Church for man's justification with God and his deliverance from Divine vengeance. This they professed to find in their doctrine of "justification by faith alone." According to this idea the sinner, filled with terror, and brought to the brink of despair, grasps at the merits of our Blessed Redeemer through faith which alone justifies him. Even in exercising this faith the individual has and acquires no merit himself. He is entirely passive, and the faith which he exercises is purely and entirely the gift of God. Nor does justification make him actually just "who is justified by faith." It is simply a forensic act of God, declaring him to be justified on account of Christ's merits, though not just in fact. Good works are the *necessary* fruits of faith; and as faith alone produces them, and as that is purely the gift of God, in the reception of which the individual (being totally depraved) exercises no volition and does nothing, good works confer no merits. With regard to sanctification, also, man is wholly passive, and the Holy Ghost entirely active. As the "Reformers" held that man, in consequence of the fall of Adam and Eve, having entirely lost the image of God, in which he was created, and having become totally corrupt and depraved, both in his intellect and his will, man was consequently incapable, till regenerated, of thinking, willing, or doing any good thing. All his actions, therefore, even those which were most strictly accordant with the precepts of the natural and divine law, were "evil and only evil, and that continually." "Conceived in sorrow and corruption, the child sins even in his mother's womb; when, as yet, a mere fœtus, an impure mass of matter, before it becomes a human creature, it commits iniquity and incurs damnation."[1] As he grows the innate element of corruption develops. Man has said to sin, "Thou art

[1] Lutum illud ex quo vasculum hoc fingi cœpit, damnabile est. Fœtus in utero ante quam nascimur et homines incipimus peccatum est. Luther on Psalm, 4.

Ex corrupta hominis nativa, nihil nisi damnabile. Calvin's Institutes, book 2, chapter 3.

my father," and every act he performs is an offence against God; and to the worms, "You are my brothers;" and he crawls like them in mire and corruption. He is a bad tree, and *cannot* produce good fruit; a dung-hill, and can only exhale foul odors. These were favorite figures of Luther.

Thus every action of an unregenerate man, however just, generous or noble, was displeasing to God, as performed by one whose nature was utterly perverse and corrupt. On the other hand, no action that was bad would bring the regenerate man under condemnation, because he was *justified* by faith; nor were his good actions, in even the slightest degree, meritorious, because they were done entirely through grace given him by the Holy Spirit.

It is self-evident that these ideas, held by all the leading Reformers, with unimportant variations, deprived human actions of all moral character and mankind of all moral responsibility. Protestants try to deny this and explain it away, but their denials and evasions are in defiance of all sound logic. Moreover, Luther accepted this conclusion. He several times speaks of having defied the devil and enraged him beyond measure, by sinning boldly when the devil taunted him with having disobeyed the law of God. So, too, Luther concisely expresses the same detestable doctrine in his well-known declaration: "Sin, and sin boldly, only believe more boldly, and you shall be saved."

It is easy to see how naturally, in order to give logical coherence to a system of religion based on the ideas just stated, Luther was led to deny the freedom of the human will. He asserted that it was totally enslaved, and possessed no self-determining power. His favorite illustration was that of a horse compelled to move in whatever direction the rider required. If God be seated in the saddle, he said, man *must* act as God wills; but if the devil be the rider, then man *must* do what the devil wills. Nor did Luther shrink from carrying out this doctrine to its logical consequence of making God the author of sin and unjustly condemning sinners. He declared that God damns some who do not deserve it;[1] that He damns some before they are born;[2] and that God excites us to sin, and produces sin in us.[3]

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[1] Dass Gott etliche menschen verdammt, die es nicht verdient haben.

[2] Dass Gott etliche zur verdamnus verordnet habe, ehe sie geboren worden.

[3] Dass Gott die menschen zur Sünde antreibe, und Laster in ihnen wurcke.

So, too, in a letter to Melanchthon from Wartburg Castle, dated August 1st, 1521, Luther writes: "Sin cannot destroy in us the reign of the Lamb, though we were to commit fornication and to kill a thousand times a day."

Again, in commenting on Genesis xix. 26, Luther says, that with regard to all things which pertain to the salvation of the soul, "man is like the statue of salt into which

Calvin's doctrine of Predestination was simply the logical capstone of Luther's impious declarations. According to Calvin, God by an unchangeable decree selected from all eternity certain persons to be saved, and certain persons to be damned. This selection was not based upon the foreseen belief, or any good disposition, or quality, or actions of those who were selected for salvation, nor on the foreseen unbelief, or bad disposition, or actions of those who were selected to be damned, but solely and entirely on the "good pleasure" of God. Those who are selected can never be cast away or lost; all others, whatever be their dispositions or their actions, are left by the eternal unchangeable decree of God in a state of "reprobation," and neither will be nor can be saved, whatever they may desire or do.[1]

Luther and Calvin were not the originators of these impious doctrines. They simply revived and reproduced in somewhat new forms ancient Gnostic and Manichean errors. The idea of man being the merely passive subject of a contest between God and the devil is only a variation of the doctrine of Manes. It is the old Persian idea of two eternal principles of good and evil, contending continually for the possession of man. We may add, too, that Luther's doctrine of the "slave-will" (this is the title Luther himself gave it) is substantially that which is now put forth by modern materialists, who contend that the human will is as devoid of self-directing and self-determining power, as is a feather subject to the action of different currents of air.

This brings us to the question: Did the "Reformation" cause a reformation of morals? That the doctrines we have just mentioned are destructive of all moral responsibility, is obvious. That they did not produce in all who accepted them a total open abnegation of all obligations of religion, natural and revealed, is easily accounted for.

However far astray men may go in their intellectual aberrations

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the wife of Lot was changed; to the trunk of a tree or a stone, like to a statue, lifeless, and having no use of either eyes, mouth, or other senses, or of a heart."

Melanchthon, like Luther, made God the author of all the evil and good that is done, of the adultery of David, the calling of St. Paul, the apostasy of Judas; and this not *permissively*, but actively and efficaciously.

[1] We are well aware that Luther and Calvin disagreed on many points, and even in their explanations of those we have brought forward. So, also, did others of the Reformers. Subsequently, too, an organized opposition to them was made by the "Remonstrants" or "Arminians." But we are not concerned here with the minor points of doctrine and side issues of the "Reformation." We are following down its main current. Luther and Calvin were the great coryphei of the "Reformation." All the other "Reformers" had subordinate parts. The Augsburg Confession, too, kept Luther's ideas in the background, though Luther signed it. Not, however, without quarrelling with Melanchthon, who drew it up. But the Augsburg Confession was an *Apology;* designedly framed for the purpose of conciliating the secular authorities of Germany by presenting Lutheranism in as inoffensive a form as was possible.

or their moral delinquencies, they still possess reason, conscience, and free-will. These exert a restraining power even over those who defy them and deny their existence. The image of God is so indelibly stamped upon humanity that men cannot, without becoming maniacs or demoniacs, totally abnegate reason and conscience.

Yet still, and notwithstanding this, the influence exerted by the doctrines of the Reformers immediately produced a great and widespread deterioration of morals, both public and private. Of this the writings of Luther's age and of that immediately following furnish incontestable proof. The correspondence, sermons, and other writings of the "Reformers," and those of the Humanists who, like Erasmus, sided decidedly neither with the Reformers nor with the Church, refer to this general deterioration of morals as a notorious fact. So, too, do Hume, Robertson, Macaulay, and Lecky, even while they, each in his own way, endeavor to disparage the Catholic religion.

Immediately on the "Reformation" movement acquiring volume and momentum crimes increased in number and enormity. Men quickly learned the lessons taught them both by the precepts and example of the Reformers. Setting up their own "private judgments" as their rule and guide, they scoffed at and defied authority, secular and spiritual. In the name of religion they perpetrated the foulest crimes.[1] A rigid Pharisaical severity on cer-

[1] In "marrying" Catherine Bora, Luther not only broke the solemn vows he had voluntarily taken, but had a child by her only a few weeks after his "marriage" with her. He was not only intolerably obscene, but in his sermon on marriage he excused and defended fornication and adultery on the ground that they were acts which all persons were irresistibly impelled to perform by an inherent necessity of human nature; and that it was impossible to find in any city youths of twenty years of age who had abstained from those acts.

He wrote to the Knights of the Teutonic Order, in 1532, as follows: "The precept of multiplying is older than that of continence enjoined by the councils; it dates from Adam. It would be better to live in concubinage than chastity. Chastity is an unpardonable sin, whereas concubinage, with God's assistance, would not involve the loss of my salvation."

In his "Table-talk" he says: "While a Catholic he passed his life in vigils, fasts, and prayers, in poverty, chastity and obedience; but that after he was "reformed" he became another man. "I burn," he says, "with a thousand flames in my unsubdued flesh . . . . and I, who ought to be fervent in spirit, am fervent only in impurity."

Calvin was branded because of having committed a crime of such shameful character that it cannot be named.

Cranmer was a sycophant, a trimmer; he perjured himself four times as executor of the will of Henry VIII., and a number of other times on other occasions. He excused and defended perjury, provided the oath were taken with a secret mental reservation. He took a "wife" while still professing to be bound by his vow of celibacy.

John Knox was foul-mouthed and of flagitious life. He excused and defended murder and assassination, when necessary to accomplish what he regarded as a good purpose.

Zwingli was guilty of fornication, and says of himself: "I cannot conceal the fire

tain points was united with utter license as regards many of the plainest obligations of religion and morality. The statute-books of the several principalities of which Germany was then composed, of Belgium and the Netherlands, of France and Switzerland, and of England, the severe measures resorted to by the magistrates to repress general lawlessness, of which they complain in their official reports and declare themselves unable to check, furnish indisputable evidence, directly to the point. But it is needless to multiply proofs. We call Luther himself as witness and give his own declaration as to the effects produced upon morality and religion by the new gospel of the "Reformation."

"I would not be astonished," he says, "if God should open the gates and windows of hell, and snow or rain down devils, or rain down on our heads fire and brimstone, or bury us in a fiery abyss as he did Sodom and Gomorrha. Had Sodom and Gomorrha received the gifts that have been granted to us, had they seen our visions and received our instructions, they would yet be standing. They were a thousand times less culpable than Germany, for they had not received the word of God from their preachers. . . . If Germany will act thus, I am ashamed to be one of her children or speak her language; and if I were permitted to impose silence on my own conscience, I would call in the Pope and assist him and his minions to forge new chains for us. Formerly, when we were the slaves of Satan, when we profaned the name of God, . . . money could be procured for endowing churches, for raising seminaries, for maintaining superstition. Now that we know the divine word, that we have learned to honor the blood of our Martyr-God, no one wishes to give anything. The children are neglected, and no one teaches them to serve God."

"Since the downfall of popery, and the cessation of excommunications and spiritual penalties, the people have learned to despise the word of God. They care no longer for the churches; they have ceased to fear and honor God. . . . I would wish if it were possible to leave these men without preacher or pastor, and let them live like swine. There is no longer any fear or love of God among them. After throwing off the yoke of the Pope every one wishes to live as he pleases."[1]

This surely is to the point, and testimonies from almost every writer of eminence who touches upon the state of society as re-

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that burns me and drives me on to incontinence, since it is true that its effects have drawn upon me too many infamous reproaches among the churches."

Of Beza, Hesshuss writes: "Who will not be astonished at the incredible impudence of this monster, whose scandalous life is known throughout France."

Œcolampadius, Luther declared, "the devil, whom Œcolampadius employed, strangled him during the night in his bed."

It is frequently urged in excuse of the virulence and coarseness and obscenity of the Reformers that they simply represented the spirit of the age. But this is untrue. They were shameful exceptions to, rather than representatives in this respect of, what the age was outside of themselves and their followers. It was in many respects an age of refinement rather than of coarseness.

Moreover, were the assertion true, it would form no excuse. Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, Knox, and their co-workers claimed to be "*reformers*," and should have set the example of reformation in themselves.

[1] So notorious was the debauchery of the followers of Luther that it became a common saying when persons proposed to engage in drunkenness and revelry: "We will spend the day like *Lutherans*."

gards religion and morals in every country where Protestantism had a foothold in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries might be adduced in confirmation of it.

But it is not necessary to go back to past ages of the so-called Reformation to decide whether it has produced a real reformation as regards morality. It is only necessary to look upon facts existing all around us to-day. Protestantism has existed now for three hundred years, and has had ample time to show what improvement it can effect or has effected as regards morality. Yet, notwithstanding all the efforts still made, here and there, to perpetuate the old traditional falsehood of the superiority of Protestantism over the Catholic religion in promoting morality, the most thoughtful and candid even of Protestants award the palm to Catholicity; and the general verdict of public opinion is fast confirming this decision. It is not necessary to refer to official statistics of crime and social immorality, which have been published and republished, analyzed, and exhaustively discussed, to prove that Protestant countries are not in advance of those where Catholicity predominates as respects morality.[1]

It is acknowledged by almost all who have any real knowledge of the subject that in point of purity of morals Catholic Spain and the really Catholic part of the people of France and Italy are immeasurably above the people of Protestant Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway; and that judged by every test applicable to morality,—female chastity, integrity, and sobriety—Catholic Ireland is far in advance of Protestant Scotland. The inhabitants of Tyrol—during past centuries and to-day the most staunch and exclusive Catholic population in Europe—beyond all denial, stand above the people of Protestant Switzerland with regard to morality. The lazzaroni of Naples, for years the standing gibe and jest of Protestant travellers, are immeasurably less debased as regards morality than persons on the same social plane in England. Coming nearer home—for every act of brigandage, murder, or robbery in Italy and Spain, there might be truthfully recounted ten in the United States.

This brings us still closer to our point. Compare the virtue and integrity here, in our country, and in England, of the persons who are under the respective influences of the Catholic religion and of Protestantism, and the general public voice ascribes superiority to the former. Where is the boasted morality of New England, the cradle and home of American Puritanism? How stand, as regards social morals or honesty, the descendants of the "Pilgrim

[1] We might refer here to Laing, Mayhew, Wolsey, Bayard Taylor, Dr. Bellows, the distinguished Unitarian minister of New York city, and many other non-Catholic writers, but it is needless.

Fathers?" And what are the moral consequences of their principles as they have permeated the public mind outside of persons who believe in and practice the Catholic religion? Witness the countless prosecutions for bigamy, for violation of the obligations of the marriage relation, for adultery and seduction; the applications for divorces, and the scandals, frauds, etc., which crowd the records of our courts and the reportorial columns of our newspapers.

It seems that God, in his justice, had determined summarily and at once to dispel the traditional delusion of the superiority of Protestantism over the Catholic religion in point of morals, and to refute once and forever the false charge, so long and persistently brought against the latter, by compelling people to open their eyes and look at the facts daily staring them in the face.

Thus we answer the question: Was the "Reformation" a reformation of morals?

III. Has the Reformation promoted intellectual progress?

It is commonly asserted that the Roman Catholic Church had held the human mind in thraldom from the time of Constantine on to the sixteenth century, and that the Reformation released it from its bondage, and gave a new impulse to intellectual progress. We deny this *in toto*. God alone is the absolute reason. Human reason, with all its high powers, is limited and dependent. When it attempts to soar beyond its proper sphere and divinely-appointed limits, it is shorn of its powers and falls helpless to the ground. It is no longer reason, but becomes *un*-reason. The Church, in the first ages of its existence, had to contend with those who attempted to exalt reason above faith and subject to the test of human understanding the incomprehensible mysteries of divine revelation. In this the Church simply followed the example of St. Paul, who, though profoundly philosophic in some of his Epistles, discards and denounces the "vain philosophy" which would put human thought and knowledge above faith. This principle the Church has always adhered to in her relation to human science.

But this, far from convicting the Church of tyrannizing over human thought, proves that the Church knows its just limits; that she both understands in what its true freedom consists, and respects and promotes it. Man is not free to believe error. This principle is accepted universally in the exact sciences. The man who would insist that he is at liberty to believe that two and three are seven, would be set down as a fool. Yet, strange to say, when the Church applies this same principle in the sphere of religion she is held up to scorn and detestation as tyrannical, and as striving to keep human reason in bondage. And then, again, with glaring incon-

sistency, the same persons who hurl these reproaches upon the Church, accuse her as having been too active, particularly in the last two centuries of the Middle Ages, in promoting the study of philosophy and of ancient classic literature.

As soon as, and even before, the Church emerged from the Catacombs, whenever the early Christians could obtain a momentary respite from persecution, they established schools for the promotion of secular science as well as of Christian doctrine. And ever onwards, in every age of the Church, the acts and decrees of her Councils, and the letters and briefs of her sovereign Pontiffs, testify to their constant, ardent zeal to diffuse knowledge and promote intellectual training and culture. When successive invasions of barbarians destroyed knowledge, education and civil institutions, it was the Church which, immediately upon the cessation of that flood of ignorance and barbarity, indeed even while it was inundating different regions of Europe, sought for and rescued and reproduced the most precious monuments of ancient learning and cultivation. It is owing to her zeal, using the monks of different orders chiefly, and particularly those of the Order of St. Benedict, that we have to-day any of the works of Virgil, Cicero, and other distinguished writers of heathen Rome. Wherever her priests and bishops could secure a foothold, and wherever her missionaries could penetrate, schools were established, which grew into academies, and many of them into universities. The work of educating the barbarians and diffusing knowledge among them went hand in hand with that of converting them from heathenism to Christianity. The immensity of this work and its difficulty may be judged by the slow progress and small success of the people of the United States in educating the colored people of the South and the Indians within their States and Territories. It was a work of far greater extent and far greater difficulty. Yet the Church succeeded, and throughout all Christianized Europe schools were rapidly multiplied; schools, too, not chiefly for the children of kings and nobles, but specially for the children of the common people,—the poor. The sons and daughters of kings and dukes and counts sat on the same benches and side by side with the children of peasants and serfs.

This educational work of the Church culminated in the fourteenth century, and still more in the fifteenth, in covering Europe with universities, and carrying educational training and literary culture to a height never since surpassed, and it is questionable whether it has even now been reached. The universities of that period were certainly superior as regards extent of mental training to any that now exist. Their number was greater, and the numbers of students attending them have never since been equalled. Going back even to the thirteenth century, we search

in vain among the learned of our own time for scholars of equal encyclopædic knowledge to that of Albertus Magnus, taking into consideration the respective facilities for acquiring knowledge in his age and ours; and for minds as acute and profound as those of St. Thomas Aquinas and the galaxy of brilliant thinkers who surrounded him, or were his immediate predecessors or successors. And never before or since has there been such a multitude of thoroughly-learned and cultivated scholars as those who, particularly in Italy, were the intellectual glory of the age immediately preceding the so-called Reformation.

The "Reformers" themselves owed all the learning and intellectual training they possessed to the educational facilities provided by the Church. Their immediate successors and those who in the course of time succeeded them, were far inferior in extent of knowledge and mental development. The so-called Augustan age of France and England owed whatever literary excellence and culture it possessed to the impulses previously given by the Church.

The promoters of the "Reformation" could plunder universities or destroy them, as they did at the instigation of Luther and other "Reformers," but they could not restore them, or establish new ones. Those which they did not utterly demolish, they maimed and crippled. They tore into pieces and scattered to the winds, or burned, or sold to bakers as fuel for their ovens, their libraries, containing priceless treasures of learning and materials for authentic history, which are irrecoverable. They appropriated to their own use and squandered the revenues of those universities, ejected their professors, and then found themselves unable to find other teachers of competent ability and knowledge to replace them. The students, too, were greatly inferior in numbers, in application to their studies, and in morality, to their Catholic predecessors. The "Reformation" pulled down, destroyed, or plundered the educational institutions of its time, but was unable to rebuild and restore them, and infuse into them their former intellectual vigor and life. The writers of that age and of the one immediately following constantly refer to the decay of learning and of interest in education.

Of England like remarks are true. It is only necessary to turn over the pages of Hume, Macaulay, Hallam, and Disraeli, for more than sufficient proofs of the decay of learning and the ignorance of the Protestant clergy in England, long after the so-called "Reformation." The libraries of the monasteries, containing priceless treasures and invaluable materials for history, were scattered to the winds, or sold for fuel to bakers. The splendid library of Oxford subsequently met with a like fate. The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge were not destroyed. They still survive. Of them,

as of the present universities of Germany, it may be truthfully said that they send forth some respectable scholars, and a few who are erudite, but the majority of their students go to them for any other purpose than to *study*. In those of Germany, drinking, smoking, duelling, profligacy and secret associations are the order of the day. At Oxford and Cambridge, the greater number of their "students" go there simply for the name and prestige which attendance upon those ancient seats of learning confers.

Catholicity and Protestantism have now confronted each other for nearly four hundred years. They have had ample time to show to the world what their respective influence is upon the intellect of those who severally adhere to them. We sum up with the utmost possible brevity the results of a comparison. Take, first, the lowest classes, the common laboring people of Catholic and Protestant countries.

No intelligent and unprejudiced traveller (nor many even of those who are prejudiced against the Catholic religion) will deny that the peasantry of France, of Ireland, and of Spain, are not only the equals, but the superiors, of the same class in Protestant Germany, England, and Denmark, in intellectual brightness, dignity, and respectful manners. And the same remark holds good as to the higher grades of society. In the city of Rome, previous to the Italian Revolution, according to Laing, a Scotch Presbyterian (who travelled over all Europe, investigating the social, moral and intellectual condition of its different countries), and of the late N. P. Willis, a non-Catholic, there were a greater number of schools for the common people, in proportion to population, than in any other city in Europe. And it is a notorious fact that the institutions for higher learning were incomparably superior as regards the extent and thoroughness of their courses of study, to any existing elsewhere throughout the world.

As regards our own country, Protestants, in virtue of their numbers, have had almost exclusive control, and Catholics till recently formed but an insignificant part of the population; mostly poor, and burdened, too, with taxation to support schools, in which the tuition and reigning spirit are directly hostile to their religion. Yet, no one will say that, despite these disadvantages, Catholics are inferior to Protestants in intelligence or in zeal to promote education. And to-day they are not only abreast of Protestants in these respects, but bid fair soon to be in advance of them.

Thus, as judged either by the past or by the present, by its immediate action at the outset or by its subsequent results, the so-called Reformation produced no advance in mental development, training, or education. It retarded them, and society is only now recovering from the effects of retardation.

IV. Did the Reformation advance society as respects civil liberty?

It is claimed that this so-called right of private judgment promoted the progress of civil liberty. It did just the opposite. It promoted a license of opinion and action that was unbearable, because of the excesses, moral and political, which it quickly produced. Consequently, the "Reformers," who first declared that private judgment was an inalienable right, quickly began to limit its exercise to themselves. They allowed it to none others. They denounced with utmost bitterness, and in words which Protestant historians are ashamed to quote, all who presumed to dispute their doctrines. They split into opposing factions, the leader of each faction ruling his followers as with a rod of iron and anathematizing all other Protestants as (along with "papists") children of the devil. Surely, this was a strange though true exhibition of how private judgment promotes true freedom, civil and religious.

No despotism is so arbitrary, so unreasoning, so limitless, as the despotism of anarchy, and to that private judgment, if carried out to its last consequences, inevitably leads. But men are not maniacs, nor yet are they devils (though the Protestant doctrine of total depravity represents them as such, or akin to them). Consequently even the Reformers practically confined the so-called right of private judgment each one to himself and his followers. Soon, too, they virtually surrendered it to the secular princes who protected them. Refusing to submit to the spiritual authority of the Church, they quickly placed their belief at the disposal of the secular authorities whose favor they had secured. *Cujus regio, ejus religio*, became their ruling maxim. Dukedoms and kingdoms became "Lutheran," or "Sacramentarian," or "Calvinistic," or adopted some other phase of Protestantism, according to the dictate of the prince or duke or king who ruled them. This is simply an historical fact. It is also undeniable that, with few exceptions, the almost countless Protestant "confessions" and declarations of belief of the sixteenth century were submitted to the approval of secular rulers and enforced by them. This is the fact as regards the Augsburg Confession, which is the fundamental declaration of belief of the Lutherans; the Heidelberg Catechism, the most generally accepted formula of belief of the "Sacramentarians," or followers of Zwingli and Calvin, or, as they style themselves, the "*Reformed*" churches of France, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland; and it is notoriously true with regard to the "Thirty-nine Articles" of the "Established Church of England."

Where the Reformers dared attempt it, as in Switzerland, they fused the secular and spiritual authority together, and established

a theocracy. Where they dared not attempt this, they placed themselves sycophantly at the feet of secular rulers as in England and Germany.

The lesson of the Reformers was quickly learned by those of the temporal rulers who professedly remained Catholic. They were Catholic in their expressed belief in Catholic doctrines, but anything else than Catholic in their political policy, and their utter lack of that obedience which real faith includes and requires. Francis I. of France, Charles V. of Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands, Philip II., his son and successor in the two last-named countries, were Catholics in belief. In their actions as regards both Church and State they were not Catholics but Protestants. If they protected the Catholic religion to some extent, and sometimes persecuted Protestants (as Philip II. did most cruelly in the Netherlands), they did it professedly in the name of religion, but in reality as a part of their political policy. The Duke of Alva, satrap of Philip II. in the Netherlands, put to death Catholics as well as Protestants who refused to tamely submit to his iron rule. All three of them were ambitious secular rulers, whose hearts were set on self-aggrandizement and the extension of their royal prerogatives.

Following the example of the "Reformers," *they* set up *their own* private judgments as the supreme tribunal for the determination of all matters, ecclesiastical or political, within their respective domains. The two first-named alternately resisted the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church or sided with them, as considerations of expediency for the time being seemed to indicate would be politic. Each of them wished the "Reformation" to acquire a certain degree of power (though not to become predominant) as a check upon the exercise of authority by the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church. They subsidized and made alliances with Protestant princes and rulers, and instituted a policy which, as systematized and further carried out by their successors, culminated in the almost entire demolition of the institutions of constitutional government and of the safeguards of civil liberty in all Protestant countries and in most of the Catholic countries of Europe during the seventeenth century, and far on into the eighteenth.

Referring to this, Guizot says: "The *emancipation* (!) of the human mind (by the 'Reformation') and absolute monarchy triumphed simultaneously in Europe." His statement is the simple truth.[1] During the one hundred and fifty years that followed the so-called Reformation, Europe went back as regards civil liberty almost to the absolutism of Cæsar Augustus and his successors.

[1] That is, the *fact* stated is true, reserving the word "emancipation."

The ancient liberties of the people were crushed, and temporal rulers were virtual despots. Passing over England with its tyrannical sovereigns, its alternately sycophantic and rebellious Parliaments, its revolutions and restorations, it is only necessary to cite Protestant Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. Nor does the fact that the statement applies also to France and Spain weaken in the least the force of our argument. Their peoples were Catholic; in Spain exclusively so, in France by a vast majority. Their rulers were professedly Catholic. But, to be truly Catholic, according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, requires obedience to truth as well as belief in it, both as to faith and good works. The kings of France and Spain were behind no other temporal sovereigns in extending their royal prerogatives and breaking down all the ancient guarantees of constitutional liberty in their respective dominions, despite the remonstrances and protests of successive Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church.

In all this the kings of France and Spain acted not as Catholics but according to their own imperial "private judgment," defying alike the authority of constitutional civil law and that of the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church. The famous *dictum* of Louis XIV. of France, "*I am the State*," was carried out by him to a despotic extent with regard also to ecclesiastical affairs. He might consistently have added, as expressing his own idea: "*I am the Church.*" Since the "Reformation" up to to-day, the peoples of France and Spain have never possessed the civil freedom and constitutional rights which they enjoyed before that revolt against authority, human and divine.

A like remark holds good emphatically of Prussia: Albert of Brandenburg, who laid the foundation for the present kingdom of Prussia by sacrilegious plundering and invasions, was called by his contemporaries "the Attila of the Reformation." He was an apostate, treacherous and unprincipled. He appropriated to his own use the vast property of the Knights of the Teutonic Order.[1] He established a despotism, and his despotic rule has descended as a part of his patrimony to his successors on the throne of Prussia. In no country in Europe has despotism been so thoroughly systematized as to Church and State as in Prussia. No more perfect tyrant ever sat on a throne than Frederick "the Great;" the rule both of his predecessors and of his successors has been of like character.

Thus, from the very outset of the Reformation onwards, that movement has not promoted civil liberty, but has retarded its

[1] It was to encourage Albert of Brandenburg and other Teutonic Knights to violate their religious vows, that Luther wrote that by the mercy of God he could expect to be saved if he practiced concubinage, but never if he adhered to his vow of celibacy.

progress. It taught no true principle respecting human rights and civil institutions that was not previously known and taught by the Catholic Church, her doctors and theologians, long ages ago. It introduced principles of disorder and confusion, which inevitably led to anarchy on the one hand and tyranny on the other.

Every guarantee of personal rights, every institution that protects and defends personal freedom, every element that enters into constitutional government, republican government, were known and in full practice long before the sixteenth century,—trial by jury, the election of officers and rulers, the restraint of their powers within just limits, the confederation and union of sovereign States for a common purpose. The Church has always fostered and promoted them, and always will do so. Modern constitutional governments are not built upon any basis of principles and institutions discovered or brought into exercise by the so-called Reformation, but on one which preceded that movement. All through Europe, and particularly in Italy, there had been for centuries free cities and republics, in one or another of which every essential principle of constitutional government was recognized. And it is an historical fact, too, that the peoples of most of these Italian republics lost in great degree their ancient liberties, and fell under the domination of ruling families, only *after* the spirit of revolt against legitimate authority in Church and State, which Luther subsequently formulated, had sapped in Italy, as elsewhere, the true foundation of all government. Centuries before the so-called Reformation, St. Thomas Aquinas wrote as follows:

"The law, strictly speaking, is directed primarily and chiefly to the common good; and to decree anything for the common benefit *belongs either to the whole body of the people or to some one acting in their place.*"

Then, as to the best form of government, he wrote:

"The choice of rulers in any state or kingdom is best when one *is chosen for his merit* to preside over all, and under him are other rulers *chosen for their merit*, and the government *belongs to all*, because the rulers *may be chosen from any class of society*, and the *choice is made by all.*"

Nor were these statements made by St. Thomas as new; they were made as explaining and maintaining principles always held and taught by the Church. And, after the Reformation had paved the way for, and actively promoted, ideas destructive of constitutional liberty,—and which, in England, culminated among the Episcopalians in the doctrine of "passive obedience" to kings, and the declaration of James to Parliament that "God had appointed him absolutely master, and that all privileges which co-legislative bodies enjoyed were pure concessions from the bounty of kings"—the

Catholic theologian, Suarez, wrote a treatise, entitled "A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith against the Errors of the Anglicans." In this treatise Suarez declares that society has received political and civil power immediately from God, and communicates it to certain persons whom it selects. He then says:

"In the second place, it follows from what has been said that the civil power, whenever it is found in a man or a prince, has emanated according to usual and legitimate law from *the people and the community*, either directly or remotely; *otherwise, it cannot be justly possessed.*"

And in this Suarez repeats and defends what Cardinal Bellarmine had previously written, declaring—

"Political power emanates from God alone; for, being necessarily annexed to man's nature, it proceeds from Him who has made that nature. *It resides primarily in the body of the people.* The divine will has not given it to any man in particular. The people *transfer it*, to one person or more, *by natural right. Particular forms* of government, accordingly, are by the law of nations, and *not by divine law*, since it depends on the consent of the multitude to place over themselves a king, consuls, or other magistrates, as may seem best; and, for a legitimate reason, they can change royalty into aristocracy or democracy, or *vice versa.*"

St. Alphonsus Liguori, in his *Moral Theology*, in speaking of laws says:

"It is certain that the power of making laws exists among men, but so far as civil laws are concerned, this power belongs naturally to no individual. It belongs to the community, who transfer it to one or more, that by them the community itself may be governed."

Billuart, in his *Moral Theology*, says:

"I maintain in the first place that legislative power belongs to the community or its representative. . . . . It is the duty of the community, or its ruler, to watch over the common good. . . . . The law has the power of commanding and coercing in such manner that no individual has any authority to command or restrain the multitude. This authority belongs exclusively to the community or its representative; to these, therefore, legislative power belongs. . . . . The community may be considered collectively as one moral body, and in this sense it is superior to itself as considered distributively in each of its members. Again, it may be considered as acting in the place of God, from whom emanates all legislative power, as it is said in Proverbs, 'By ME kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.'"

Lastly, Concina, in his *Dogmatic and Moral Theology*, says:

"God does not confer this (civil) power by any *special act distinct from creation, but it is a property of right reason, inasmuch as right reason dictates that men, united in one moral whole, shall prescribe, by express or tacit consent, in what manner society shall be governed, preserved, and upheld.* . . . . It is evident, therefore, that the power existing in the prince, the king, or in many persons, whether nobles or plebeians, *emanates from the community itself*, directly or indirectly."

Compare these luminous and consistent expositions of the true basis of civil power by Catholic theologians, before and after

the Reformation, with the confused, contradictory declarations (sometimes anarchical, and sometimes direct apologies for tyranny and despotism) of the "Reformers" and their followers, and the conclusion is unavoidable that the Reformation did not promote higher or truer ideas of civil liberty than those which the Catholic Church has always taught.

We have thus gone over all the points in respect to which the movement in the sixteenth century is claimed to have been a "reformation." It is obvious, we think, that it reformed nothing; that it was not a "reformation," in any true sense whatever. It was a rebellion, not only against the then existing order of things in Church and in State, but also against all the principles that form the basis of civil government and civil liberty, as well as against the *one* divinely-founded and divinely-constituted and commissioned Church of Christ.

It was a revolt against all legitimate authority, ecclesiastical and civil. It started with an attempt to place the individual above society, as well as above the Church; to make *his* private judgment superior to the collective reason of men in society, as well as to the authoritative teaching of the Church,—the sole infallible interpreter of Divine Revelation. In its successive variations and divergencies it was productive, first, of general confusion, fanaticism, and anarchy, and then, of tyranny and despotism; taking sometimes, according to circumstances, the despotism of fanatics, who imagined that they only were the saints and elect of God, and that they only had the right to rule in Church and State, and, at other times, lodging unlimited power in temporal rulers, princes, and kings.

V. We have said little or nothing respecting abuses in the Church, the reformation of which was the ostensible object of the movement miscalled "The Reformation." It seemed scarcely pertinent to our subject to do so. Whatever abuses did or did not exist in the Church, whether as to its head or its members, the "Reformation" did nothing to abate or cure them. It had nothing in fact to do with them, except to employ them as a plausible pretext and excuse for its revolt against authority.

Whatever reform the "Reformers" undertook or professed to carry out, it obviously was not a reformation of abuses in the Church. They went out from it, broke loose from it, denounced it as "the synagogue of Satan." According to them it was apostate, utterly corrupt, Antichrist, and the only duty they and their followers acknowledged with regard to it, was to fight against it to the death and utterly destroy it.

Thus, the so-called Reformation, as soon as it took shape or shapes, and moved in its various divergent directions, was outside

of the Church, independent of it, and had "no part or lot" in any reformation instituted and carried out by the Church. Yet still it may be proper to say a few words on this subject of abuses.

That grievous abuses, causing great scandals, existed, is acknowledged. It was not only universally acknowledged at the time of Luther's outburst, but had been acknowledged long before. The abuses had been pointed out, lamented over, condemned, denounced, and attempted to be reformed by numerous Popes, Prelates, Saints, and Doctors of the Church. Their efforts were thwarted and rendered ineffective, except in the way of making partial reformations, by the opposition and jealousies of the different temporal rulers of Europe. But to this we shall refer again.

Abuses and scandals have always existed in the Church as regards its members, hierarchy, and, sometimes, as regards its head. They existed in the time of the Apostles, as their Epistles plainly show. They existed immediately after the Apostles were called to rest from their labors, as the writings of the earliest post-Apostolic ages prove. They continued to exist in every subsequent age. They always will exist. Our Saviour plainly warned His Apostles of this. "Scandals," he says, "must needs come," though woe to those by whom they come.

The "need" of scandals coming arises not from the divine will, nor from any lack of divine grace, extended to all who seek it and employ its help. To suppose the contrary would be horrible impiety.

The "need" arises from the constitution of human nature. God has endowed our nature with free-will, a gift inexpressibly precious, yet inexpressibly terrible in view of the awful responsibilities that gift includes. Man, in the exercise of his free-will, may do good or do evil; may engage in the service of God or the service of the devil. Of this gift, which makes man only "a little lower than the angels," God will not deprive man. To do so would be to make him the gift of reason He has bestowed on man only a mockery. It would be to give him reason, yet to deprive him of the power of rightly directing and employing his reason. It would make a mere automaton, destitute of self-volition and self-control, and degrade him to the level of a brute or below it.

Consequently, men have not only the option and choice of entering into the Church,—the true Ark of Salvation,—but, after they have entered, the free option of availing themselves of its spiritual blessings and rightly employing the divine grace which the Church dispenses, or of neglecting it, misemploying, abusing it, and thus incurring deeper guilt than those who remain outside of the Church. This truth holds good as to all who are in the

Church, without regard to station or order, to the laity, the priesthood, the episcopate, and the Pope, the Visible Head of the Church and Primate of its priests and bishops. And the higher and more exalted the office, the greater the responsibility, and the greater the need of care, and vigilance, and prayer, and of correspondence with the special grace attached respectively to the offices of Priest, Bishop, and Sovereign Pontiff of the Church. Hence, Priest, Prelate, and Pope, if they fail rightly and diligently to employ the special grace connected with their sacred offices, may fall, will fall into sin, and create scandals, as readily as—more readily than—even the lowest layman, and will incur immeasurably greater guilt. For, "to whom much is given, from him shall much be required."

God has given immunity from sin—impeccability—to no human being, in the Church or out of the Church, no matter what position, dignity, or office he holds. The sole special safeguard and privilege Christ provides for the perpetuity of His Church, and its indefectibility, is its incapability of believing and teaching error, its constant, unchanging belief in, and teaching of (without corruption), the truth He gave to it and commissioned it to teach. And the sole privilege He granted to Peter and his successors in the Primacy is, that in their *ex cathedra*—official—promulgations and definitions of doctrines respecting faith and morals to the Universal Church, they should be preserved from error.

The fact, therefore, of abuses and scandals in the Church, whether on the part of the laity, the priesthood, the episcopate, or the Primacy, is no proof or argument against the divine institution of the Church, or its divinely-established constitution and mission. Abuses and scandals arise, and will ever arise, from the abuse of that freedom of the will with which God has endowed us. Yet, the Church, in the fulfilment of her divine mission, strives and ever will strive to correct and reform those abuses.

But while this general primal cause of abuses was especially active during the one or two hundred years immediately preceding the "Reformation," owing to the increase of knowledge, the thorough intellectual training, and the intense intellectual activity which the Church promoted, but which learned scholars, in the pride to which the human heart is prone, abused and perverted, there were other causes subordinate to this.

Among these, the chief one, and of long standing, was the constant interference of the secular powers of Europe with the freedom of the Church, and their constant restriction of her legitimately-divine power and liberty. The Church ever strives to promote peace. She recognizes, respects, and upholds the rights and authority of temporal rulers within their proper sphere. She endeavors to work in harmony with them for the welfare of mankind.

Hence, to a certain extent, she is willing to consult their preferences and wishes in the appointment of bishops, and in the administration of the temporal affairs which necessarily belong to the practical carrying out of her divine mission.

But the secular governments of Europe, from the time of Constantine onwards, and particularly during the Middle Ages, and specially those of Germany, France, and England, taking advantage of these concessions by the Church, claimed as *rights* what the Church allowed only for the sake of peace and harmony. Moved by that ambition which is inherent in the human heart, by a desire to extend their prerogatives and power, and by cupidity, they constantly claimed the right of supervising and guarding (as robbers guard their plunder) the revenues of the Church's charitable and religious foundations, and of selecting and nominating, and even investing with the symbols of their sacred offices, the abbots, and bishops, and archbishops, within their respective dominions. The Church resisted this preposterous assumption to the full extent of her power. How many conflicts she engaged in, successfully or unsuccessfully, on this account, history records, but want of space will not permit us even to advert to them. But, opposed and tyrannized over by counts, dukes, kings, and emperors, who, though they professed her faith, were anything but obedient to it, she reluctantly submitted to what she could not successfully oppose for the sake of peace and lest in rooting up the cockle the wheat also should be rooted up. The secular rulers of Europe compelled the Church to acquiesce in the appointment to abbacies, bishoprics, and archbishoprics, of men who were their choice.

In many cases, and yet fewer than might be supposed, these were from the start unfit for, and unworthy of the high offices to which they were appointed. They became mere courtiers and dependents upon the rulers who exercised so potential a voice in their selection. They became worldly-minded, and neglected to employ the grace connected with their exalted offices. They failed to devote themselves to the faithful discharge of their sacred duties. They set a bad example to their clergy, and to the laity under them, permitted discipline to become relaxed, and thus created scandals themselves, or allowed them to be created by others and to grow unchecked.

This was the chief, special cause of the abuses which undoubtedly existed in the Church at the time of the so-called Reformation, and previous to it. Those abuses were protested against, condemned, and denounced repeatedly by the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church, her Saints, and Doctors. Yet the Church, how unjustly we need not say, was held responsible for them.

Yet, at last, the Council of Trent was convened after almost interminable delays and postponements owing to the jealousies and hostilities of different temporal rulers of European countries, and the intrigues and opposition of the Reformers and their adherents, and a thorough reformation of abuses was achieved. In this real reformation, the supporters of the so-called Reformation did not participate. They opposed it, and endeavored to prevent it by all means in their power. Into the details of the reformation effected by the Council of Trent we cannot enter. Suffice it to say, it swept away a countless number of abuses caused by laxity of discipline, growing directly out of the unrighteous assumptions of authority by the temporal rulers of Europe. It provided for the thorough education and training of the clergy, for the instruction of the laity in Christian doctrine. It set forth more explicitly the functions and duties of bishops. It expounded and defined with greater precision and clearness the doctrines which errorists and heretics had confused, obscured, and perverted. In this work, as we have said, the Reformers and their followers did not participate, and from it they utterly held aloof. They conspired against it, and endeavored to prevent it.

The so-called Reformation was a rebellion against the existing Church, an effort to destroy it, a revolution. Yet as a revolution it failed, signally failed in its immediate, direct object; and in thus failing it has failed also in obtaining that false criterion by which revolutions are now popularly justified—success. The Catholic Church of to-day is the unquestioned continuance of the existing Church of all previous ages. And the Catholic Church of to-day has sustained not only without destruction, but without diminution of her strength, all the assaults that have been made upon her. As soon as, and even before, the various heretical schisms which conglomerated constitute the so-called Reformation, the Church, in the plenitude of her divinely-given authority and powers, renewed her strength, and erected defences against newly disseminated errors, by promulgating additional definitions of her faith and doctrine. She reformed abuses, introduced stricter discipline, infused increased zeal and devotion into her children, and sent her missionaries, glorious examples of heroic self-abnegation, virtue, and purity, and of spiritual power, into all regions of the world. She lost thousands from her communion of those whose faith had been weakened and corrupted; but she more than made up for the loss by the greater number of converts she gained in India, Japan, the islands of the Southern Seas, and in America. And to-day, though her Sovereign Pontiff is a prisoner in the Vatican (a voluntary prisoner, the world sneeringly styles him), because he refuses to become the subject of any temporal power, she stands

visibly more compact in her organization, more uniform and strict in her discipline, more conspicuous in the salutary influences she is exerting upon society, than in any previous age. Her unchanged and unchangeable faith more clearly and fully defined, and universally respected, even by those who fear and hate her. Though Protestants and infidels—with the rise of every little petty schism, like those of Rongeism, thirty years ago, in Germany; and Old Catholicism, ten years back; and with every movement to persecute and plunder her, like those of Bismarck in Germany, and the Garibaldians in Italy—have constantly predicted her downfall, yet their predictions are scarcely made ere the signs of their certain falsification begin to show themselves.

To-day the Czar of Russia longs to make peace with the Holy Roman See, and wavers between his desire to secure its support by freeing the Catholic Church in his dominions from persecution, and his reluctance to surrender the traditionary assumption that is attached to his office as supreme ruler of religion in Russia. The clergy and bishops of the schismatic body styled the Holy Orthodox Church of Russia, of which he is the official head, he despises, as well he may, for they are his sycophantic tools and slaves.

Bismarck, with all his arrogance, has humbled his pride, and tacitly acknowledged that though arbiter of all secular Europe, yet his astute diplomacy and his stubborn persistence, backed by the entire power of the German imperial government, have not been able to destroy the faith of German Catholics, nor tear them from their unity with the Holy Roman See.

In France, the infidels, who have seized the reins of secular power, partly through the remissness of its Catholics, and partly because the Catholic faith strives for peace and quietness, exercises patience when wronged, and fights persecution chiefly with spiritual weapons, have gone on from one wicked step to another. They have suppressed religious orders, driven their members into exile, expelled Sisters of Mercy and Charity from hospitals, closed Christian schools and convents, banished the very name of God from their public schools; and yet to-day the Catholic religion has a stronger hold on France than when the so-called Reformation divided its people into two antagonistic, warring factions. And to-day President Grévy dreads coming to an open breach with the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church more than with any secular European power.

In England, the Crown, or its Cabinet which really exercises the executive and administrative powers of government, pays no regard, or merely a contemptuous show of respect to the bishops and archbishops of the "Established Church." (Why should it? they are but its own creatures.) But it would gladly enter, if it

could, into diplomatic relations with the Holy Roman See, and secure its assistance and co-operation in settling questions with which the English Government feels itself unable to cope.

In Italy the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church has more real power (though despoiled and confined to the Vatican) than the usurpation which forms to-day the secular government of Italy. That government, though it has three hundred thousand soldiers to back it, fears and dreads the Church's Visible Head, even more than Nero or Domitian feared the then Sovereign Pontiff of the Church, hidden in the catacombs.

In the United States, so far as religion is at all really respected it is the Catholic religion. *It* is acknowledged to possess a definite faith which those who profess it really hold. Its power is confessed, and it exerts more real influence upon the general public than all the Protestant sects combined, so far as they can combine. It is felt to be the only bulwark against the progress of ideas which threaten to overturn social and civil order, and to be the only consistent representative of Christian morality.

All over the civilized world and even in the regions dominated by Mohammedanism and heathenism the Catholic Church exercises a power and an influence beyond all comparison greater than any that Protestantism can exert. The number of her faithful children has gone on increasing since the day when Luther's hammer on the Church-door in Wittenberg sounded the signal for rebellion against spiritual and civil authority in Europe, and to-day they far outnumber the collective aggregate of all the adherents of Protestant sects. The Encyclicals of her Sovereign Pontiff are read, and studied, and commented on as documents of supreme importance, securing a consideration which is accorded to no state-papers of secular governments, and (we need scarcely add) to no declarations of Protestant Bishops, Archbishops, Conventions or Synods.

As for Protestantism, its power has waned. Except in America, it is mostly a part merely of the state-machinery of the different countries in which it exists. Its various creeds are obsolete, effete, and not even the members of the sects which are supposed to hold them pay the slightest attention to their declarations; and indeed, in greater part, are profoundly ignorant of what their declarations are. Protestantism, in brief, has gone on disintegrating and dissolving until no one knows or can tell precisely what it is. Only one uniform constant movement can be distinguished amid its constant, whirling eddyings, and the direction of that movement plainly is towards rationalism. The dividing line between Protestantism and outspoken rationalism is invisible. There is none.

Thus, whether regarded as a revolution striving to destroy the

Church, or a reformation aiming to amend and improve it, the movement of the sixteenth century is a failure. It is plainly rapidly reaching its logical conclusion,—individualism. It is equally plain to every thoughtful, discriminating mind that if the religion of Christ be the power by which men are to be brought into subjection to a law higher than that of mere self-will and individual opinion, it is through Christianity, not as Protestantism presents it, but through that of which the Catholic Church has been, according to the testimony of history, both secular and sacred, the witness, the teacher, the guardian and preserver, from the days of the Apostles till now.

THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

ONE of the most common objections to the Catholic religion is that it tends to formalism; that, in fact, the whole system of worship and morals of the Church is a thoroughly perfunctory system, destitute of the life and power of godliness, and totally inadequate to the great purposes of "vital" religion. Indeed, so firmly has this "first principle of the Protestant tradition," as Cardinal Newman calls it, become fixed in the minds of our separated brethren, that, when they meet with a truly devout and earnest Catholic, they will unhesitatingly tell you that he is what he is in spite of his religion, and that he ought to be a Protestant; and when they discover a superior book of Catholic devotion or of practical religion, they will unblushingly use it as if it belonged by good rights to them, and claim it as a good Protestant book, which has undoubtedly been written by some one who was entirely out of place in the Catholic Church, and ought to be numbered in the ranks of her opponents. Indeed, the coolness with which some Protestant writers and publishers, more especially in England, are of late appropriating the lives of our saints and doctors, and holy men and women, is really refreshing. We admit that it is a cheering indication of the revulsion of religious thought and feeling that is going on in the minds of the non-Catholic community, that almost unexceptionable lives of such Catholics as St. Francis of Assisi, St. Francis of Sales, Bossuet, Fénelon, Henri Perreyve, Père Besson, Père Lacordaire, Charles de Condren and Madame Louise de France, not to mention others of equal merit, should be published and circulated among them quite as a matter

of course. But it cannot but be amusing to Catholics to note how studiously all allusion is avoided to the fact that these admirable saints and heroes and heroines of charity were *Roman* Catholics, thoroughly loyal and devoted to their faith, and that they were what they were as the legitimate result of the teaching and influence of the Church to which they belonged, and in whose service they gloried to live and die.

Again, take the more common and familiar instance of that most beautiful and precious of mere human compositions, *The Imitation of Christ*, by Thomas a Kempis,—that book so full of a divine wisdom and so fraught with comfort, consolation, and encouragement, especially to the weary, heavy-laden toilers in the world's great workshop; that book which George Eliot so beautifully describes in her *Mill on the Floss*, in which she makes her heroine, Maggie Tulliver, accidentally find an old copy of the *Imitation*. "A strange thrill of awe passed through Maggie, while she read as if she had been wakened in the night by a strain of solemn music, telling of beings whose souls had been astir, while hers was in a stupor. . . . Here was a secret of life that would enable her to renounce all other secrets; here was a sublime height to be reached without the help of outward things; here was insight, and strength, and conquest, to be won by means entirely within her own soul, where a Supreme Teacher was waiting to be heard. . . Maggie was still panting for happiness, and was in ecstasy because she had found the key to it. She knew nothing of doctrines and systems, of mysticism or quietism; but this voice out of the far-off Middle Ages was the direct communication of a human soul's belief and experience, and came to Maggie as an unquestioned message."

Alas! that this "voice from the far-off Middle Ages" should not come with equal force and sweetness as an "unquestioned message" to all the restless seekers after truth — the souls longing for rest and peace—as the loving voice of that Holy Mother, towards whom they have learned, from a false Protestant tradition, to indulge such strange, unfilial, and mistaken sentiments and feelings! Thank God! the book is in almost universal use among the more intelligent and devout portion of the non-Catholic community, not, as formerly, in expurgated editions, to accommodate it to Protestant taste and Protestant sentiment, but entire,—fourth book and all,—and without note or comment or gloss. Yet, it is a curious fact, worthy of notice here, that the apparently learned but narrow author of the *Life of Thomas a Kempis* recently published, Rev. Mr. Kettlewell, a clergyman of the Church of England, who labors through two heavy volumes to prove that Thomas a Kempis wrote the *Imitation*, carries the

idea through the whole of his extensive work that this truly devout and holy man, so thoroughly Catholic in all his teaching, his principles, and his spirit, was a member of a religious Order which, though in the Church, somehow was not of it; that the spirit of this Order was entirely foreign to the Church of which they were members, and that they, in fact, were harbingers of the great Protestant "Reformation," and really belonged to the sixteenth rather than the thirteenth century.

Now, how perfectly ridiculous and absurd, and contrary to fact, all this is will appear when we consider that the Catholic Church alone teaches the science of the Saints, and holds out the highest encouragement to saintliness by a system of instruction and discipline the most thorough and complete, and such as is found nowhere else in the world. In this respect it is a most perfect contrast to Protestantism. Indeed, Protestantism may most justly be characterized as a veritable go-as-you-please race for heaven, in which all ideas of rigid "training" have been abandoned; where every man is his own guide, and follows his own notions of what is right and best, and in which the "every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost" sentiment seems to be predominant. Whereas, the Catholic Church has the most perfect system of ethics —of spiritual training and direction—that the world has ever seen. These principles are embodied in what is called moral theology, and are the result of the reflection and experience of the wisest and best men—the greatest saints—that ever lived. Protestants know little or nothing about the grand science of moral theology which constitutes so important a part of ecclesiastical training in the Catholic Church. On the contrary, they despise it, and ridicule it; and this fact is a good indication of the inner life and spirit of Protestantism. What do they care for cases of conscience? Are they not their own guides? Why should they seek counsel and direction from man in things pertaining to God? They will not be in bondage to any man. The very word casuistry has come to be a term of reproach among them, and designing, bad men, of corrupt mind and heart, take advantage of professional treatises in casuistry to misrepresent and prejudice the minds of the people against the Church, charging it with pandering to the passions of men, and thus tending to corrupt society. What ought to be thought of the man who would deliberately go through the country lecturing, "to gentlemen only," on the more delicate subjects of *Physiology*, and professing to expose the "immoral tendency" of the practice of medicine, by quoting from treatises in which those subjects are discussed, and even exhibiting the illustrating cuts? We may lay it down as a settled, fixed principle, that there can be no true spirituality, no high degree of sanctity,

without spiritual direction. Man is naturally so weak, so partial, so blind to his own faults, so easily seduced to presumption, or tempted to despair, that, without proper guidance, he is sure to err in one or the other direction, and thus come short of the degree of perfection he might otherwise attain. Scruples are sure to arise in the mind of the conscientious Christian out of every relation and circumstance in life. Therefore it is necessary that there should be settled, fixed rules of conduct, so far as possible, for every case that may arise. The absence of spiritual direction is, undoubtedly, one reason why Protestantism has not produced, and never can produce a saint. We do not, of course, deny that there have been some very excellent people among Protestants, as the world goes. Indeed, there were and are excellent people among the pagans. Some of the more favored among them have practised the natural virtues to a very high degree, and it is a well-known fact that there are pagan communities which in point of public morals, are a standing reproach to our boasted Christian civilization. But it should be borne in mind that there is a very great difference between natural virtue and supernatural sanctity. To be convinced of this, one has only to read candidly the life of a Catholic saint. Protestants, as a general thing, have lost faith in the supernatural, and hence, they cannot appreciate the life of a Catholic saint. They not only have no sympathy with such lives, but they are actually scandalized by them. Their detachment from the world, their self-denial and self-abnegation, their severe penances and mortifications seem unnatural and even fanatical, while their heroic acts of charity, especially when they freely offer their lives for others, or suffer martyrdom for the faith with joy, are incomprehensible to them. They admire those heroic acts ; they wonder at them, but they cannot rise to a comprehension of the supernatural plane in which alone they are possible. In their view, as man was made for society, the free indulgence of his appetites and passions, at least within reasonable limits, is not only a legitimate privilege, but an essential obligation. The man or woman who voluntarily eschews the pleasures of matrimony, and sacrifices the joys of social and domestic life, deliberately violates the laws of his constitution, and flies in the face of Providence.

As for the miracles and supernatural experiences of the saints,—well, please don't tax their credulity too far. "Legends" they call them, and by that term they mean not things to be read and accepted as true, but mythical stories unworthy of credence. The question, of course, is not whether all the legends of the saints are equally credible, but whether they are, as they claim, all equally mythical. We are not disposed to deny that there are counterfeit miracles, but we believe it is generally admitted that counterfeits

suppose the existence of the genuine. And in objecting to the genuineness of certain more modern miracles, on account of their apparent frivolous character, we must be careful that we do not unwittingly trench upon the ground of Sacred Scripture, and even of common-sense. For who can tell beforehand what God would and what He would not do under certain circumstances? Indeed, is it not expressly said in Holy Writ that God hath chosen the foolish things of the world that He may confound the wise, and weak things of the world that He may confound the mighty? And as for the miracles of the Bible, what could be more apparently frivolous and naturally incredible than that a man should, by a mere word, cause an axe to swim upon the water, that another man should be raised to life by touching the bones of a dead human body, or that multitudes should be healed of diseases by handkerchiefs and aprons carried from one to another, and even that the shadow of a man should be endowed with the supernatural power of healing all upon whom it should fall? Are these not veritable Catholic miracles, such as our friends object to? Cardinal Newman, in his *Apologia*, says, with his usual force, that Protestants, in arguing against modern miracles, "assume as a first principle that what God did once," by the hands of the apostles, "He is *not* likely to do again; while our first principle or presumption is, that what God did once He is likely to do again. They say, 'It cannot be supposed He will work *many* miracles;' we, 'It cannot be supposed He will work *few*.'" And we may add that it would be the most natural thing in the world, indeed the ordinary course of Providence would lead us to expect, that the later miracles would bear the same general characteristics as the elder. But now, if you have any doubt about this whole subject of extraordinary supernatural occurrences in the Church, read, as we said before, the life of some Catholic saint. Take, for instance, that charming *Life of St. Catharine of Siena*, so carefully and conscientiously written by that most interesting writer, Augusta Theodosia Drane. There you will see a feeble woman, by an extraordinary endowment of divine grace, made the most conspicuous figure of her age and country. She counsels Popes, reconciles princes, restores harmony between alienated states and cities. At great personal sacrifice she goes to Avignon, where the Popes had been in exile for more than fifty years, and in spite of the machinations of designing nobles, and the opposition and threats of worldly French ecclesiastics, induces Gregory XI. to return to Rome, the proper seat of St. Peter. She counsels him as if he had been her own son, and he listens to her as an obedient child listens to a revered and beloved mother. And, in fact, says the historian, "her whole life seemed one continued miracle; but

what the servants of God admired most in her was the perpetual, strict union of her soul with God, for, though obliged to converse with different persons on so many different affairs and transact business of the greatest moment, she was always occupied on God and absorbed in Him." She was often in ecstasy, and obtained innumerable extraordinary answers to prayer. And the candid reader will be struck with the manifest perfect authenticity of the original documents from which these facts were derived. They are not lost in a "dim" antiquity. St. Catharine had a numerous following, and the familiar correspondence, as well as the biographical sketches, of the various members of her community, are extant, and these letters, especially her own, amounting to several hundreds, let us into the very secrets of her daily life. Those extraordinary events are alluded to by the various writers in the most familiar, commonplace, matter-of-fact manner. We seem for the time to be living with them, and even to be participating in those deeply interesting and absorbing scenes. Especially do we contemplate with wonder and admiration the grand central figure around whom revolve innumerable satellites, attracted by her extraordinary sanctity, and ready and glad to do her bidding, while she, conscious of her own weakness, always deprecates their praise, and strives, by every means in her power, to avoid notoriety and humble herself as the servant of all. Recognizing fully the hand of God in all the extraordinary events of which she is made such a conspicuous actor, and afraid of the least shadow of an impulse to vainglory, she practices the most extraordinary voluntary humiliations, spends long hours in prayer, and is admitted to the most intimate communion of the beloved of her soul, where, like St. Paul, rapt to the third heaven, she is permitted to see and hear what it is not lawful for man to utter.

It is said, and with perfect truth, that the continued existence and progress of the Church, notwithstanding all the scandals from within, and all the opposition of the world, the flesh and the devil from without, is the greatest of all miracles. So, with equal truth may it be said that the lives of the great saints of the Church, the succession of whom never dies out, are a perpetual miracle, and, therefore, a standing and irrefragable proof of the supernatural character of the Church and of her divine mission. And this, no doubt, is one object and motive of their existence—to teach us by example, by actual, living, practical illustration, that this world is not all, that there is "more beyond," that God has spoken to man, and that He still speaks. He has not withdrawn into infinite space, and left us to work out our destiny in darkness and despair. He continues to communicate with His creatures through His Church. Through her means and instrumentalities He imparts to them

spiritual graces and supernatural strength. He admits them to the secret *penetralia* of His sweet presence and communion; He endows them with extraordinary courage, and, in certain special cases, even with the power of working miracles, in fulfilment of the promise of the Great Head of the Church, "These signs shall follow them that believe. In my name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues. They shall take up serpents, and if they shall drink any deadly thing it shall not hurt them; they shall lay their hands on the sick, and they shall recover."

Now, it is a curious fact, that notwithstanding the strong prejudice to which we have alluded in the first part of this article, our Protestant friends, who occasionally stray into our churches, are very much impressed with the solemnity of Catholic worship. It may only be at a Low Mass where there is no preaching, little or no music, and no prayers in the vernacular; only a distant echo of the softly murmuring voice of the officiating Priest, as, with absorbed recollection and in solemn stillness, he offers up the Holy Sacrifice—the Divine Victim—on the Altar; even so, entirely new and strange and unaccustomed as all the services are, and contrary to all their experience and preconceived notions as to what is proper for the worship of Almighty God, and the true service of religion, somehow there is a mysterious awe, an apparent, deeply-felt, all-pervading presence of holiness and devotion manifest in the countenances and deportment of the worshippers, that takes deep hold of their minds and hearts, so that, when they go away, they are ready to exclaim with the patriarch of old, "Surely, God is in this place, and I knew it not." And, notwithstanding the Puritan predilection in favor of what they call the simplicity of devotion, that taste that professes to prefer "the little wooden meeting-house, painted white, with green blinds," and the brief *ex tempore* prayers, though long enough sometimes in all conscience, without form, or ceremony, or external adornment, it is found that when the more candid and thoughtful of our non-Catholic friends enter one of our magnificent churches, especially our grand cathedrals, and participate in the splendid ceremonial accompanying the offering of the Holy Sacrifice, or it may be at Vespers, or only a grand procession, as on *Corpus Christi*, or a festival in honor of some great saint of the Calendar, their faith, or rather their prejudices, become greatly shaken. They cannot help feeling and acknowledging the superior power of accessories, so beautiful, so grand, and so admirably adapted to impress the imagination, to affect the heart, and, in a word, to influence the whole man with the most profound and elevated feelings of devotion. The recent testimony of the distinguished conservative Unitarian minister of Boston, Rev. James Freeman Clarke, D.D., is but the ex-

pression of the feeling of thousands of visitors to our churches, more especially of travellers abroad entering our grand old Cathedrals. "How imposing are these Catholic Churches! What beauty and majesty in their vast proportions and lovely details! One cannot doubt that this atmosphere of worship suits the mood and calms the excitement of great multitudes. As we enter these solemn aisles, a sense of religion enters the soul. We drop our cares, our desires, and for a few moments feel the presence of eternity. Everything looks upward, everything turns to God. . . . . While we feel this influence, we forget papal infallibility, the doctrine of transubstantiation, the sacraments, and think of nothing in dispute. The Catholic Church represents the element of worship latent in every soul, and represents and serves it so well that it retains its hold on millions."

As Mr. Clarke is a Unitarian minister, we could not, of course, expect him to entertain, for a moment, the suspicion that perhaps, after all, this old Catholic Church is the true home of the soul, and that her teaching and her discipline, as well as her devotional system, are equally adapted to all. Or, if the suspicion did enter his mind, as, we cannot deny, would be most natural, and as, in fact, we fear it too often does enter the minds of unwilling observers, we could hardly expect him to give any intimation of it. It was certainly no small concession on his part to acknowledge so frankly the profound religious impression and the admirably soothing and elevating influence of the devotional system of the Church; and, we must acknowledge, it was with a still greater stretch of liberality that he declared that "when the deeper and larger religion comes it must retain all that is good in this Church." But we confess it is with profound melancholy that we reflect, not only upon the ignorance of such otherwise intelligent men as Mr. Clarke, as to the depth and largeness of the Catholic Church, but also upon that fatuitous blindness that leads them to resist the entrance of light when it shines upon them like the light of the sun in the heavens. Mr. Clarke prays, with apparent sincerity, that the day of the "deeper and larger religion," of which he dreams, "may dawn soon." We cannot but pray with all our hearts that he, and all who think and feel with him, may, in God's good time, be endowed with that heavenly gift of faith which shall open up to them the vision of the "King's daughter who is all glorious within, whose clothing is of wrought gold," and under the folds of whose garments alone they can find that rest and peace, and that high spiritual communion for which they so ardently seek and sigh.

We cannot close without noticing an objection which is most intimately associated with the prejudice against the Church on

account of its supposed tendency to formalism, which we are endeavoring to combat. We refer to the impression, so common among Protestants, that devotion to the saints, and especially devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary, has a tendency to deaden true devotion in the hearts of Catholics by drawing them away from the great central source of light and grace, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Now it is a remarkable fact that, at the very moment that this objection is made, Protestants almost universally are losing faith in Jesus Christ as the true Son of God and in the efficacy of His atonement, and consequently devotion to Him; while, on the other hand, the Catholic Church is making the most strenuous efforts to revive and increase devotion to Jesus as our only and all-sufficient Saviour, "the chief among ten thousand, the one altogether lovely." We refer particularly to that most striking development of modern times, the spread of the "Confraternity of the Sacred Heart of Jesus," which was established for the express purpose of reviving in the hearts of Catholics a more ardent love and devotion to Jesus. Why devotion to the Sacred *Heart* of Jesus? Because the heart is the seat of the affections, and the originators of the devotion desired to draw out the hearts and affections of the people by an irresistible appeal from the loving Heart of Jesus. It was designed on purpose to impress upon an age when the love of many had waxed cold, what Our Lord Himself so emphatically taught, "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father who is in heaven." That will is, that we should love His son Jesus Christ, and hence this devotion is particularly designed to interest the heart and engage the affections. Let any of our non-Catholic friends take up the devotions to the Sacred Heart which so greatly abound in the Church, and read them carefully, and he will be surprised to see how completely they disprove all his preconceived notions about the obscurantism of the Church in reference to her supreme devotion to Jesus the Saviour. He will be surprised at the wealth and variety of the devotions, as if pious ingenuity had been on the stretch to invent the most attractive forms, and those most calculated to appeal to the heart and captivate the affections. And when he is told that there is no more popular devotion in the church at the present time; that it has spread throughout the whole world; that Confraternities have been established in almost every known nation on the face of the earth, he will, perhaps, be prepared to believe that devotion to the saints has not quite extinguished devotion to Jesus in the hearts of the Catholic people.

And why should it? Why should devotion to Mary lessen devotion to Jesus? Why should the love of the mother weaken

our attachment to her divine Son? Devotion to Mary is simply the worship of Jesus in the arms of His blessed mother. We love her, indeed, for her own sake, because we believe her to be the fairest of the daughters of men,—nay, immaculate and transcendently beautiful and lovely beyond the power of conception. But we love and reverence her chiefly because she is the mother of Jesus,—the mother of God. Jesus took His body from her immaculate flesh; He is bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh; and we reverence her as the greatest and the purest and the holiest of human beings. But we love her in Jesus and for Jesus, and we love Him in her. In the mind of the devout Catholic the two are inseparably associated by the most tender and endearing ties, and there is not the slightest danger of mistaking the relative position of each. Instead of repressing devotion to Jesus, the love of Mary adds a thousand charms to that devotion. And hence it has always been true in the history of the Church that the greatest saints have been the most devoted to Mary, and that devotion to Mary may be taken as a very good indication of the spiritual condition—the zeal and fervor of Christians—in any part of the Church. Oh! it is sad to think how much our separated brethren lose by their groundless prejudices against devotion to the blessed mother of God, though it is a cheering sign that in the English Church, at least, they have begun to discover the great mistake that was made by their ancestors in discarding this beautiful, attractive, and edifying devotion. The advanced Ritualists have actually established "Confraternities of the Children of St. Mary," and they have issued a manual of devotion, taken principally from our own Catholic manuals. They recommend the saying of the Angelus thrice daily, after the Franciscan form; the Rosary; the Litany of Loretto (with indulgences of Popes Sixtus V. and Boniface XIII.!); the *Salve Regina* and the *Sub tuum præsidium*, as well as various other Catholic prayers "in honor of the immaculate heart of Mary." Of the consistency and even honesty of introducing such a devotion into the Protestant English Establishment we are not called upon now to speak. But it is certainly a very remarkable indication of the progress of religious thought, and the revulsion from the old Protestant tradition, which seems to be going on everywhere and all around us. These Ritualists are no doubt excellent people. They are said to embrace the most earnest and zealous portion of the English Church. They have, of course, discovered that there is absolutely no incompatibility between devotion to Mary and devotion to Jesus. And we cannot but express the hope that the day is not far distant when this grand discovery will be made by all who are so unhappy as to be outside the true fold, and that they will not be satisfied with vain efforts

to establish the devotion in societies which for the last three hundred years have denounced and protested against it, but be led to cast in their lot with those who have always cherished it, as well as all else that is beautiful and lovely and of good report,—that grand old Church, which is the true Israel of God, and to which "belong the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the service of God and the promises, of whom Christ Jesus is the Head,—God over all, blessed forevermore. Amen!"

BOOK NOTICES.

THE REFORMATION. By *George P. Fisher, D.D.*, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

The Protestant public, for which this book is intended, cares very little what the Reformation was or was not. The "right of Private Judgment"—which Professor Fisher declares was but "another side" of the doctrine of the "Reformers," that "Christ spoke in the Scriptures," and that "the truth He uttered was one of which they (the Reformers) had an immediate spiritual recognition"—has now been so far and so logically carried out by Protestants that, with a few exceptions, they care as little about what the "Reformers" said and wrote as they do about the doctrines of the Church Fathers. They regard the Reformers and worship them simply as the representatives of the principle of "free-thought," and beyond that they have little concern either as to their opinions, their motives, their real character, or their actions. This same indifference, too, exists as to the real causes, objects, and nature of the so-called "Reformation." Non-Catholics commonly accept, without investigation or reflection, the Protestant traditional statement that it was a movement which has resulted in the purification and elevation of society, the promotion of civil liberty and of intellectual progress, the general diffusion of knowledge and the advancement of civilization, etc. Accepting this as an historical fact, they are unwilling or intellectually incompetent to go behind it and investigate whether it is supported by proof or not.

For these reasons we think that Professor Fisher's work, when first issued from the press a few years ago, received but little attention, except from persons who were in search of a convenient text-book for non-Catholic academies and colleges, or a work of reference for Protestant ministers. But now it is likely to secure more general attention from its connection with subjects which have been again brought into discussion through the recent celebration, by Protestants and Rationalists, of the four hundredth anniversary of Luther's birth, followed by a more restricted and less prominent celebration of the same anniversary of the birth of Ulric Zuingli.

In the volume before us Protestants of the "advanced" "Liberal" type and also Rationalists will find just what they want. But Protestants who still cling to the idea that Episcopalianism, or Presbyterianism, or some other particular "ism" is the purer, if not the purest, form of Christianity will be displeased with Professor Fisher's "breadth" of views, and still more with many of the admissions he makes on various pages of his work. His portraitures of Calvin and Calvinism particularly, though he has done his utmost to soften down their bigotry, arrogance and narrow exclusiveness, will not be agreeable reading to the admirers of the French-Swiss "Reformer" and the ideas to which he gave systematic form. Yet in fact Professor Fisher has labored to make the strongest apology for the "Reformation" that could be framed; and, in the prosecution of his undertaking, has brought to his task unquestioned ability, learning, and skill. With a prudence which shows that he is fully aware of the difficulty of the task he has set himself to perform, and the countless historical facts which oppose his claim that the "Reformation" conferred upon society the benefits he claims that it has conferred, he endeavors in advance to evade the force of those facts, and to free himself from the charge of *suppressio veri*, by stating in a note that the effects which are ascribed to the "Reformation," "are not credited to the *dogmatic system* of Protestantism exclusively, but to the Protestant religion taken comprehensively"—to the "genius and spirit of Protestantism." In the same note he says: "The Church of the Middle Ages, I do not consider a 'mitigated evil,' but an incalculable benefit to society. What is said of the Papacy should not be understood of the Church—the organized, collective influence of Christianity. But even the Papacy, as is shown, was in the mediæval period, in many respects, a beneficent institution."

These qualifications and concessions along with countless others that will be found in the body of Professor Fisher's work are not made with any intention of raising doubts as to the justifiability of the "Reformation," or of underrating the benefits he believes it conferred, but for the purpose of more effectively defending it and eulogizing it. He looks upon the Church as having no divinely given constitution or authority, but simply as a natural outgrowth of Christian thought and feeling in each age and country, taking to itself such form as Christians at any time or in any place choose to give it; and that all authority in the Church and all its officers have their origin in and owe their existence only to the common will and consent of the individuals who make up its membership.

Hence, along with Macaulay, and Guizot and other Rationalists or "Liberal" Protestants, Professor Fisher can admit in perfect consistency with his idea—what few Protestants of the "orthodox" "evangelical" school are willing to admit—that the Papacy was the chief instrumentality for conquering ancient heathenism, as well as the barbarism which subsequently inundated Europe; for reducing society to order, educating, elevating and purifying it. The Papacy in Professor Fisher's mind is simply a human institution useful for a time, and up to a certain stage of human progress, but which became useless and obsolete as society advanced. Accordingly, Professor Fisher treats the Papacy not (as traditionary Protestantism regards it) as "a corruption of primitive Christianity," foisted upon the Church in the fifth and subsequent centuries, but as the natural outgrowth of the circumstances in which Christians found themselves during the first ages of Christianity. He quotes from St. Irenæus in proof that "even as early as the latter part of the second century, the Church had passed into the condition of a visible

organized commonwealth," with Bishops "extending their jurisdiction over dependent churches," and the officers of the Church "assuming the position of a distinct order, which is placed above the laity, and is the appointed medium of conveying to them grace," and "the conception of a priesthood attaching itself to the Christian ministry."

In proof of the progress which this "process" had made, Professor Fisher refers to St. Irenæus "uttering the famous dictum that where the Church is—meaning the visible body of its clergy and sacraments—there is the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church. To be cut off from the Church is to be separated from Christ. The Church is the door of access to him."

So, too, Professor Fisher refers to "the importance" that then was ("*began to be*," is his manner of stating the fact) "attached to tradition," and mentions that Saint Irenæus and Tertullian, in defending Christianity "against Gnostical corruptions, naturally fell back on the historical evidence afforded by the presence and testimony of the leading churches which the Apostles themselves had planted," directing the inquirer to "go to Corinth, Ephesus, Rome, to the places where the Apostles had taught, and ascertain whether the novel speculations of the time could justly claim the sanction of the first disciples of Christ, or had been transmitted from them." He also says that "the pre-eminence of Rome as the custodian of traditions" is what St. Irenæus "means to assert in a noted passage in which he exalts that Church;" and that "the unity of the Church, this great visible society of Christians, was realized in the unity of the sacerdotal body.

"It was natural," Professor Fisher goes on to say, "to seek and find a head for the body. And where should it be found except at Rome, the capital of the world, the seat of the principal Church, where, as it was generally and perhaps truly believed, Peter and Paul had perished as martyrs? After Peter came to be considered the chief of the Apostles, and when, near the close of the second century, the idea was suggested and became current that Peter had been bishop of the Roman Church, a strong foundation was laid in the minds of men for the recognition of the primacy of that Church and its chief Pastor."

These statements and admissions by Professor Fisher (qualified and partial as they are) of incontestable facts of history, will not be welcome to those Protestants who still hold on to the Protestant traditional notion that the "Reformation" was a restoration of Christianity to its pristine purity, and that the Papacy and Episcopacy and Priesthood with all the ideas, functions, and offices inseparably connected with them, are simply corruptions of ancient Christianity. Yet it is the only possible ground that can be taken to defend the Reformation without utterly falsifying or ignoring the plain testimony of history as to what the Church actually was in the age of the Council of Nice and in the preceding century. Professor Fisher's theory is an easier one to maintain in view of the facts of history than the common traditional one of Protestants. It has fewer historical difficulties to contend with, inasmuch as it admits the existence of the Papacy, and of the hierarchical system of which it is the head, at a much earlier period than Protestants usually acknowledge it to have existed. His idea, too, that the Papacy was both a natural and a legitimate outgrowth of the circumstances in which the early Christians were placed, has a plausibility about it which the theory that it was a corruption, a cunningly devised system of tyranny, does not possess.

But while thus avoiding some difficulties, by the adoption of this rationalistic idea of the Church, Professor Fisher encounters others which he seems not to have thought of. His idea is that "the enlargement of

the jurisdiction of bishops," and the "extension of it over dependent churches in the neighborhood of the towns," began in the second century, and that from this naturally grew the idea of investing the Bishop of Rome with the authority and powers of the Primacy. So, too, the appeal to "tradition as an authoritative tribunal for settling all questions of doctrine, grew out of the controversies which the early Christians had to carry on with the Gnostics and other ancient heretics."

Here, however, other historical facts confront Professor Fisher. He is acquainted with what Tertullian and Saints Cyprian and Irenæus say of Bishops and the Priesthood and the Church of Rome, and quotes them in support of his theory; but yet he fails to mention the fact that what they say on these subjects they say not as expressing their own personal ideas or ideas that had grown up in the Church, but as the universal belief and faith of Christians from the days of the Apostles. Strange that Professor Fisher should overlook this telling and significant fact. In like manner Professor Fisher strangely stops short in his search for historical proof to support his theory. That theory, to state it briefly yet substantially, is, that at first the different churches were entirely independent of each other and purely democratic in government; that they each elected their own officers, and invested them with such powers as each "body of disciples" choose; that in these elections "the body of disciples" had a controlling voice, although, "as long as the Apostles lived, their suggestions or appointments would naturally be accepted." But by the force of circumstances, according to Professor Fisher, this system very soon "naturally" *grew* (strange growth) into just an opposite system—that of an ecclesiastical hierarchy with the Bishop of Rome at its head and its centre of unity.

But here some other historical difficulties confront Professor Fisher and his theory. Growth, however rapid, implies stages and a certain amount of time, long or short. Professor Fisher limits the time for this growth of the Apostolic churches into the beginning of an entirely opposite system of thought, belief, and church organization to less than a hundred years; that is to the period between the first century of Christianity (the Apostolic age) and "the latter part of the second century." Yet even this will not do. Why should Professor Fisher, who surely must know of the existence of certain extant writings of Saints Ignatius and Polycarp and Clement of Rome, not have looked into their writings to see what evidences they contained of this theory of rapid but gradual and "natural" growth theory of different churches into one Church, and of all of them into an entirely opposite idea and system from that on which they started? It would be discourteous to Professor Fisher to suggest that he did not examine or refer to the writings mentioned, because they do not support his theory. Yet it certainly seems so. Saints Ignatius and Polycarp unquestionably exercised what Professor Fisher calls "enlarged jurisdiction over dependent churches," and exercised it not as conceded by the "body of disciples" through force of circumstances, but as of divine appointment. They were the immediate disciples of the Apostles, learned the Christian doctrine from their lips, and yet they used strange language, indeed, for Bishops who had recently "enlarged" and "extended" their "jurisdiction" by the consent of "the body of the disciples." "Take heed that ye do not set up yourselves against your Bishop, that ye *may be subject to God.*" "Hearken unto the Bishop that *God may hearken unto you,*" etc. St. Clement, Bishop of Rome, also learned his doctrine from the lips of the Apostles, and was contemporary during part of his life with Saints Peter and Paul, and during all of it with St. John. He, too, has left at least one authentic epistle—

that sent to the Christians at Corinth in answer to their request for his interposition to settle their disputes. In that letter (written while St. John was still living at Ephesus), St. Clement uses still stronger language than St. Ignatius, and strange for one whose office was dependent on the good pleasure of "the body of the disciples;" language that would be insufferably supercilious and insolent, if addressed to an independent society of Christians at Corinth over which he had no authority. The dispute he was requested to settle arose chiefly out of opposition to some of the Priests at Corinth. He tells those who opposed them that Priests and Bishops were their ecclesiastical superiors appointed by the Apostles who, taught by Christ, provided for a perpetual succession of those officers in the Church. He then adds: "Ye, therefore, that laid the foundation of this sedition, submit yourselves; . . . learn to submit yourselves, laying aside the arrogant and proud stubbornness of your tongue;" with much more to the same purpose.

These still earlier historical evidences of the visible compact unity of the Church and of an organized hierarchy which based its authority not on the consent of local "societies" of Christians over which they exercised jurisdiction, Professor Fisher does not even allude to. It would have embarrassed him had he done so. For they completely upset his theory; leaving no time whatever for scattered, independent, ecclesiastical democracies to *grow* into a compact unity ruled over by an organized hierarchy with the Bishop of Rome at its head.

When we pass on through Professor Fisher's work, we find a like method employed. Inconvenient facts are omitted or thrust into an obscure corner of the background of his pictures, while those which fall in with his ideas are arranged so as best to suit his purpose. His skill, too, in what we may be allowed to style inverted perspective resembles Hogarth's, though, unlike his, it is employed not for a humorous, but for a serious purpose. In its effects it reminds us of the magic spell described in the "Lay of the Last Minstrel:"

> "It had much of glamour might
> To make a lady seem a knight;
> The cobwebs on a dungeon wall
> Seem tapestry in lordly hall;
> A nutshell seem a gilded barge,
> A sheeling seem a palace large,
> And youth seem age, and age seem youth;—
> All was delusion, nought was truth."

This skill of Professor Fisher shows itself particularly in his descriptions of the lives and characters of the "Reformers," and the fanaticism, lawlessness, and immoralities of their followers. Acknowledging that the "Reformers" were not "without grave faults and infirmities," and bringing to view some of their minor failings, he omits all mention of and thrusts out of view their glaring breaches of morality and of the precepts of Christianity. He paints them, if not as saints, yet as devout strictly conscientious Christian men of heroic mould. In like manner the countless variations and contradictions of their doctrines are skilfully obscured. In the chapters on the relation of Protestantism to "literature," "civilization," "religion," and "culture," whatever good he finds in modern society he attributes to Protestantism; and whatever evil, to causes disconnected with it.

As might be expected from Professor Fisher's "liberal" sentiments as regards religion, his work has little of a polemical character, and makes many concessions, or seeming concessions, in favor of the Cath-

olic Church and the Papacy, which Protestants commonly are unwilling to make.

Persons who desire a skilful defence of the "Reformation," after the method known among lawyers as "confessing and avoiding" facts, will find it in this volume; those who wish to learn the true nature, character, and effects of that movement, will turn its pages to no purpose.

THE WORKS OF ORESTES A. BROWNSON. Collected and Arranged by Henry F. Brownson. Vol. V.: Containing "The Convert," and the first part of the writings in defence of the Church. Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, Publisher. 1884.

The volume before us is in some respects the most important of all the volumes of the series of republished writings of Dr. Orestes A. Brownson that has yet appeared. Unless we are greatly mistaken, it is the one that will be most interesting to the general public. The first third of the volume is occupied with a republication of *The Convert, or, Leaves from My Own Experience*, in which the wanderings, religious convictions, and experience of Dr. Brownson in search of the truth, the manner in which he at last found it and was led to embrace it, are narrated with remarkable clearness and with equally remarkable simplicity and candor.

A narrative of any person's strivings to escape from error, of his mistakes and the manner in which he discovered and escaped from them, and of the way by which at last he arrived at a certain knowledge of the truth, scarcely ever fails to interest, if the writer possesses sufficient powers of analysis and description to make his narrative clear and consistent. And the interest is greatly increased when it is a history of the internal struggles, opinions, and convictions of one who, by his vigor and energy of thought and action, was a leader of men, and occupied a most prominent place in the public mind.

It is this, that apart from its charming style, makes Newman's *Apologia pro vita sua* so attractive a book, and Dr. Brownson's *Convert, or Leaves from My Experience*, reminds us of it, though entirely different in method, style, and immediate object.

Dr. Brownson's religious experience, till he found light and rest in the Communion of the Church, was a very varied and eventful one. From earliest boyhood religion engrossed his thoughts; and this not as a matter of speculation chiefly, but of personal practical interest and concern. Unbaptized, placed at six years of age with an aged couple, plain, upright, strictly moral persons, who had been brought up in New England Congregationalism, but had no particular religion and seldom went to meeting, he "was taught to be honest, to owe no one anything but good-will, to speak the truth, never to tell a lie or take what was not his own, to keep the Sabbath, and never let the sun go down upon his wrath." He was taught the shorter Presbyterian Catechism, the Lord's prayer, and a short evening prayer in rhyme:

> "Now I lay me down to sleep,
> I pray the Lord my soul to keep;
> If I should die before I wake,
> I pray the Lord my soul to take."

The Sacred Scriptures formed the chief part of his reading, much of which he had committed to memory before he was fourteen years old. The simple history of the Passion of our Lord as given by the holy Evangelists affected him deeply, and was a constant subject of meditation. Sometimes he seemed to hold familiar conversations with Him. Sometimes, too, he seemed to have "spiritual intercourse with the

Blessed Virgin Mary and the holy Angel Gabriel who announced to her that she was to be the mother of the Redeemer." He preferred to be alone and "feel that he was in the presence of Jesus and Mary and the holy angels;" yet he had received very little instruction, except such as he had obtained from reading the Sacred Scriptures.

They had marked him at this early age as he was, unbaptized as he was, and living in the midst of a mixed population of Congregationalists, Methodists, Baptists, Universalists, and Christ-ians. He seldom attended their meetings, for all he "learned from either of them was that he must be born again or go to hell, get religion or be damned." The more he "listened to them the more he feared hell, and the less he loved God. Love gave place to terror." Yet he "tried to get religion, and almost made up his mind to submit to the Methodists."

From this he was saved by the advice of an elderly woman who was living in great poverty in a hut on one corner of the farm owned by the persons by whom young Brownson was brought up. She was a woman of great intelligence, who had seen better days, had been well educated, and preserved her self-respect, dignity, and refinement, despite her destitution. Brownson made known to her his perplexities, fears, and distress. She made this remarkable reply to him (a boy just twelve years old)—remarkable for a Protestant:

"My poor boy, God has been good to you, and has no doubt gracious purposes towards you. He means to use you for purposes of His own, and you must be faithful to His inspirations. But go not to the Methodists or any of the sects. They are New Lights and not to be trusted. The Christian religion is not new, and Christians have existed from the time of Christ. These New Lights are of yesterday. You yourself know the founder of the Christ-ian sect, and I myself knew personally both George Whitfield and John Wesley, the founders of Methodism. Neither can be right, for they came too late, and have broken off, separated from the body of Christians who subsisted before them. When you join any body calling itself a Christian body, find out and join one that began with Christ and his Apostles, and has continued to subsist the same without any change of doctrine or worship down to our own times. You will find the true religion with that body, and nowhere else. Join it, obey it, and you will find rest and salvation. But beware of sects and New Lights; they will make you fair promises, but in the end will deceive you to your own destruction."

These words made a deep impression on the boy Brownson. The argument was one which only a Catholic can consistently make, yet it was constantly in the mouths of the old Puritans as an unanswerable objection to other sects. The old Puritans retained a conception of the Church of Christ. They held that Christ had himself founded a Church, established its order, given to it its ordinances, and taught that it was necessary to belong to it to be saved. They claimed that *they* were the genuine, true successors of the Apostles. The loose notions of the Church, the humanitarianism, and transcendentalism now rife among their descendants, were unknown to them.

Thus Brownson was preserved, for the time being, from joining a Protestant sect. At the age of fourteen, he was thrown upon the world, "into the midst of new and strange scenes, and exposed to new and corrupting influences." He fell in with all kinds and classes of sectaries and "nothingarians." Yet, he still held fast to his belief in his need of religion, though his "young head became confused" with the contradictory opinions he heard advanced, and with the doubts and denials to which he listened.

"For a time" his "mind was darkened," and he "was half-persuaded that all religion was a delusion—the work of priestcraft or statecraft." He "was in a labyrinth, and there was no Ariadne's clue to guide" him "out to the light of day." He felt that his own reason was insufficient to guide him, and the more he attempted by it alone to arrive at truth, the more uncertain and perplexed he became.

One day, when he was about nineteen years of age, he casually went into a Presbyterian meeting-house. The sermon was a commonplace one, to which he paid little attention, but the singing and some of the other exercises deeply affected him, "even unto tears." After he went out of the meeting-house, he began to commune with himself:

"I have done my best to find the truth, to experience religion, to lead a religious life, yet here I am without faith; I know not what to believe; I know not what to do. . . . Was I not told at the outset that if I followed my own reason, it would lead me astray, that I should lose all belief, and find myself involved in universal doubt and uncertainty? I did not believe what these people said, and yet were they not right? They were. They told me to submit my reason to revelation. I will do so. I am incapable of directing myself. I must have a guide. I will hear the Church. I will surrender, abnegate my own reason, which hitherto has only led me astray, and make myself a member of the Church, and do what she commands me."

Accordingly, he went to see the Presbyterian minister, and told to him and to the Session of his church "his experience," and was baptized and received into the Presbyterian "communion." He did not ask whether the Presbyterian Church was the true Church or not, for the church question had not yet been fairly raised in his mind, and, as the Presbyterian Church claimed to be the true Church, he was satisfied, for the moment. "What it believed," he says, "was of little consequence, since I had resolved to abnegate my own reason, and take the Church for my guide."

His conclusion was logical, but his premises were wrong. In submitting his reason to a fallible guide, he indeed abnegated it, as he soon discovered. Had it been an infallible authority, his act would have been entirely and in the highest degree reasonable. Accordingly, he almost immediately was disappointed. "I had joined the Church," he says, "because I had despaired of myself, and because, despairing of reason, I had wished to submit to authority. If the Presbyterian Church had satisfied me that she had authority, was authorized by Almighty God to teach and direct me, I could have continued to submit; but, while she exercised the most rigid authority over me, she disclaimed all authority over me, and remitted me to the Scriptures and private judgment."

We have thus followed young Brownson with as much particularity as we could, yet as briefly as we could, till he landed in Presbyterianism, and found only disappointment and self-contradiction. Our object in this was to show how early in life and how strongly the conviction of a need of an infallible guide possessed him. *This* was the "Ariadne's clue" that guided him, without his knowing it, in all his meanderings, then and subsequently, through the labyrinth of error, and finally brought him out to the light of day. We would like to recount his description of the despotic tyranny exercised by Presbyterianism over him, while it at the same time disclaimed all legitimate right to direct him, and sent him to the Bible as his guide. He clearly though concisely states it, and the personal experience of the writer of this while a member of another Calvinistic sect fully confirms Brownson's state-

ment. Suffice it to say, that Brownson found no rest in Presbyterianism. He honestly strove to content himself with it. But he *could* not. It was then that the alternative was presented to his mind, which we personally know from personal sources of knowledge continually confronts thousands of Protestants, a few of them, from time to time, accepting the right alternative, more of them choosing the wrong, but the vast multitude refusing to take either and falling into a state of unconscious indifference, and really, though unconsciously, disbelieving in the existence of truth, or at least in the possibility of a personal certain apprehension of it.

It became clear to young Brownson that the Presbyterian Church "was not and could not be the Church of Christ," and that, if Christ had a Church on earth which He had founded, and which had authority to teach in His name, it was evidently the Roman Catholic Church. But this seemed to him, as once it seemed to the writer of this, and as it seems to thousands of Protestants, a *reductio ad absurdum*. "That Church, of course, was out of the question," says Brownson. "It was everything that was vile, base, odious, and demoralizing. It had been condemned by the judgment of mankind, and the thought of becoming a Roman Catholic found and could find no entrance into my mind. There was no alternative. It was the Catholic Church, or no church. All the so-called Protestant Churches were New Lights, were of yesterday, founded by fallible men, without any warrant from God, without any authority but their private interpretation of Scripture. I cannot accept any one of them as having any authority to teach or direct me. . . . They have no authority over my conscience, and no right to hold me amenable to them. Then, since I cannot be a Catholic, I must be a no-church man, and deny all churches, make war upon every sect claiming the slightest authority in matters of faith or conscience."

We cannot farther follow Brownson on his meandering way, as narrated clearly, frankly, and candidly in *The Convert*, through Universalism, Unitarianism, and different forms of Humanitarianism and Rationalism, until at last he found light and rest and peace, and the infallible guide and legitimate divine authority he had so long and painfully sought for, in the communion of the One, Holy, Catholic Church, —a guide and authority which did not tyrannize over his reason and seek to crush it, did not require him to abnegate it, but in requiring him to submit his reason to *faith* opened up the way to a higher exercise of it, and guided him in that way.

Dr. Brownson, it has been alleged, was fanciful, notionate, whimsical. To those who know of his many changes of opinion previous to his reception into the Catholic Church, but know not of their reasons and the logical connection between them, the charge seems true. Yet, in reality, it has no foundation whatever. As well charge a man in an unknown wilderness at night with a starless sky above him, with pursuing an erratic course. To those who wish to read the experience of a mind given honestly, heartily, and undividedly to the search for truth, *The Convert*, which occupies the first part of the volume before us, cannot fail to be intensely interesting. It is instructive, too, in the highest degree, in its keen, critical analysis of the various theories and systems, which Dr. Brownson successively took up with, tried, and discarded.

The remaining two-thirds of the volume are occupied with articles on subjects of primary importance, some of them elicited by attacks upon *The Convert*, and efforts to answer it. As a specimen of incisive, conclusive, and crushing, yet courteous retort, we know not

where a superior, or even an equal, can be found to the article entitled "The Princeton Review and The Convert," unless in Newman's *Apologia*, nor of earnest, kind expostulation than the "Letter to Protestants."

The other articles,—"The Church Against No Church," "Faith not Possible without the Church," "Liberalism and Catholicity," "The Great Question," and "Extra Ecclesiasm Nulla Salus," are on subjects of fundamental importance, and are treated with masterly ability.

La Vie de N. S. Jésus Christ. Par *l'Abbé E. Le Camus*, Docteur en Théologie, Directeur du Collège Catholique de Castelnaudary. 2 vols. 8vo. Paris: Poussielque Frères. 1883.

There have long been many lives of Christ in the French language, but, strange to say, there has not been, until the year 1883, a real history of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ written originally in that language. Excellent as works of piety and edification, these books have failed to meet the needs of our age of criticism and investigation, and the attacks of infidels against the divinity of Christ, and the real significance to Christians of His mission on earth. Such histories had already appeared in German and English, and some of these had been translated into French. But no great national work came from the press before that of the Abbé Le Camus.

It is no exaggeration to call this a great work. The fruit of twelve years assiduous study, it is in every way as complete and satisfactory a history as need be asked for, satisfying alike both the critical and the devout reader. The Bishop of Carcassonne, of whose Cathedral the author is a Canon, says, in a letter of commendation to him:

"In your preface you make so clear a statement of your plan and method as to enable your readers to perceive at once that it is not merely to the intellect you want to speak, but to the soul, and that you excel in bestowing warmth as well as light. You offer to the public an eloquent demonstration of the divinity of Jesus Christ, and at the same time a striking revelation of His incomparable grandeur of character, and infinite tenderness of heart.

"The man of learning, the unbeliever, the honest seeker after truth, will all derive profit from the study of your critical discussions, enlightened as they are by a thorough knowledge of scriptural interpretation, and whilst the theologian will be entirely satisfied with the soundness of your doctrine, which, moreover, has been humbly submitted by you on all points to the infallible judgment of the Holy See, the faithful will rapturously enjoy the delicious perfume of sweet piety which is exhaled by your book from very many of its pages. All will admire your full and graphic description of the manners of the Jewish people, and of the country in which our Saviour's life on earth was spent, making us almost imagine we are witnesses of the scenes and incidents described."

From the general character of the book as thus described by the author's ecclesiastical superior, we proceed to give an outline of its plan and arrangement of matter. An introduction of over seventy pages deals in general with the nature of Christ's mission, the records of it that have come down to us, and the manners and customs of the people chosen to be its living witnesses, as well as the topography or general physical character of their country. This is of itself a most valuable addition to the literature of the subject, and a worthy precursor to the great history that follows.

The body of the work is divided into three parts, treating respectively of the nativity and early life of Jesus Christ, His public life, and the close of His mission, namely: His death, resurrection, and glorious ascension. In the first part the author, following the example of the evangelists St. Mark and St. John, enters at once, as Horace advises, *in medias res.* The voice of the Baptist crying in the desert, and the promised appearance of the Messiah in Israel, form the subject of the first book, which is followed in the second by a retrospective history of the Promised One. The third is devoted to the immediate preparation for His mission.

The public life of the Saviour being the most important part of His history, occupies by far the largest space. Like the first and third parts, this also is subdivided into three books, representing three distinct periods, namely, that of general exploration, that of real constructive work in Galilee, and that of combat and struggle against opposition in Judea. This division the author deems preferable to that by years, as being less superficial, and more in harmony with the Gospel narratives, copying, indeed, the order followed by St. John. Were space at our disposal, we would enter into more details concerning this part of the work, in which so many disputed points are most ably treated and many difficulties of interpretation and concordance removed.

To the third part also, we can refer but too briefly. Naturally it should receive the most touching and pathetic treatment, for its subject is the close of a most wonderful existence. "The Divine victim," says Father Le Camus, "having fallen into the hands of His enemies, seems to go to sleep in death, only to wake up again to life, and sit forever in glory."

Each volume is furnished with a well-executed map, the one of Palestine, and the other of the city of Jerusalem.

On the whole, it is a work destined to take a very high rank, most likely a place of honor, among the most remarkable literary productions of this age. Our readers may judge of the spirit animating the author during his labors upon it, from the following paragraph at the close of the preface:

"O Jesus, while writing these lines, more than once did science, penetration, and exactness seem to fail me; but it appears to me that your love has never been wanting to me. Indeed it has made my sense of insufficiency the keener. I offer this work to you after having often prayed you to bless it. Entirely unworthy of you as it is, it appears to me full of good-will, and this is enough for your heart to accept it. May it make you better known, admired, and loved."

THE LIFE OF LADY FALKLAND, 1585–1639. By *Lady Georgiana Fullerton.* London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

The dates given above sufficiently indicate the period in history which this life comprises,—the latter part of the reign of Elizabeth of England, the whole of that of James I., and the first and middle parts of that of Charles I.,—a period of intense religious controversy, during the first part of which, too, the fires of persecution of Catholics were unextinguished, and during all of which the penal laws against Catholics remained unrepealed upon the statute-books of England.

Lady Falkland was the daughter of Sir Lawrence Tanfield, an eminent lawyer, subsequently a judge and Lord Chief Baron, a Protestant, who seems never to have had a doubt of the truth of his religion, but was virtuous and conscientious. His daughter from earliest years exhibited

signs of rare intelligence, and at an age at which most children are engaged in the amusements of the nursery was assiduous in studies which usually are prosecuted only in mature years. The love of study was an absorbing passion with her in childhood, and remained with her during all the vicissitudes of her eventful life. She became acquainted with the French, Spanish, and Italian languages, had a thorough knowledge of the Latin, and read Hebrew with facility. At the age of fifteen she was disposed of in marriage by her parents, and bestowed upon Sir Henry Cary, then Master of the Jewel-House of Queen Elizabeth. He had never seen her, nor she him, but her fortune suited his decayed circumstances. The consummation of her marriage was deferred for one year, during which time, and for some years afterwards, while Sir Henry was in Holland and France, returning to England occasionally, but paying little attention to his young wife, Lady Falkland was under the rule of her imperious and despotic mother-in-law. She continued her studies, though under great difficulties and subject to constant opposition. Yet at the same time she faithfully performed every duty of a wife and mother and mistress of a family. During this time she came to entertain serious doubts of her religion—Anglicanism. The first occasion of these doubts was her study of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Policy*. To use her own words, "it left her hanging in the air."

We refrain from further following the thread of the story. Suffice it to say that, after several years of struggling, examination, and prayer, amid difficulties and snares, opposition and persecution from every side and in various forms, she found her way into the communion of the Church. Then followed still fiercer trials and persecutions for a large part of her life on the part of her own relatives, and of her husband and mother-in-law. She was confined to a house assigned to her, without the means even of obtaining food. Her children were taken from her and educated under Protestant influences. After a time this persecution was relaxed and her children were restored to her. Yet, under all these circumstances Lady Falkland exhibited a wonderful degree of firmness, combined with gentleness, patience, and endurance. In the end she had the happiness of seeing six of the eleven children God gave to her embrace the true faith. Her four daughters became Religious, some of them eminent for their Christian virtues.

The hardships Lady Falkland endured, the eminent personages she met with, and some of whom she was intimate with, the different state of society of her age from that of our own, her remarkable gifts and virtues are well described in the volume before us, and constitute a most interesting biography.

In one respect, it is a tale of our own times. The absence of penal laws modifies the trials a convert to the Catholic faith must now endure. But, though their form is changed, their nature remains unchanged. Many a daughter, wife, and mother, who gives up the delusions of the sects and enters the true faith, will find in the history of Lady Falkland many resemblances to their own experience.

GOD THE TEACHER OF MANKIND; or Popular Catholic Theology, Apologetical, Dogmatical, Moral, Liturgical, Pastoral, and Ascetical; the Dignity, Authority, and Duties of Parents; Ecclesiastical and Civil Powers; their Enemy. By *Michael Müller, C.SS.R.* Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. Fr. Pustet & Co., New York and Cincinnati. B. Herder, St. Louis.

The volume before us, treating specially on "the dignity, authority, and duties of parents, ecclesiastical and civil powers," and their enemy, is the fifth of Father Müller's series of publications under the general

title of "God the Teacher of Mankind." The sub-title Father Müller has given his works—"Popular Catholic Theology"—well designates their general intention and character. They are designed for popular use, and as respects subjects discussed and elucidated, the manner of treating them, and the language in which Father Müller expresses himself, they are just what works intended for general reading should be, clear, simple and easy of comprehension, yet replete with weighty matter.

The volume before us treats of subjects of immediate practical importance, particularly in their relation to the prevailing errors and sins of our day. After exhibiting in several chapters the dignity and sacredness of the Family, and the mutual relations, rights and duties of its members, Father Müller shows in what true education consists, and then gives a number of excellent directions as to the education of the body, of the soul, education by Christian instruction, by vigilance over children, by training them to obedience, by punishment, by setting a good example to children, pointing out under each head how parents violate their duties as regards each of these points. With great force and clearness he insists on the duty of Catholics to send their children to Catholic schools, shows why Catholics cannot, without sin, send their children to godless schools, points out the evils of the public schools, and answers the objections of nominal Catholics and "moderate" Catholics. He then speaks of the duty of parents to assist their children in choosing a state of life, giving sound practical advice to those who are about to make the choice, and also advice to those who are about to enter into matrimony. He then speaks of mixed marriages, shows their evils, their unhappy consequences, and that they are opposed to the law of God and of the Church.

After elucidating these and many other kindred subjects, Father Müller takes up the subject of ecclesiastical authority, shows its extent and scope; that the Catholic Church has been invested with it by divine appointment, and what the Catholic Church has done for mankind. He then speaks of civil authority, showing its basis, design, and scope, and the duties of temporal rulers to their subjects, of masters to their servants, and the correlative duties of subjects and of servants.

He then shows what is the great enemy of all authority, divine and human. This he finds in Freemasonry. He shows what its real spirit, its chief object is; that it is in reality "an attempt to introduce heathenism practically into the world, to establish the church of Satan." He then points out the means by which it strives to accomplish this. These are: First, the destruction of secular governments; second, the overthrow of the Catholic Church; third, the spread of immoral and infidel principles through the press; fourth, infidel education.

Special chapters are given to an exhibition of American Freemasonry, and to showing that it is condemned by ex-Masons and by the Church.

Life of the Venerable Servant of God, Clement Maria Hofbauer, Vicar-General of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. By *Father R. P. Michael Haringer.* Translated into English by Lady Herbert. New York and Cincinnati: F. Pustet & Co., 1883.

"The Liguori of the North," as Father Clement Hofbauer was called, has found an excellent biographer in Father Haringer, the Consultor-General of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. Father Hofbauer was proclaimed Venerable by Pope Pius IX., on the 14th of May, 1876. This decree acknowledged the heroic nature of F. Hof-

bauer's virtues. It only remains to decide upon the miracles which God has wrought at the intercession of his servant, to prepare the way for his ultimate canonization. We feel confident that this life, so free from exaggeration, so calm and so thoroughly historical and accurate, will tend greatly to the glory of the Venerable Missionary, and, by awakening devotion to him, move God to crown him on earth with the sign of the halo, which he has in heaven,—that of saintship.

Father Clement was chosen by God to transplant and consolidate, north of the Alps, the work begun by St. Alphonsus in the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. He began his Apostolic ministry in 1785, two years before the death of St. Alphonsus. His career embraced the stormy and anarchical period of the French Revolution. He beheld the fall of the monarchy in France, the fearful excesses of the Reign of Terror, the birth of the Empire and its fall, the ruin of Poland, and the decadence of religion in Germany and elsewhere. Father Clement was indefatigable in preaching the faith, and in combating errors, and he endured the hardest trials in defence of the rights and liberties of the Church. He died in 1820, in his sixty-ninth year, after making a remarkable prediction of the spread of the Redemptorist Congregation. As an illustration of the fulfilment of this prediction, Lady Herbert gives a sketch of the extraordinary success of the Congregation in Great Britain and America, and the blessing which rested upon the labors of Father Frederick de Held, the founder of the English Province.

Incident to the life of Father Hofbauer, is a series of admirable sketches of the state of religion and society in Poland (1786), and in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. Austria is also well delineated in a few but firmly drawn lines. These historical sketches add great variety and interest to the biography of the saint. We have also his maxims on preaching and the care of souls, his predilections in devotions, particularly to the Blessed Sacrament and to our Lady, and many valuable hints and sayings which are peculiarly precious, as Father Faber declares, because they come from a saint.

There are also short and interesting notices of the remarkable men, whom Father Clement drew to the Congregation. One of these, Father F. W. Werner, a convert from Lutheranism, was a man of great ability, and an orator of extraordinary power. He and Father Clement almost alone converted Vienna to God, the one by his preaching, the other by the example of the highest virtue. An Appendix gives a number of documents, including the decrees of the Prussian government inimical to the Church. They show that the present anti-religious movement had its beginnings in the dawn of the century.

The Eternal Priesthood. By *Henry Edward, Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster*. New York: Catholic Publication Society, 1883.

Probably the chapter that will attract most attention in this admirable treatise upon the nature and duties of the Priesthood, is the fourth, which has for its thesis the obligation to sanctity in the sacerdotal state. "The notion of obligation," says Cardinal Manning, "has been so identified with laws, canons, vows, and contracts, that, if these cannot be shown to exist, no obligation is supposed to exist. It is true that all laws, canons, vows, and contracts lay obligations upon those who are subject to them. But all obligations are not by laws, nor by canons, nor by vows, nor by contracts." He quotes St. Alphonsus in support of the declaration that interior spiritual perfection is a

prerequisite condition to receiving sacred orders. This is the judgment of all the Fathers and Doctors with one voice. We call the special attention of our ecclesiastical readers to this point, as an impression prevails that only the Regular Clergy and the Episcopate are states of perfection, or, as some theologians express it, are bound *ex vi voti*, or *ex ordine*, to exercise spiritual perfection.

The work bears full evidence of the author's wide and intimate acquaintance with the practical duties of the missionary clergy. This gives the treatise an immense superiority over those manuals of the clergy which are written in the seclusion of monasteries or seminaries, by devout men who know little about the actual dangers and trials of the mission. Cardinal Manning has been in the midst of the battle for years, and his book is exactly adapted to the needs of priests exercising the sacred ministry in the world around them. The chapters on "The Priest's Dangers," "The Priest's Helps," and "The Priest as Preacher," are replete with practical advice and counsel.

Singular as it may seem, a great part of the books designed for the guidance of the clergy, consist of depressing homilies on the almost inevitable damnation, which follows upon the slightest relaxation or unbending of a high-strung rigor, which is set forth as the crowning grace of the priesthood. Men of a scrupulous turn are tortured by the impossible standard held up for their attainment, and, as such books find their way into the hands of the laity, a false impression spreads that a Catholic Priest should be of the same mould as a Puritan preacher of the Cromwellian era.

Cardinal Manning's book (particularly the chapter on "The Pastoral Office, a Source of Confidence," and "The Priest's Liberty") will prove most encouraging to all priests who wish to realize a lofty yet attainable ideal of their sacred office. It is on the ground of its strong common-sense, as well as its devotional fervor, that we recommend the work to the perusal of the laity.

"The Childen of the Golden Sheaf" is the title of Miss Eleanor C. Donnelly's latest volume of poems. There are thirty-nine of them, dedicated to the children of our Catholic schools, "at home and abroad," and they are, in themselves, a sweet and wholesome handful of ripe grains of truth. As usual, the title is well-chosen, graceful, musical, and awakening interest. The opening verses tell its story. At the door of a convent chapel there hangs

> "A little box, seal'd evermore,
> But, with a tiny cross pierc'd in its lid;"

and into it the children drop a grain of wheat "for every act of faith, of hope, of love," for every conquest of themselves, and every pain "endur'd to please Christ's loving heart above." When the box is filled, the grain is taken to the convent mills, and from its "snowy meal," are made the Hosts given to the children on First Communion Day. The happy little ones are called the "Children of the Golden Sheaf," and Miss Donnelly draws a beautiful picture of their possible future as the outgrowth of such a holy gleaning time. This poem is followed by many a favorite, where all are delicately pure and fervent. "The Legend of the Waxen Ciborium," "Pleading Hands," "The Sparrow in the Rain," "The Bee at the Altar," and "A Vision of St. Joseph," which closes the list, and is inscribed to Father Drumgoole, of St. Joseph's Union, New York, are each a gentle reminder and a persuasive lesson for old and young. Essentially for children are "The

Lay of the Easter Eggs" and "Minnie's Christmas Sermon." Miss Donnelly's easy flow of rhyme and rhythm are as delightful as ever, and the manner in which she still crystallizes into a holy thought each suggestion from the outer life is fitly exemplified by the two stanzas, "Like the Swallows."

"Across the ether's blue expanse,
To southern bowers swiftly hieing,
This autumn eve, with upward glance,
I watch a flock of swallows flying:
Till floating pinions migratory
Melt in the sunset's golden glory.

"E'en thus, my soul (I softly say),
When chill temptations o'er thee hover,
From frost of Fear, from Doubt's decay,
Oh! may'st thou flee to blissful cover:
And, like the swallows migratory,
Be lost to view in God's glad glory."

The poems are approved by the Very Rev. Dr. Walsh, Administrator of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, who says, in his letter to Miss Donnelly regarding the volume: "I recommend it highly to the readers of sacred poetry and song, and particularly to the children of Catholic schools." It is neatly and daintily gotten up, as it deserves, and is a creditable addition to Catholic literature.

THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF JESUS CHRIST. Gathered from the Four Gospels and Arranged for Meditation for Every Day of the Year. By *Nicholas Avancino*, of the Society of Jesus. In two volumes. London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

Father Avacino was one of the members of the Society of Jesus in the seventeenth century, whose whole life may be said to have been spent in arduous labors and good works for the benefit of souls. He was Professor of rhetoric and philosophy, and afterwards of theology, at Gratz, and subsequently at Vienna. Afterwards he governed several colleges as Rector, and the Austrian Province of the Society of Jesus as Provincial, besides discharging the duties of Visitor of Bohemia. Called to Rome in the latter part of his life to occupy the post of Assistant for the German Provinces of the Society, he died there at the age of seventy-four years.

The list of his various publications is a long one, but none of his other works have retained a popularity equal to that of his *Meditations*, of which the volumes before us are a translation. They were composed when Father Avancino was in the maturity of vigorous life, and have the advantage of being the production of large experience as well as of a mind perfectly trained and exercised in theological studies and also in the holy practice of daily meditation after the method of St. Ignatius. They seem to have been originally composed for the use of the members of the Society of Jesus. They are short and leave much to be done by the person who uses them for purposes of meditation. This is in accordance with the method of St. Ignatius, who always insisted on brevity in giving meditations for Retreats, so that the mind of the person making the meditation might be encouraged to exert itself, and form considerations, reflections, and resolutions of its own.

Yet as some persons complain of this brevity, as making such works dry, Father Avancino's "Meditations" have been enlarged both in France and Germany by additions derived from the famous works of Father Louis de la Puenta and other eminent writers. These additions have been retained in the English translation. Indeed, they are

so interwoven with the original text that it would now be difficult to remove them.

The arrangement of subjects in the work follows the course which the endeavor to comprise the whole of the Gospel history and the succession of Christian seasons and festivals requires. From Advent to the end of the Epiphany season the meditations are occupied with the Incarnaton and the Holy Infancy. The consideration of the Holy Passion begins with Septuagesima Sunday. The weeks between Easter and Whit-Sunday are given to the mysteries of the Resurrection, the Forty Days, Ascension, and Pentecost. The weeks immediately after Pentecost are devoted to the Ever-Blessed Trinity and the Blessed Sacrament; the remainder of the year is given to considering the Public Life of our Lord.

SHORT SERMONS FOR THE LOW MASSES OF SUNDAY. Comprising in Four Series a Methodical Exposition of Christian Doctrine. By the *Rev. F. X. Schoeppe, S. J.* Translated from the French, with the Permission of the Author, by the Rev. Edward Th. McGinley. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1883.

The necessity for plain and pithy sermons or instructions on points of Christian doctrine and Christian duties is daily becoming greater. Vast numbers of Catholics no longer attend the High Mass and hear the regular sermon preached at that service. They usually attend only the Low Masses, and the only opportunity the Priest has of speaking to them from the Altar is at those Masses. Unless, therefore, some brief plain instruction is given at those times, a large proportion of the laity will know very little about religion or the duties it imposes.

The work before us is intended to assist Clergymen in meeting this exigency. The sermons are very brief, requiring only from five to seven minutes for delivery. Yet they are full of solid matter logically arranged, clearly and pointedly expressed, and pervaded with a fervid holy unction. The four series which the volume comprises form a complete course of moral instruction, and also of dogmatic, so far as the latter is connected with the former. Taken together, they contain clear and full explanations of the Apostle's Creed and its dependent tenets, of the Ten Commandments, the Six Precepts of the Church, the Sacraments, the Feasts and Ceremonies of the Church, and of the Last Four Things.

They are not dry skeletons of sermons, but concise, pithy, fervid discourses. They will be useful to the laity as edifying reading, as well as an assistance of great value to those of the clergy whose other pressing duties allow them no time for the preparation of such discourses,—a work of far greater difficulty than to compose a lengthy sermon.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE LIFE OF THE VENERABLE FATHER CLAUDE DE LA COLOMBIÈRE, OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS. Abridged from the French Life by *Eugene Seguin, of the same Society*. London: Burns & Oates. 1883. (Quarterly Series, Fortieth Volume.)

MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS, AND HER MARRIAGE WITH BOTHWELL. Seven Letters to "The Tablet." Revised, with a preface and notes and a supplement. By *the Hon. Colin Lindsay*. London: Burns & Oates. Edinburgh: William Paterson. 1883.

BANES ET MOLINA, HISTOIRE, DOCTRINE, CRITIQUE METAPHYSIQUE. Par le P. *Th. de Regnon*, de la Compagnie de Jesus. Paris: H. Oudin & Cie. 1883.

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